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This study was completed in 1975-76. During that time I held a Na-
tional Endowment for the Humanities Senior Fellowship, which made 
it possible for me to take a leave of absence from my teaching duties 
at the University of California, Santa Cruz. I am grateful to the NEH 
for its support of my work. Some of the material included in this book 
has been published before. Chapter Three is a much revised version 
of my article "Kleist's Das Erdbeben in Chili," which first appeared in 
Publications of the English Goethe Society, NS 33 (1963), 10-55, and later 
as part of my book Narration in the Gennan Novelle: Theory and Interpre-
tation (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1974). Chapter Four is a 
somewhat revised version of "Kleist's 'Der Zweikampf; "Monatshefte, 
65 (1973), 48-60. Chapter Six takes a view of the play based on that of 
my monograph Kleist's "Prinz Friedrich van Homburg": A Critical Study 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970). (The 
reader is referred to that source for a much more extensive and de-
tailed study of the play than was possible within the confines of even 
this kind of consciously selective general account of Kleist.) In each 
case I have included some second thoughts, however, as well as some 
consideration of criticism that has appeared since the original dates of 
these three separate studies. My thanks are due to the English Goethe 
Society, the University of Wisconsin Press, and the University of 
California Press for kind permission to include this material in the 
present volume. I am very much indebted to the painstaking and 
shrewd scrutiny of my manuscript by the general editor of this series, 
Professor Siegfried Mews; his helpful suggestions concerning both 
substance and form of this book have much improved it. That one 
scholar should give so much of his time, skill, and energy to improv-
ing the work of another is an act of selfless generosity that is greatly 




It is important to explain what this book is, and what it is not. It is 
neither a standard comprehensive survey of Kleist's life and work nor 
simply a collection of essays on diverse aspects of Kleist. Its focus is 
on what I take to be the most central issue in criticism of Kleist, the 
essential character and meaning of his best and most mature work. To 
put the same point differently, I shall be concerned with what is 
characteristically and uniquely Kleistian, and with the reasons for his 
importance as a figure in German literature. For reasons that I shall 
set out in a moment, I do not think that a comprehensive survey of an 
author's entire output and life is a form of critical study that is well 
adapted to this kind of concern; I have chosen instead a form that is 
conducive to the fundamental critical inquiry that my focus entails. 
In this book I have chosen to analyse and interpret in considerable 
detail six of Kleist's best and most mature works, all taken from the 
last few years of his life. Following these discussions in the first six 
chapters, I then consider in Chapter Seven the general picture of 
Kleist that emerges-his fundamental concerns, the temper and basic 
strategies of his works, the kinds of human issues upon which he 
focusses, and how he approaches and develops them. In the final 
chapter I place my results in the general context of prevailing critical 
views of Kleist. In the process of doing so, I show how those results 
differ from prevailing views and why those views are insufficient, but 
my aim is not simply to carp and criticize. Anyone who puts forward 
a view that he claims to be new has an obligation to show clearly how 
it differs from older views, where and how those older conceptions 
went wrong, and the reason why the new view is to be preferred to 
prevailing ideas. Original scholarship is always a contribution to an 
existing field, and the precise character of its contribution to that field 
can only be judged when it is seen in relation to the existing work that 
it either supplements or attempts to render obsolete and replace. 
It will readily be seen that I am concerned with the general character 
of Kleist's work rather than selected aspects of it; but had I entitled 
this book simply Heinrich van Kleist, I should have run the risk of 
misleading and disappointing the reader who expected a complete 
chronological survey. To obviate that possibility, I have adopted in my 
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subtitle the notation Studies in, but I do not believe that the standard 
complete survey has any more right to a simple and absolute title 
than my own book does-in fact, rather less. The reason for my 
choosing the form that I have adopted is in fact not entirely a matter 
of my having aims which are fundamentally different from those of a 
comprehensive survey; on the contrary, I share the most important of 
those aims-to achieve a general characterization of the author's 
work, for example-but do not believe that they can be or are achieved 
by studies that profess to pursue them through a standard survey. 
The most obvious and serious limitation of the critical survey is 
superficiality. There is not space in a book of readable length for an 
adequate treatment of more than half a dozen works. The compre-
hensive survey appears to avoid the problem of selection, but that is 
an illusion: a different and more damaging kind of selection is being 
made. The desire to have "coverage" of all works, important and un-
important, is here given priority over any depth of treatment of the 
most important works; after the content of everything has been de-
scribed, together with the circumstances of Kleist's life that surround 
the composition of each work, there is little time for anything more 
than some fairly standard, and usually rather familiar, critical com-
ment. That may work moderately well in the cases of some authors, 
but surely not in the case of so subtle a writer as Kleist. Indeed, if the 
results of my investigation should prove correct, Kleist's meaning is 
especially likely to elude the treatment predominating in that kind of 
critical study. Kleist often presents a plausible first impression that 
subsequently becomes more and more problematic, and eventually 
must be abandoned. Survey volumes are inherently likely to miss the 
whole point of Kleist as a writer by presenting that first impression as 
the meaning of the work. 1 Superficial treatment of an author who 
specializes in probing beneath the surface of what is going on in the 
world is especially dangerous. 
Another danger of the comprehensive survey is the likelihood of its 
degeneration into a routine operation, a factor that again reinforces 
superficiality and reduces the critic's wakefulness and receptivity to 
the complexity of Kleist's texts. If a critic feels that he needs to say 
something about everything, including works that he may not find 
very interesting, an insidious change in his motivation occurs: he 
begins to say things not because he has something worth saying, but 
becausic> he feels he ought to say something. It becomes too easy to 
get by with making a few worthwhile comments on some texts and to 
revert to well-worn views on everything else. And that is why the 
majority of the comprehensive treatments of Kleist repeat much the 
same standard interpretations of his works; in the process they have 
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perpetuated and sanctified many superficial and bad readings, as 
well as many simpleminded and trivial ideas about the essence of 
Kleist' s work. 2 
The author of a critical survey will commonly try to obviate the 
problem of superficiality by taking a specific approach to the whole of 
Kleist's output, usually through tracing a specific theme or attitude 
through each of his works, one by one. But that only makes matters 
worse; this exercise too degenerates into a monotonous identification 
of Lle binding theme in each case, and so great a degree of prejudg-
ment of each work allows only a very superficial glance at it. 
It is to avoid this kind of mistake that I have placed my discussion 
of the general character and meaning of Kleist's work after the chap-
ters that investigate the individual works, rather than before. Again, 
this arrangement is unlike that of most general books on literary 
figures, which normally begin with chapters that serve as an intro-
duction to the discussion of individual works. That is neither the 
natural order of the critic's thought nor the best order for the reader 
to follow. To start with a general discussion would be to give the 
chapters on the individual works a pre-established framework-
whether biographical or thematic-which would effectively set limits 
on their scope. The general discussion too would be limited since it 
would not grow out of careful scrutiny of the individual works. It is 
clearly preferable, when dealing with complex entitites such as literary 
texts, to proceed from the particular to the general rather than vice 
versa. Accordingly, my general analysis of the significance and char-
acter of Kleist' s work is placed after, and is the result of, the detailed 
investigations of the meaning of the individual texts. 
Chapter Eight, a discussion of how Kleist criticism has seen his 
work to date, might too have been expected to precede the others. 
Again, I think that the order of the chapters here makes more sense; 
to discuss the way Kleist has been seen after, and therefore always in 
the context of, the results of the first seven chapters is to add another 
dimension to those chapters-to see more clearly what is really char-
acteristic of the view I have taken of Kleist. In addition to more general 
arguments for this procedure, a further reason for it emerges from the 
view that I take of Kleist' s characteristic quality. An examination of 
how critics have interpreted his work and of how they have responded 
to its figures and situations has a very special relevance to Kleist 
because he makes the process of interpreting characters and events 
an important part of the thematic structure of his writings. 
There are some functions of a survey volume that mine cannot 
serve, but those functions are far more limited than might be sup-
posed. A survey volume can at least make a claim to be a survey: a 
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complete annotated catalog of the facts and circumstances of Kleist's 
life and works. Such volumes clearly have a usefulness, but many 
such exist already, and I see no need for another. Another function of 
a survey may be to study Kleist's development as an author, since 
that particular aim necessitates a look at everything in chronological 
sequence-the good and the bad, the important and the trivial. To 
claim these functions for criticism that is in the form of a comprehen-
sive survey of Kleist's entire body of writing is fair enough; but many 
other claims for that form seem to me very dubious. For example, it is 
commonly said that such volumes are designed to introduce Kleist to 
the beginner, but it appears to me that the reverse ought to be the 
case. The beginner is best introduced to Kleist through his best and 
most characteristic work-he should be taken immediately to the 
heart of what is most intriguing and exciting about Kleist, as I have 
tried to do. The comprehensive survey belongs to a much later stage 
in the student's acquaintance with an author, one at which he is 
prepared to look at the more obscure features of Kleist's work, having 
already become well acquainted with much of his best and more 
celebrated texts. 
The view that the beginner needs a comprehensive survey of an 
author is in fact one of the great myths of literary criticism; it is surely 
a pale introduction to a great writer to give the beginner a volume full 
of the insignificant detail about the writer's life and work, plot resu-
mes and superficial comment. If instead he is introduced to Kleist 
through the medium of his most important work, he will quickly 
want to know more. 
An even stranger view is that general surveys serve the interests of 
those who have not read Kleist. I doubt that those who have not read 
Kleist can have much interest in knowing about him, or that they can 
be said to know anything meaningful about Kleist without having 
read him-whether or not they have read a comprehensive survey of 
his work. At all events, let me say that this book is very definitely for 
those who have read Kleist and will go on reading him. It is intended 
for those readers who like to think about the meaning of Kleist' s 
brilliant work, and who want for a while to do so in the company of 
another who likes to do just the same. Can criticism of literature make 
any sense if it is otherwise? If the comprehensive critical survey of an 
author needs to be justified by reference to a nonreader of Kleist, so 
much the worse for such an undertaking. 
I return, then, to the view that the most important task for Kleist 
criticism is to focus sharply on the essential character and meaning of 
Kleist's best, most mature, and most characteristically Kleistian work. 
This book is dedicated to that aim, and its form is chosen accordingly. 
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Granted that selection is always inevitable, I must comment on the 
particular choices that I have made. The six works that I have chosen 
for detailed discussion include five Novellen (Der Findling, Die Marquise 
van O ... , Das Erdbeben in Chili, Der Zweikampf, and Michael Kohlhaas) 
and one play (Prinz Friedrich van Homburg). There are several general 
factors involved in this choice. One is the question of maturity: all of 
these works date from the last few years of Kleist's life. Kleist died in 
1811; Prinz Friedrich van Homburg was written in 1810-11, Der Zwei-
kampf and Der Findling were published for the first time in 1811, and 
Michael Kohlhaas in 1810, though a fragment of it was published in 
1808, in a version which was later considerably changed for the first 
complete publication of 1810. Only Die Marquise van O ... and Das 
Erdbeben in Chili were completed earlier (1808 and 1807 respectively), 
but not by much. Another criterion was acclaim: Michael Kohlhaas and 
Prinz Friedrich van Homburg deserved inclusion as Kleist's two most 
celebrated works. 
The fact that I have included more Novellen than plays in the first 
six chapters is a more complex matter. It relates first of all to the two 
criteria that I have mentioned above. Kleist's last three dramas are 
Das Kiitchen van Heilbronn, Die Hermannsschlacht and Prinz Friedrich van 
Homburg. The first two were finished in 1810. I have not chosen 
Kiitchen or the Hermannsschlacht for detailed discussion because there 
is a general consensus that in spite of their late date they are not 
among Kleist's most important works. I do not quarrel with that 
consensus: these two plays do not seem to me to match the thematic 
complexity and interest of his best work. Kleist's best-known drama, 
apart from Prinz Friedrich van Homburg, is Der zerbrochne Krug, but it is 
one of his earliest plays and so does not belong in the category of his 
most mature works. The one other exclusion I must comment on is 
that of Penthesilea, also among the better-known plays. In this case, a 
critical judgment of my own comes into play: Penthesilea seems to me 
atypical when set beside Kleist's most characteristic work. The end-
ings of his works are seldom either clearly positive or negative but are 
most often ambiguous. This can be seen in all of those works dis-
cussed in the first six chapters. By contrast, Penthesilea's ending is 
unambiguously savage and despairing. In this sense, Penthesilea is 
unlike the rest of Kleist's work and so represents a case in which a 
man who generally expressed a complex attitude to life suddenly, 
almost primitively, reduced that complexity to a savage destructive-
ness. The general view of Kleist as a morbid and even pathological 
writer derives largely from the notorious ending of Penthesilea, in 
which Penthesilea sets her dogs to tear Achilles, the man she loves, to 
pieces. I think it unfortunate that the brutality of that event is so 
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much part of Kleist's image as a writer, since it is atypical as a resolu-
tion in his work. To be sure, there are other violent episodes in his 
work; but, as I shall argue in Chapter Seven, these are part of the 
development of a particular text rather than a key to the tone and 
meaning of the whole. My decision not to take Penthesilea as one of 
the six works discussed in detail here is in part due to a wish to 
change that aspect of the image of Kleist with which it is associated. 
Kleist's best and most characteristic work is remarkable precisely for a 
complexity and balance that are not maintained in Penthesilea. If it 
seems unusual not to devote extended treatment to Penthesilea, my 
point in this volume is to argue for a view of Kleist that would make 
that play much less of an automatic choice than it has been. 
It was with these considerations in mind, therefore, that I selected 
the six works discussed in the first six chapters of this book. Taken 
together, the reasons for my choices add up to a general comment on 
Kleist's dramatic work as opposed to his prose fiction. The fact that 
an early drama (Der zerbrochne Krug) and a drama with a rather sensa-
tional ending (Penthesilea) have been more popular than the later plays 
Das Kiitchen van Heilbronn and Die Hennannsschlacht, taken together 
with the fact that the popularity of Prinz Friedrich van Homburg so 
completely eclipses that of all his other plays, indicates to me that 
Kleist's dramatic work is less uniformly successful than his stories. 
His last play is in a class by itself, but there is no one story which 
stands so far above the others. My conclusions are that Kleist found 
his most interesting vein, the writing on which his position in Ger-
man literature rests, and the style and thematic complexity that are 
uniquely his, only in the last few years of his life; that this happened 
first of all in the Novellen, all of which appear to be late compositions; 
and that only the very last of the dramas shows this development 
completely. To set out these general conclusions is to state in a differ-
ent way the reasons for the choices I have made. I have, however, 
made some compromise on the question of the dramatic work by 
including discussion of Der zerbrochne Krug, Amphitryon, and Penthesi-
lea in the general evaluation of Kleist in Chapter Seven. 
I have avoided any concern with Kleist's biography. This decision is 
in part dictated by a theoretical view on the relevance or irrelevance 
of biography to criticism, a matter on which critics are still deeply 
divided, with strong opinion on both sides of the question. Here each 
critic, since the debate is far from settled, must make his own choice. I 
have contributed to this debate and set out what seem to me very 
powerful arguments for my own standpoint in my Theory of Literary 
Criticism: A Logical Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974). And I 
have attempted to show in Chapter Eight how critics who have ad-
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duced such aspects of Kleist's "intellectual" biography as his Kant-
crisis have succeeded only in narrowing and simplifying the meaning 
of his work. But the theoretical question of the relevance of biographi-
cal evidence to criticism cannot yet be said to allow of any final judg-
ment; no one is in a position to say that anyone else is simply right or 
wrong here, and until a consensus begins to emerge, no scholar is in 
a position to insist that another ought to conform to his own notions 
as to whether and how biography is relevant. I could not, without 
such a consensus, impose on others the notion that any book that 
adopts such a framework is simply in error; likewise, in these circum-
stances those who disagree with my own position would be foolish to 
assert that my book lacks a framework that is obligatory. 
In any case, I do not think that this issue should divide Kleist critics 
on theoretical grounds: there are in this instance some additional 
practical reasons for proceeding as I have done. Biographical infor-
mation on Kleist is rather sketchy and often ambiguous. As a result, 
critics who have insisted on a biographical framework have seemed 
to restrict the terms of the discussion unnecessarily and to hold it at a 
level of complexity far below that of the works themselves. A rather 
convincing demonstration of the ambiguity of certain key issues in 
Kleist' s biography is seen in the fact that biographically oriented critics 
have produced exactly the same range of opinions and disagreements 
on Prinz Friedrich von Homburg as have other critics. 





Some of Kleist's stories have provoked widely differing interpreta-
tions, but Der Findling is not one of them. 1 Its critics have, with almost 
no exception, 2 taken the view of the story that would seem to be 
suggested by the outline of its plot: the kindly old Piachi finds that his 
generosity to his adopted son Nicolo is rewarded only by ingratitude 
and treachery, and when the old man finally comes to see that he has 
nurtured a viper whose evil nature has caused the death of his wife 
and the loss of all his property, he is driven to the murder of Nicolo. 
Some critics, while committed to this overall interpretation of the 
story, have seen only too well that it does present problems, and that 
the text seems on occasion to be inconsistent with it; but they have 
blamed the text rather than the interpretation for any discrepancies 
between the two and so have judged the story to be flawed in certain 
respects. The Piachi of the ending, for example, may well seem some-
what out of character with the Piachi that we see in the interpretation:3 
can the kindly, generous old man really be the person who at the end 
is so consumed by the idea of revenge against Nicolo? Piachi's obses-
sion with vengeance is so extreme that, after he has killed Nicolo by 
crushing his head against the wall, he stuffs the legal decree confirm-
ing his adopted son's possession of what the old man had given to 
him down the dead Nicola's throat; and not satisfied even with this, 
he then refuses absolution so that he may go to hell in order to pursue 
his revenge against his adopted son even further. 
If the ending of the story must seem inconsistent with the interpre-
tation given, much of the rest seems completely irrelevant to it. The 
text of Der Findling concerns itself a good deal with the strange history 
of the disturbed Elvire who still grieves obsessively and unhealthily 
for the young knight who rescued her from a fire when she was only 
thirteen years old-some fifteen years ago. Much is also made in the 
text of the apparent resemblance of Nicolo to the dead man. On the 
whole, critics have seen the ending as unnecessarily and inconsis-
tently violent, and the strand of the story that concerns Colina and 
his resemblance to Nicolo as being not integral to the general drift of 
Der Findling. 4 
Now there is no doubt that the interpretation can find no use for 
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the parts of the text in question; but perhaps that should lead us to 
ask whether the text can find any use for the interpretation. The 
character of the material that has to be discarded should make us 
doubly cautious, for Kleist's endings commonly pose enigmas that 
function to make us think again about whether we had really under-
stood the work properly. It is, furthermore, another common char-
acteristic of his stories to introduce an excursus into its prehistory 
halfway through the story, so that a situation with which we thought 
we were familiar then appears in a new light. Both kinds of material 
serve to introduce new emphases and issues to complicate what had 
previously seemed a simpler situation. 
The ending of the story is indeed a shock. Nevertheless, it is not 
entirely unprepared, and it is an instructive exercise to separate out 
those aspects of the story that make us disturbed by Piachi' s incredi-
bly savage vengefulness from those other aspects of the text that 
might, with hindsight at least, have prepared us for this behavior. 
When we do so, an interesting fact comes immediately to light: what 
is hard to reconcile with the ending is mainly the narrator's character-
izations of Piachi as "der gute Alte," "der redliche Alte," and so on. 
The frequent occurrences of such phrases lull us into thinking of 
Piachi as a gentle and relaxed harmless old man, devoid of malice. 
But they are only characterizations by the narrator, and the actual 
events described are always at odds with them. Piachi appears to be 
more determined and self-willed, and not at all relaxed and kindly 
when, for example, he strictly forbids Nicolo to see Xaviera. And that 
impression of him as a determined figure is taken one stage further 
when he finds out that his order has been disobeyed, for his punish-
ment of Nicolo is already then of a needlessly cruel and vengeful 
character. The entire episode, in fact, stresses the relentlessness of 
Piachi that is so characteristic of his behavior at the end of the story. 
When he sees Xaviera's maid coming out of the house and guesses 
that she has carried a message from Xaviera to Nicolo, he is immedi-
ately ruthless in his attempts to get the letter: "Zufallig aber traf es 
sich, daB Piachi, der in der Stadt gewesen war, beim Eintritt in sein 
Haus dem Madchen begegnete, und da er wohl merkte, was sie hier 
zu schaffen gehabt hatte, sie heftig anging und ihr halb mit List, halb 
mit Gewalt, den Brief, den sie bei sich trug, abgewann" (205). A 
genuinely kindly or tolerant old man might have concluded at this 
point that he had been wrong to compel Nicolo to marry a woman 
whom he did not love; or, failing this, he might at least have con-
cluded that the now-adult Nicola's affairs were none of his business, 
and that intercepting his correspondence was in any case unconscio-
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nable. No such thoughts occur to this "guter Alte," however; Piachi is 
only angry that he has been disobeyed, and he sustains this anger 
long enough to make the complicated arrangements necessary to stage 
a deep humiliation for his son, in the process also usurping a hus-
band's right to arrange the burial of his wife. Already, Piachi, when 
crossed, shows himself to have one thought uppermost in his mind-
to attack and wound anyone who has defied him. Why, then, are we 
surprised that such is Piachi's response at the end of the story? It is 
surely because the narrator, just a few lines after this episode, still 
goes on to call Piachi "der redliche Alte" just when "Redlichkeit" 
would seem to be very remote from the behavior he has displayed. 
This is evidently another example of what Wolfgang Kayser had ob-
served when he said that the judgments of Kleist's narrator do not 
give us a secure authoritative standpoint since they are "oft aus der 
Perspektive einer Gestalt und immer unter dem Eindruck der jewei-
ligen Situation gesprochen." 5 Not only are the narrator's evaluations 
limited to the specific situation in which they occur-therefore af-
fording no secure judgment based on the entire text of the story-but 
they can even be limited to the point of view of one character in that 
single situation. Evidently, the narrator's terming Piachi "redlich" at 
this point of the story follows a view of Piachi that is in line with the 
character's own view of himself, not with the events that the reader 
witnesses. 
Let me take one more example of the discrepancy between the 
narrator's evaluations and the events he describes, one which, once 
more, can only be resolved by the assumption that the evaluation 
involved is a pro forma assumption of the view of the situation that 
Piachi himself would adopt. Early on in the story, as Nicolo grows up, 
we are told that Piachi is very pleased with him except in one respect: 
"Nichts hatte der Yater, der ein geschworner Feind aller Bigotterie 
war, an ihm auszusetzen, als den Umgang mit den Monchen des 
Karmeliterklosters, die dem jungen Mann, wegen des betrachtlichen 
Vermogens das ihm einst, aus der Hinterlassenschaft des Alten, zu-
fallen sollte, mit groBer Gunst zugetan waren" (201). The word "Bi-
gotterie" seems to go well beyond the evidence of the rest of the 
sentence. The most plausible way of relating this value judgment to 
the facts we are given might be to assume that monks who have their 
eye on access to Piachi's money are not sincere Christians. But even if 
we assume that any interest in a source of financial support for the 
monastery must be synonymous with greed (though it seems a little 
harsh to rule out any possibility that monks can take a legitimate 
interest in philanthropic support), that is still not the same thing as 
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bigotry. Bigotry, after all, is intolerance, not greed; but the only issue 
of intolerance raised by the text is that of Piachi's attitude to the 
monks. 
The next occurrence of the word "Bigotterie," however, makes clear 
that its reference was in any case not to the monks but to Nicolo (205), 
for in that context Nicolo's bigotry is under discussion. But we never 
see any evidence of bigotry on Nicolo' s part; his friendship with the 
monks appears to be the only explanation for Piachi' s judgment. 
What this all seems to show is Piachi's intemperate and intolerant 
attitude, and it indicates that anyone who acts contrary to Piachi's 
wishes and beliefs can expect not the tolerance of a kindly old man 
but vigorous and bitter disapproval. 
It would seem, then, that the prevailing critical interpretation of 
Der Findling follows too faithfully the image of Piachi provided by the 
narrator, but that this reading is actually inconsistent with the events 
of the narrative; and that being the case, it is not surprising that this 
interpretation also has to reject both the ending of the story and the 
whole question of Colino. There is in fact a very good reason for the 
narrator's stance, and I shall return to it at a later stage. For the 
moment it would appear necessary to approach the more fundamen-
tal question of the text's thematic structure: if the view of Pia chi as the 
kindly old man wronged is indeed an insufficient account of the 
story, what other view will do? Is there a thematic basis of the story 
which organizes all of its aspects and figures, and is there a thematic 
unity that is developed throughout its various episodes and to which 
each episode makes its own necessary contribution? 
Our starting point can be a conspicuous fact about relationships in 
the story that seems strange yet can be observed in the case of every 
character of importance in it: it is that there is much substitution of 
one character for another in the lives of the central figures. Everyone 
loses someone who has a major role in his or her life and makes up 
for it by substituting another; but the substitute is never really suc-
cessful. What binds together the stories of Piachi-Nicolo on the one 
hand and those of Elvire-Colino on the other is precisely the loss of 
an important relationship and the subsequent attempt to fill the gap 
by substituting another for it. The title of the story draws our atten-
tion mainly to one example of this pattern, the adoption of the found-
ling Nicolo by Piachi, through which the old man hopes to have 
Nicolo fill the position and assume the role of his recently dead son 
Paolo; likewise the young boy Nicolo lets Piachi and Elvire fill the role 
of his own recently dead parents. But wherever we look, a similar 
pattern can be found. In the story of Elvire' s past, Piachi enters El-
vire' s life soon after she has lost Colino and adopts Co lino's role as 
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her male protector; meanwhile, Elvire is to substitute for Piachi's 
recently dead wife. From this point of view, the Colino subplot is 
suddenly far more interesting: Nicolo's attempt to substitute for Co-
lino in Elvire's life is the most drastic and the most problematic sub-
stitution of all, but it is also one that concerns the most emotion-
charged void of any-the gap in Elvire' s emotional life that Piachi has 
never even begun to fill. Even Constanze, Nicolo's wife, is seen by 
his adoptive parents as a substitute for Xaviera in his life. This pattern 
of one character substituting for another, or conversely of calling on 
another to assume a role in his life by substituting for the one who 
recently played that role, is clearly the basis of the story's thematic 
coherence and the thematic strand that perseveres through its diverse 
episodes. What, then, does Kleist do with this theme? This question 
can best be pursued by looking at the quality and character of the 
relationships in the story and how they are affected by the persistent 
substitution and role-playing. 
In the main, relationships in the story seem extraordinarily distant 
and formal, a fact that is hardly surprising in view of their origin in 
rather indiscriminate attempts to substitute one person for another; 
when relationships are hastily replaced in this way, the emphasis is 
clearly on the need of people to have a certain spot in their lives filled 
by someone-perhaps anyone-rather than on their having a rela-
tionship that arises from the affinity of the two people. It is already 
possible to see how this may relate to the old man's inappropriate 
attitude to his adopted son and his continued generosity long after 
warning signs have appeared; Piachi acts toward Nicolo as father to 
son in almost mechanical fashion, and regardless of the real person 
he is dealing with. His judgment of Nicolo is not just poor, for it 
scarcely operates at all; what motivates him here is simply a notion of 
a father's role. 
Nothing stresses the predominant quality of relationships as much 
as the opening of the story, where we see the way in which Piachi 
takes Nicolo into his life. After his son's death, Piachi sets out to 
return home: "Er bestieg eben, sehr von Schmerz bewegt, den Wagen 
und nahm, bei dem Anblick des Platzes, der neben ihm leer blieb, 
sein Schnupftuch heraus, um seine Tranen fliefsen zu lassen" (200). It 
is then that Nicolo appears and Piachi decides to take him "an seines 
Sohnes Statt, mit sich nach Rom" (200). The emphasis is clear: it is 
the sight of the empty place beside him that makes Piachi weep, and 
it is to fill that empty place that Nicolo is taken back home by Piachi. 
The text might have stressed that this was a kindly old man taking 
pity on an orphan, but instead it stresses Piachi's own need for a 
replacement for his son. And the relationship, as it develops, stays 
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very much within the mold established by this initial textual empha-
sis. Throughout, Piachi has a rigid set of expectations of Nicolo, and 
Nicolo is expected to conform to them; he must play the prescribed 
role or face considerable anger. 
The relationship between Piachi and Elvire is substantially similar 
in all important respects. She too is a kind of foundling. Just as in the 
case of Nicolo, Piachi finds a defenseless young person in great dis-
tress while on one of his business journeys. She also has just lost an 
important figure in her life (Colina) and is taken home by Piachi not 
because he takes pity on her but in order to fill the gap in his life that 
has recently been created by the death of his wife. Once again, there 
is a relationship based not on two individuals but on formal substitu-
tions. It is, of course, painfully obvious that Nicolo is inappropriate to 
the rolle offered him, because he repeatedly transgresses against it. 
Less obvious, but equally true, is the fact that the role Elvire is given 
in Piachi's life is no less inappropriate. She is in her twenties and he 
in his sixties when they both die; there are never any signs of love 
between them throughout, 6 and it is her emotional distress while in 
that role that is the most prominent cause of the final disaster. 
The substituting of Nicolo for Colino requires a careful considera-
tion all of its own. It is evidently more enigmatic than any other 
substitution and even on the surface involves on both sides a more 
serious need for human contact than is displayed in any other rela-
tionship in Piachi's household. Elvire's need for Colina or a substitute 
for him is a human, emotional need, not a formal or social one, as 
Piachi''s need for wife and son turns out to be. But for the rest, rela-
tionships are sad things indeed in this family. The individuals all live 
in their own private worlds and play only a proforma role in the lives 
of the others. The history of their substituting for their predecessors 
in those roles points to the fact that those who now are to each other 
husband and wife, or father and son, were arbitrarily pushed into 
those positions to fill a vacuum that had occurred after more natural 
and more appropriate choices had been removed; and it is mainly 
Piachi who seems both to have been the original moving force in 
setting up a household of this kind and to have a continuing attitude 
to Elvire and Nicolo that prevents any development beyond mere 
formal role-filling. It was he who found two young people to sit in the 
empty seats beside him, and in both cases these young people were 
in such a desperate condition that they had little freedom to refuse 
the role Piachi offered them. 
It is of course true that from one point of view they are protected by 
Piachi when in a vulnerable state. But that does not exclude the 
possibility of a quite different view of the situation: there is a sense in 
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which he exploits this vulnerability to satisfy his own needs. He does 
give them shelter but otherwise wants little from them, and has little 
to give them. To Elvire he cannot be a real husband, and we are told 
that she cannot expect children from him; but she is required to 
occupy the formal position of wife nonetheless. Piachi's demands of 
Nicolo are similarly restrictive. He is to behave as Piachi expects him 
to, and he is forbidden to do whatever does not fall within Piachi's 
notion of what a son should be. Nothing shows more clearly the 
extent to which the members of Piachi's household must conform to 
his image of them than Nicolo's marriage to Constanze. This mar-
riage, too, is evidently formal only, and Nicolo, not surprisingly, treats 
it as a formal obligation rather than an emotional commitment, an-
other distant and detached relationship in a household that, having 
no room for real human attachments, remains a loveless and oppres-
sive place. Even Piachi's apparent acts of generosity towards Nicolo, 
when examined closely, have a formal aspect and even an ungener-
ous side. He gives Nicolo a position in the office of his business-but 
he has had to dismiss another clerk in order to substitute Nicolo in 
that position. On his retirement he makes a formal(!) gift to Nicolo of 
his entire fortune "mit Ausnahme eines kleinen Kapitals" (202), which 
all sounds very fine until we realize that he has actually disinherited 
Elvire, who is still in her twenties. If at first sight these appeared 
generous actions, on closer inspection they appear more as gestures 
dominated by Piachi' s formal sense of having a son and heir that are 
inappropriate to his real relationship with Nicolo and brush aside any 
more genuine ideas of generosity or considerateness to the other 
people involved in the situations. 
Even so, it might seem that this household, cold as it is, is still to be 
preferred to the immoral world of Nicolo, 7 with shady characters 
such as Xaviera and unsavory episodes such as Nicolo's carrying on 
his illicit liaison even as his wife lies dead in his house. Yet once 
again, if we look more closely, things are not quite as they appear to 
be. The text, to be sure, speaks of Nicolo's general proclivity for "das 
weibliche Geschlecht" (200) and somewhat later of his "Hang zu den 
Weibern" (205). But this is a judgment that, as in the case of his 
alleged "Bigotterie," begins as a view of one parent (this time Elvire) 
and only then passes into general use by the narrator; and it is once 
more not justified by the facts as we see them presented to us in the 
narrative. Apart from the later episode involving Elvire herself, to 
which I shall return, Nicolo is seen to be involved with only one 
woman, Xaviera Tartini. We are told that Nicolo is seduced by her 
when he is only fourteen, but when he is twenty he is still seeing her. 
If we only put aside the judgment of the narrator, it might be possible 
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to call this a relationship to which both sides are remarkably faithful, 
and which appears to have considerable human importance for both; 
they show evidence of an attachment to each other that in its charac-
ter completely transcends the pro forma relationships of the Piachi 
household. During the entire six years in which complaints about 
Nicolo' s sexual behavior occur in the story, voiced either by his par-
ents or by the narrator as if on their behalf, what we see is only a 
doggedly persistent relationship with this one person. There is no 
hint of promiscuity, no hint that any other woman is involved with 
Nicolo. It is not difficult to see the point of the relationship: Xaviera's 
youth is exploited in one way by the Bishop, while Nicolo's youth is 
exploited in another way by Piachi. Each has a role dictated by an 
older figure of authority that is not humanly satisfying, and it seems 
natural enough that the two should want and be able to find with the 
other a warmer and more personal relationship, one in which the 
partner is chosen rather than imposed. The paradox here is that the 
relationship between Nicolo and Xaviera seems immoral and un-
wholesome because of Xaviera's being mistress to a bishop, on the 
one hand, and because of Piachi' s strong disapproval on the other 
-yet the basis and value of the relationship for the two are surely in 
their reacting against the influence of the Bishop and Piachi in their 
lives. If the narrator's conventional judgments are set aside and we 
take note of the inappropriate and exploitative character of both Pi-
achi' s marriage and the Bishop's liaison with a young girl, the rela-
tionship between Xaviera and Nicolo looks by contrast natural and 
human-and a source of real emotional support to both. Even the 
apparent scandal of Nicolo's going to see Xaviera when his wife lies 
awaiting burial in his house does not seem so scandalous after all if 
we remember that Constanze was Elvire's niece. It would be consis-
tent with everything else that happens to Nicolo in Piachi' s house-
hold if he had not been entirely a free agent in making the marriage, 
which was from the beginning irrelevant to the relationsip that per-
sisted both before and after it-that with Xaviera. If his wife had been 
virtually imposed on him, that would put his faithlessness to her in a 
different light. 
What little we see of the two together only confirms the importance 
of the relationship. Xaviera, far from being promiscuous and indis-
criminate, shows feelings about Nicolo that suggest a unique rela-
tionship with him: she is very jealous of Nicolo' s developing feelings 
for Elvire, which she correctly judges to be the growing threat to their 
relationship. When Nicolo manages to smuggle her into the house 
during Elvire's absence so that she might see and possibly identify 
the picture of the Genoese knight, Xaviera registers alarm as she sees 
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how like Nicolo himself the picture is: "Xaviera verstummte" (208). 
Xaviera's child and Nicolo then carry on with their ambiguous con-
versation about the picture, but as for Xaviera: "Doch Xaviera, in 
deren Brust das bittere Gefiihl der Eifersucht rege geworden war, 
warf einen Blick auf ihn; sie sagte, indem sie vor den Spiegel trat, 
zuletzt sei es gleichgiiltig, wer die Person sei; empfahl sich ihm ziem-
lich kalt und verlie8 das Zimmer." Xaviera knows immediately what 
the point of the whole situation is, and her stepping towards the 
mirror is an instinctive reaction of looking to the weapons she still 
possesses-her own femininity-in the struggle over Nicolo that she 
now knows herself to be in. When Xaviera finds the truth about the 
picture-that Elvire's knight died twelve years ago-she immediately 
and triumphantly summons Nicolo to tell him about it, appearing 
"schalkhaft" and "schelmisch" (211-12) as she does so: she is clearly 
delighted. None of this is consistent with the possibility that Nicolo 
promiscuously forms sexual liaisons with anyone and everyone, or 
that Xaviera is an immoral woman; it indicates instead a degree of 
closeness and uniqueness of the relationship that is not found else-
where in the story-at least not until the strange situation between 
Nicolo and Elvire begins to take shape. 
The superficially odious relationship of Xaviera and Nicolo is, then, 
in reality the only one in the story that actually works in a humanly 
valuable way, on more than a formal basis; yet the relationship be-
tween Nicolo and Elvire seems potentially the most powerful and 
necessary relationship of all. It is no accident that the positive rela-
tionships in the story involve the three exploited foundlings Nicolo, 
Elvire, and Xaviera. On the surface, the narrator evaluates the Elvire-
Nicolo situation in a consistently negative way, but the text gives us 
good reason not to follow him. Take, for example, the judgment of 
the narrator that Nicolo's emotions concerning Elvire are "unnatiir-
lich" (211); here he is evidently thinking of the fact that Elvire is 
technically Nicolo' s mother-though she is actually only so by adop-
tion. The problem with using the word "unnatural" here is that it is 
almost a provocation to the reader to think about the natural as op-
posed to the formal situation-and if we do that, it will reverse the 
judgment as to what is unnatural. Elvire' s age is not directly stated, 
but as so often, Kleist gives us all the details we need to work it out 
for ourselves-once we see that we need to do so. During most of the 
story we know only that Elvire was thirteen when saved from the fire 
by her Genoese knight, sixteen when he died, and eighteen when 
married to Piachi. But when Xaviera tells us that Colino had been 
dead twelve years, we can conclude that Elvire must be twenty-eight, 
which means that if Nicolo entered the Piachi household as a child of 
10 Heinrich von Kleist 
eleven, Elvire herself was still little more than a child, only nineteen. 
At the end of the story, then, the household consists of Piachi, aged 
sixty, Nicolo, aged twenty or twenty-one, and the twenty-eight year-
old Elvire. The unnaturalness of the marriage 8 of the old man with a 
very young girl is underlined by the news that she could not hope to 
have children by him. There is, then, no natural husband-wife rela-
tionship here, and by contrast, if we focus on what seems natural, a 
relationship between the two people in the household who are in 
their twenties would appear more natural than that of the married 
couple. Indeed, the whole history of the relationship between the 
two shows just how natural it is that both should be and are attracted 
to each other. 
It would be a very superficial reading of the text to conclude that 
only Nicolo is attracted to Elvire, while she is exclusively concerned 
with the memory of her dead knight and thus with Nicolo only in that 
he resembles Colina. There is, on the contrary, much direct evidence 
that Elvire gravitates just as strongly towards Nicolo as he towards 
her, and towards Nicolo not merely as the double of the dead man. 
From the beginning, Elvire shows an interest and involvement in 
Nicolo that is strong, instinctive, and not well controlled. As he grows 
up, Piachi is the one, we are told, who disapproves of Nicolo's "Um-
gang mit den Monchen," but it is already Elvire who takes an interest 
in his relations with women, one that looks surprisingly aggressive 
for so withdrawn a woman. She disapproves of the "friih, wie es ihr 
schien, in der Brust desselben sich regenden Hang fiir das weibliche 
Geschlecht" (201). And Elvire continues to hover around all of Nico-
Io's activities in this direction, with what would otherwise be a quite 
uncharacteristic degree of energy and outward-directedness. In gen-
eral, the picture that we have of Elvire is a passive one, while Piachi is 
the sh·ong-willed father who forbids Nicolo to do whatever Piachi 
does not wish him to do; and so it is all the more interesting to note 
that Elvire is assertive only in one area in the household-namely, 
that of Nicolo's relations with the opposite sex, or rather with Xaviera. 
When Elvire sees Nicolo returning home from a masked ball where 
he had been with Xaviera, the narrator tells us that she has arisen by 
chance in order to get something for Piachi, who was unwell, "in 
Ermangelung der Magde" (204); but that explanation is undercut by 
the curious phenomenon of the door to Nicolo' s room being locked. 
More suggestive yet, Nicolo finds the key in the bundle carried by 
Elvire after she faints at the sight of him dressed as a Genoese knight. 
Had she locked his door and deliberately found reason to be up to 
catch him coming back? And did she faint not because she thought 
she saw Colino, but because she now saw the resemblance between 
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Nicolo and Colino? Kleist leaves the situation open to either interpre-
tation by avoiding any explicit statement of what is going on in her 
mind. A further sign of Elvire's excessive interest in Nicola's seeing 
Xaviera is Elvire's discovery of Xaviera's maid with Nicolo, which 
occurs in a way that is more than mildly surprising: she walks into 
Nicola's room without knocking, finds the maid, and walks out with-
out a word. She then weeps by the body of the dead Constanze, but 
we surely must suspect that, after she had shown so much attention 
to this aspect of Nicolo's life, she weeps not only on the dead Con-
stanze's account but also on her own. Meanwhile, Nicolo and Xaviera 
both believe that "alle Schwierigkeiten, die sie [Nicolo und Xaviera] 
in ihrem Umgang fanden, von ihr herriihrten" (208). This is, again, 
not seemingly consistent with the shy Elvire. 
Even when Elvire does nothing in relation to Nicolo for some weeks 
after this, there are hints that she is still in the grip of a growing 
emotional involvement with him. The mere fact that she goes off to 
the country shortly after discovering Xaviera's maid with Nicolo might 
not by itself be significant. If that were all that we saw happening, 
one might still speculate that this absence represents retreat from a 
developing situation that frightened her, but there would be little to 
put the speculation on more solid ground. When she returns, Nicolo 
greets her warmly but she gives him only "einen fliichtigen nichtsbe-
deutenden Blick" (209), which begins to suggest that she is indeed 
seeking to avoid a growing emotional problem. But when we learn 
that she has brought back with her a young relative and that the next 
several weeks were "aufgeopfert" to the business of taking the young 
girl on visits to any place that would amuse her, the pattern of es-
capism becomes unavoidably obvious. Elvire is evidently using the 
presence of the young girl to protect herself from her emotions con-
cerning Nicolo. The narrator diagnoses that something is wrong, 
without putting his finger on what it is, when he says that these 
weeks "vergingen in einer dem Hause ungewohnlichen Unruhe." 
The household, and Elvire most conspicuously so, is indeed uneasy. 
But it requires little interpretation to see that the basis of that uneasy 
quality in the household is that two of its members are falling in love 
and are in a confused way struggling with that frightening fact-
frightening because while they are naturally suited to each other in 
being unrelated and of comparable age, they are also in a socially 
unnatural situation through being technically mother and son. That 
Elvire's reaction is to withdraw and retreat from her emotions should 
be no surprise, for that pattern is well established by all that is said 
about her in the story. At emotional crises in her life the withdrawal is 
often accompanied by illness, and the end of her life is an extreme 
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version of that pattern, for she dies of a fever induced by emotional 
shock. 
The household's unusual unrest, then, is an ominous sign of Nicolo 
and Elvire's growing involvement; and since the unrest is the result 
of Elvire's actions, it is clear that she is aware of the danger that her 
own emotions present. Could we still possibly think of this involve-
ment only in terms of Nicola's resembling Colino? It is surely im-
plausible to think of a mere similarity causing so much real unrest. 
Nicola's resemblance to Colino is of course one factor in the situation; 
but it is only one among others, and even that factor must not be 
taken too lightly. When Elvire became the substitute for Piachi's first 
wife, or Piachi for Colino, there were no resemblances between the 
two successive occupants of the role, and that had much to do with 
the inappropriateness of the substitution. There is no resemblance 
possible between the old man Piachi and the young knight Colina, 
nor between the presumably mature woman who was Piachi' s wife 
and the sixteen-year-old Elvire. The attempts to make one stand in 
for the other do not work precisely because the two are so unalike. 
Nicola's looking like Colino may in one sense be incidental, but in 
another sense it stresses that they are comparable, and a substitution 
of one for the other in Elvire's emotional life is indeed a possibility. 
Paradoxically, then, Nicola's accidental resemblance to Colino indi-
cates in part a real, not merely a superficial, appropriateness in his 
assuming Colino's role. And it must be noted that this is the one 
substitution that is not imposed formally but is actually desired by 
both sildes because it is the only substitution based on the realities of 
the personal situation. To criticize the resemblance as an artificial 
element in the story is therefore to miss the importance of the resem-
blance as the symbol of a real potential for Nicolo's becoming to Elvire 
what Colino had been. 
The real disaster in Elvire's life is in fact her marriage to Piachi, an 
impossible substitute for Colino. After her marriage she falls into a 
fever, an act which for Elvire always indicates withdrawal, here from 
Piachi and the marriage. In truth, while Piachi offers her a kind of 
protection, he can also be seen as her oppressor rather than her 
protector. Yet one more ironic feature of Nicola's role in the story is 
that he very nearly does liberate her from the trauma of her child-
hood. Piachi, on the other hand, perpetuates that trauma by continu-
ing to offer her protection from it far longer than the issue should 
have remained dominant in her life. In so doing he of course pre-
cludes any possibility that she might solve her problem, because his 
presence keeps away the most obvious source of such a solution. A 
new relationship with a suitable figure like Nicolo, rather than an 
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inappropriate substitute, like Piachi, would have been the surest exit 
from her depressed condition. Yet she is locked into that condition by 
the almost symbolic return of Piachi in the nick of time, which seems 
to emphasize the inescapability of the framework that once protected 
her but now perpetuates the problem she was initially protected from. 
Yet even if it is clear by now that Elvire is attracted to Nicolo, and 
that the character of that attraction is a natural and even a valuable 
force in her life when compared with her sterile relationship with 
Piachi, it might still seem that Nicolo' s side of the situation was repre-
hensible and his motivation questionable and even vicious. But this 
impression, too, is based on the narrator's proforma evaluations. The 
events of the story, when viewed in themselves, create a quite differ-
ent impression. 
The clues to Elvire' s emotional responses to Nicolo can be seen 
largely in uncharacteristic assertiveness and curiousity about his ac-
tivities, as well as in her fear and withdrawal from growing aware-
ness. Nicolo's growing attraction to Elvire, on the other hand, is 
indicated in different ways; he is confused by it, and his attitude to 
Elvire undergoes violent changes, even from love to hate. But what 
appears on the surface as hate is easily enough seen in context as an 
expression of the sense of vulnerability and fear that a powerful new 
emotional attraction can cause, and therefore as a sudden reaction of 
self-defense rather than hate. It is true that Nicolo, believing (as it 
happens, wrongly) that it was Elvire who must have told Piachi about 
his secret meeting with Xaviera, and hence that she was ultimately 
responsible for the humiliation he suffers at Piachi' s hand, is said as a 
result to feel "einen brennenden HaB gegen Elviren" (206). Taken only 
by itself, this might be interpreted quite simply as unambiguous ha-
tred, though the formulation seems a strangely emotional one, and it 
is odd to think that this hatred is aimed not at the person who has in 
fact humiliated him but instead at Elvire for her having told Piachi of 
the visit from Xaviera's maid. But only a few lines later, this interpre-
tation becomes clearly untenable: "Zugleich war ihm Elvire niemals 
schoner vorgekommen, als in dem Augenblick, da sie, zu seiner Ver-
nichtung, das Zimmer, in welchem sich das Madchen befand, offnete 
und wieder schloB. Der Unwille, der sich mit sanfter Glut auf ihren 
Wangen entzi.indete, goB einen unendlichen Reiz i.iber ihr mildes, 
von Affekten nur selten bewegtes Antlitz" (206). This description of 
Elvire from the point of view of Nicolo leaves no doubt that Nicolo is 
indeed falling in love with Elvire, and that his talk of hate is only a 
measure of the strength and obsessiveness of his emotions with re-
gard to her but does not show their real direction; nor could the 
language of the passage be interpreted as mere surface sexual attrac-
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tion, for on the contrary, it is the emotional situation between the two 
that dominates the description. Nicolo is enchanted by the subtle 
beauty that arises in Elvire's face precisely when she loses her nor-
mally passive look and allows her expression to show her emotions 
about him. To that extent the description is also another pointer to 
Elvire's own growing invovlement, and Nicolo is very probably re-
sponding to her expressing that emotion in finding her face so beauti-
ful at that moment. 
Nicolo's train of thought following this passage is again ambiguous. 
He wonders why Elvire herself has never transgressed, and he thinks 
of getting his own back by betraying her secret to the old man, if ever 
she did, as he imagines she had done with him. But the language of 
his longing for such a revenge is strangely out of place: "Er ghihte vor 
Begierde, ihr, falls dies der Fall sein sollte, bei dem Alten denselben 
Dienst zu erweisen, als sie ihm" (206). An anticipation of revenge is 
not normally linked with the phrase "gliihte vor Begierde," and the 
mismatch shows how a strange new emotion, too frightening to face, 
is channeled into an aggression that makes it less difficult to handle. 
The very position of the phrase confirms the point; the jumbled word 
order of the sentence splits "gliihte vor Begierde" from its logical 
reference (revenge against Elvire) and sets it instead in the middle of 
Nicolo's thoughts about Elvire's imagined sexual activities. When Ni-
colo discovers Elvire's secret portrait of Colino, the narrator's formu-
lations of Nicolo's thoughts leave all their ambiguity full play, this 
time giving them no precise shape. Nicolo is said to leave the room 
with "eine Menge von Gedanken" and "in nicht geringer Verwir-
rung" (207). And when Xaviera's small daughter notices the resem-
blance between the portrait and Nicolo, the range of his emotions is 
once more not limited by the narrator's comment on his response; 
there is note only of "ein plotzliches Erroten" (208). Yet this noncom-
mittal observation does, on closer inspection, rule out some possibili-
ties. Nicolo would not have blushed on being faced with the possibility 
that Elvire loves him if revenge were uppermost in his mind; the most 
likely reason for that reaction is surely that Nicolo is embarrassed to 
have Xaviera gain access to a secret emotion that he feels. What could 
be more embarrassing than Xaviera's seeing that he is loved by and 
loves another woman? Xaviera certainly sees the point of the situa-
tion and Nicolo's blush: she immediately leaves the room coldly, evi-
dently a jealous response to the emotions she has seen revealed. 
Nonetheless, the narrator continues with commentary as if only re-
venge were involved for Nicolo, in spite of its growing implausibility: 
"Der Gedanke, die Leidenschaft djeser, als ein Muster der Tugend 
umwandelnden Frau erweckt zu haben, schmeichelte ihn fast eben so 
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sehr, als die Begierde, sich an ihr zu rachen" (209). According to the 
narrator's view, then, he is flattered and looks forward to revenge; 
but in this instance it is more than usually dear that the narrator here 
is mainly giving us Nicola's own conscious attitude-one that serves 
a self-protective function for Nicolo. 
What we see him doing next, however, is quite inconsistent with 
this view; he waits for Elvire's return from the country "mit vieler 
Ungeduld"; he is described as being "in dem Taumel, der ihn ergrif-
fen hatte"; he is in a state of "Begierde"; and even in the sound of the 
name Colina "lag mancherlei, das sein Herz, er wufste nicht warum, 
in siifse Traume wiegte" (209). Again, sweet dreams, desire, dizzi-
ness-this is the language of love, not of revenge. But it is a love that 
Nicolo is afraid even to admit to himself; and so he hides from himself 
the terrible truth-that he is in love with his father's wife-by seeing 
his obsession with Elvire as a wish to get even with her. In Piachi' s 
household, to believe that he has a petty and spiteful motive is much 
less of a threat to him than the more natural emotion, and so the 
former is used as a defense against any awareness of the latter. 
When Elvire avoids returning Nicola's warm greeting on her return 
from the countryside and then does her best to avoid him completely 
in the next few weeks, Nicolo does not see the point of this behavior, 
as a more detached observer would; only a would-be lover who thinks 
himself spurned would fail to see the promising side of this situation 
and fall "in die iibelste Laune zuriick." Nicolo suffers "mit den bitter-
sten und qualendsten Gedanken"; there is reference to his "verwil-
dertes Herz"; somewhat later he has "triibe Gedanken"; and when 
he thinks he discovers that the secret of the name Colina lies in its 
being an anagram of his own, his state is one of "unterdriickter 
Freude" (210). All this is unmistakably the uncontrollable swings of 
emotion of an insecure lover, unsure whether his feelings are recipro-
cated; it is in no way characteristic of one who plots revenge. 
The more orthodox, negative narrator-judgments now return with 
references to his "schandliche Freude" and "unnatiirliche Hoff-
nungen" (211), though even these negative judgments now seem 
irrelevant to revenge; the last phrase dearly must relate to his unfilial 
attitude to Elvire and his attraction to her. The narrator seems at last to 
have accepted the fact that revenge is not the issue, and his judg-
ments now shift to the right area, only negatively evaluated. When 
Xaviera tells Nicolo of her discovery that the name Colina is that of a 
man who has been dead for twelve years, he shows rapid changes of 
"Blasse und Rote au£ seinem Gesicht," and he leaves Xaviera taking 
his hat "unter einem haBlichen Zucken seiner Oberlippe" (212). This 
is evidently a much deeper disturbance than frustrated revenge. 
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The final scene is introduced with a strong evaluation by the narra-
tor: "Beschamung, Wollust und Rache vereinigten sich jetzt, um die 
abscheulichste Tat, die je veriibt warden ist, auszubriiten" (212). But 
even if we were to ignore the other evidence we have seen that would 
indicate a different judgment of Nicola's emotional state and the fact 
that making love is an odd act of revenge indeed, the tenor of the 
description of what then happens is still much at variance with the 
general judgment. Nicolo does not take advantage of Elvire's swoon 
and instead is "bemiiht, sie mit heilsen Kiissen auf Brust und Lippen 
aufzuwecken" (213). The narrator was clearly speaking from Piachi's 
perspective, the only one which could ignore the obvious naturalness 
of these two gravitating towards each other in this otherwise loveless 
household. The emotions of Nicolo that have led up to this scene-
his despairs and elations-have not been the reactions of a villain 
whose infernal plotting is now successful, now frustrated, but signs 
of a growing love for Elvire. And if Nicolo himself seems to prefer 
revenge as an explanation, that is because he too finds this a less 
frightening way to look at the situation. 
Critics have on occasion claimed that the first appearance of Nicolo 
foreshadows the evil in him that is later to come to the surface;9 he 
has a face that, "ernst und klug, seine Miene niemals veranderte" 
(200). But this description, viewed without preconceptions, shows 
only a certain passivity-the same passivity that Elvire shows, and 
that Piachi' s household requires of them both. Nevertheless, the early 
part of the story does contain sinister undertones, but they all con-
cern Piachi's behavior. Early in the story he has already twice taken a 
pliant child home to fill gaps in his life in a way that stresses their 
fitting the mold he gives them, rather than his giving anything emo-
tionally to them. Elvire must function as wife, though Piachi cannot 
be a husband. Nicolo is to be a dutiful and obedient son and is 
punished when he does what the old man sees as being inconsistent 
with that role. Piachi's giving his fortune to Nicolo might seem to be 
unambiguously "good" but really is part of the same pattern of be-
havior that is the root of the trouble. This, too, is all part of Piachi's 
rigid and indiscriminate pursuit of a set of stereotypes (the devoted 
wife, the loyal son) without regard to the actual people who fill the 
roles; after so much friction between Piachi and Nicolo, Piachi's "gen-
erous" acts show that he is not thinking of Nicolo but only of a 
stereotyped image he has of a loyal son. 
It is 1the ending of the story that really shows what was beneath the 
surface that Piachi had cultivated, and its importance is not limited to 
a demonstration of the rage and hatred of which the old man is 
capable. Piachi returns unexpectedly to the house just as Nicolo is 
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about to make love to Elvire, a "chance" event that suggests rather 
strongly that the old man too has not remained untouched by the 
powerful new currents in the household and is at best uneasy at 
being away, at worst downright suspicious and watchful. After his 
discovery of Nicolo with Elvire, an interesting scene takes place. Ni-
colo begs for forgiveness, and "in der Tat warder Alte auch geneigt, 
die Sache still abzumachen; sprachlos, wie ihn einige Worte Elvirens 
gemacht hatten ... nahm er bloB, indem er die Vorhange des Bettes, 
auf welchem sie ruhte, zuzog, die Peitsche von der Wand, offnete 
ihm die Tiir und zeigte ihm den Weg, den er unmittelbar wandern 
sollte" (213). Here is one of those occasions, common in Kleist's work, 
where the narrator suddenly stops telling us what was said and what 
was thought, and makes neither comment on motivation nor any 
evaluative judgment, in spite of the fact that this is a critical juncture 
in the story. As a result the reader is compelled to ask himself what 
really is happening here. What does Elvire say? How much of Elvire's 
emotional life and her secret adoration of Colina does Piachi know? 
How much of her feelings towards Nicolo does Elvire understand, 
and how much of that has she told Piachi, either now or previously? 
How does Elvire view Nicola's attitude to her? These questions are of 
course unanswerable, and it is important only that they be raised in 
connection with the impact of Elvire's words on Piachi's behavior: he 
is made speechless and turns to get his whip. Might he without those 
words simply have forgiven Nicolo and continued in the same old 
way? Or might he have been even more violent? Whatever it is that 
Elvire said, its immediate and visible effect is Piachi' s expelling Nicolo 
from his household. The old man might have gone back to the same 
empty, formal relationships that existed before, but what Elvire said 
seems to have contributed to the destruction of that possibility once 
and for all. The most likely explanation is that she made some admis-
sion to Piachi that precluded Nicolo's continued presence. And what 
would most certainly have done that would be her having spoken of 
her own part in the emotional problems of the household. 
The conventional interpretation of the story-that of its narrator 
and of its critics-has it that Nicolo shows his true colors at last when 
he attempts to throw Piachi out of the house rather than be thrown 
out by him; but it is also possible to see what happens as a sudden 
rebellion against the assertive and repressive old man, the culmina-
tion of years in which Nicolo was compelled to do as Piachi wished. 
The very presence of a whip on the wall of his wife's bedroom is an 
unnatural and sinister sign of Piachi's menacing attitude to everyone 
in the household, including even her; and his quietly seizing it as he 
opens the door for Nicolo is a picture of barely suppressed violence. 
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The first open rebellion instantly brings on the frightening level of 
violence that had always been lurking in the strong-willed Piachi; 
when his orderly world dissolves, one in which others were com-
pelled to play the role he gave them and no other, his anger is total. 
This violent anger is a key to the force that had held everyone to their 
assigned position for so long, but that finally is unable to prevent the 
suppressed personalities of Nicolo and Elvire from expressing them-
selves. Piachi's fury is evidentfy disproportionate to Nicola's mere 
assertion of his legal right to the house, and that fact has always been 
obvious to interpreters of the story. But, far from the disproportion 
being a blemish on the story or out of character with Piachi, 10 it has 
an important function; it points to the fact that something is occurring 
which is more fundamental than Nicola's clinging to his legal posses-
sions, namely a challenge to Piachi's whole exploitative way of life 
and his right to prescribe to others their roles. The violence of the 
ending, then, is an indicator of the more subtle but no less deter-
mined violence that was always present in Piachi's iron grip on his 
household. 
There is irony in the fact that revenge possesses Piachi at the end of 
the story, for revenge was the unreal cloak in which Nicolo concealed 
even from himself his emotions about Elvire, and as if to point to the 
unreality of Nicola's "revenge," Kleist shows us in Piachi's acts just 
what sort of thing revenge really is and what kind of blind destruc-
tion it can lead to. 
Der Findling is, then, narrated from a distinct point of view that 
embodies a moral judgment of the events, but the events themselves 
at critical points do not fit the viewpoint taken. The limitation on the 
narrator's perspective is in effect a limitation to the perspective largely 
of one character, Piachi. Only from this perspective does the whole 
ending emerge as something shattering and incomprehensible, and 
its point is precisely that it is a challenge to the narrator's framework 
of interpretation. Throughout, the conventional judgments of the 
narrator 11 have seen the story as one of a kindly old man who offers 
refuge to an orphaned child and to a desperately disturbed young 
girl, and whose reward for his kindness is evil. But in the process of 
telling the story Kleist lets another image of it appear from time to 
time, one in which Piachi is repressive and exploitative, and his 
foundlings are rigidly forced into emotionally unsatisfying lives in 
order that gaps in his own can be filled, at least formally. It is the 
jarring note of the ending that suddenly forces the reader to ask 
whether the narrator's conventional judgments were ever adequate 
to the situation. And it can then be seen that the hints that prepare 
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and justify the ending supply the alternative explanation of what 
really has been happening. 
But why, we might ask, does Kleist choose to tell the story in this 
oblique and confusing way? The answer surely lies in the fact that a 
moral paradox is involved in the relation of the two views of it. The 
point of the partly hidden real explanation emerging clearly only after 
the superficial one has ground to a halt is that the story is about the 
way in which kindness can have a dark and sinister side. The effects 
of Piachi's good-hearted offer of protection to his foundlings is to 
restrict considerably their ability to be themselves and live their own 
lives. Looked at more closely, his generosity to them involves an 
exploitation and repression of them, even a crushing of their indi-
viduality. Conversely, the most valuable relationship in the story ap-
pears superficially the most unnatural and destructive. The tension 
between the narrator's judgments and the events of the story is the 
same as that between the discrepant aspects of the moral paradox 
that is the basis of the story; the paradox is therefore embodied in the 
entire strategy that Kleist employs in having his narrator take a su-
perficial view, while the events themselves push us towards a deeper 
view of what is occurring. Der Findling is a pessimistic story, but it is 
not merely or even primarily the violence of its ending that is pes-
simistic; it is most deeply pessimistic in showing how conventional 
kindness can do covert violence to its recipients, and how that covert 
violence is always ready to erupt into overt violence if it is ever chal-
lenged. 
Der Findling is a study in the character of relationships, where the 
repeated substitution of one character for another serves to place the 
emphasis on how the needs of one person in a relationship dictate the 
role of the second, regardless of the appropriateness of the second to 
that role. Nothing in the story so bares this theme of substitutions 
and of people projecting onto others their own notions of what they 
should be as the episode in which Xaviera and her little daughter are 
with Nicolo in Elvire's room looking at the portrait of Colino. The 
little girl sees the resemblance and cries out "Signor Nicolo, wer ist 
das anders, als Sie?" Nicolo, embarrassed, replies: "Wahrhaftig, lieb-
ste Klara, das Bild gleicht mir, wie du demjenigen, der sich deinen 
Yater glaubt!" (208). The ambiguity of the reply is almost inexhaust-
ible. The surface meaning, which Nicolo may well intend for Klara's 
understanding, must be: "I look as little like that man as you look like 
the Cardinal-not at all." But Kleist's text carefully avoids meaning 
only that, first, by omitting the negative, and second, by inserting the 
word "glaubt." We have been told that Klara is Xaviera's daughter by 
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the Cardinal, but even if we take this as a given, the reference to him 
who believes himself Klara's father is not solved. Nicolo, the Bishop, 
and the Cardinal are three possibilities. At least one other possible 
interpretation of what Nicolo says, then, is: "Yes, I do resemble this 
man just as you, my daughter, resemble me." 
But the point is just that that interpretation is speculative too. Kleist 
leaves Nicolo's utterance ambiguous, and it would be hard, from the 
point of view of the plot, to see why. From a fhematic point of view, 
however, this ambiguity is central to the meaning of the story. Here 
we have the possibility of many candidates for a role in Klara's life, 
the uncertainty as to who appropriately fills the role, and resemblances 
as a key, albeit also an uncertain one, to the possibility of substituting 
one for another. And the resulting meaning of the sentence, as far as 
its key issues are concerned-who is like whom, and who appropri-
ately relates to whom-is as ambiguous as is the story itself with 
regard to those issues. 
Die Marquise von O . . . 
Die Marquise van O ... is evidently one of Kleist' s most bizarre and 
intriguing stories; and yet in spite of its strangeness, it has produced 
remarkably little critical discussion and even less controversy. 1 Of the 
nine separate studies of the story, three treat it in conjunction with 
other works of literature (a procedure that always results in a partial 
view of the work that is mainly relevant to the others selected for 
discussion with it), two concern its sources, and one is a brief com-
ment on its sentence structure. Only three are serious interpretative 
essays. Yet even in these the reader finds little that is not obvious on 
first glance. The best known and most often cited of them is by Walter 
Muller-Seidel, whose title announces a focus on "die Struktur des 
Widerspruchs." But while this imposing title may seem to indicate a 
thematic interpretation, all that actually follows are some remarks on 
the contradiction between the fact of the Marquise's pregnancy and 
her sense of her own innocence of any illicit sexual behavior. Far from 
being genuinely interpretative, this is only an elementary description 
of one aspect of the plot that any reader can see easily enough for 
himself. Most other critics have spoken of the Marquise's strength of 
mind or her struggle to retain her own sense of purity and equilib-
rium;2 but again, this is superficial description rather than interpreta-
tion, adhering to what is obvious while avoiding the text's real puz-
zles. 
Some critical disagreements have been generated by the figure of 
the Count. Reusner, 3 for example, disliked the ending of the text 
because of the Marquise's acceptance of the Count after his earlier 
behavior towards her, which he considers unthinkable-how can she 
possibly marry such a man? But even here the overwhelming consen-
sus has been the bland view that the Count is acceptable as a man 
who is neither angel nor devil, but simply a human being, as Klein 
puts it. 4 The Count, then, is an ordinary man, guilty of a momentary 
lapse but still much like anybody else. Perhaps it is symptomatic of 
the apparent lack of controversial issues that Muller-Seidel 5 tries to 
produce an artificial controversy by taking a fellow critic to task for 
his carelessly paraphrasing the Marquise's final comment in a way 
that makes the Count seem to her devil and angel at the same time, 
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instead of first angel, then later devil. Muller-Seidel goes on to insist 
that only the second formulation makes sense of the Marquise's rejec-
tion of the Count when she learns the truth. But the real puzzle over 
the Count's actions and the Marquise's reactions is scarcely affected 
by this distinction; whether revealed in sequence or simultaneously, 
it is evident that the existence in the same man of the capacity for 
both modes of behavior is what troubles the Marquise, and the reader. 
That so bizarre a text can have aroused so little interpretative com-
ment and almost no critical controversy is exceedingly strange; a 
reader new to the story and to the critical literature would surely be 
surprised to find such an unusual work responded to with so little 
sense of its oddness. One of the problems may well be that the central 
event so arrests our attention that we tend to lose sight of the other 
features of the text that are almost equally strange. For there is much 
else here that is extraordinary and striking and that does not seem 
necessarily relevant to a story of a woman faced with a bizarre situa-
tion that brings out her courage and strength of character. There are 
the violent changes of mind of the Marquise at the end of the story; 
there is the managerial and sometimes devious role of the Marquise's 
mother and her virtual punishment of her husband; there is the odd-
ness of the obsessively courtly and polite behavior on the part of all 
the story's characters and the contrast of this civilized surface with 
the very uncivilized event that is central to its plot; there is the odd 
way in which the narrator broadly hints at what has happened during 
the blank in his text yet at the same time refuses to be explicit, treat-
ing the event as an unmentionable subject that we are nonetheless 
allowed and even encouraged to guess at; and finally there is the 
person of the Commandant, and especially the grotesque scene of his 
reconciliation with his daughter. I have left mention of that scene 
until last because immediately upon contemplation, it becomes the 
most arresting element in the entire text; there is surely nothing quite 
so bizarre in all of Kleist's stories. Some critics pass over it in silence; 
some judge it as what they would perhaps like it to be: "riihrende 
Versohnungsszenen voll SiiBigkeit" ;6 and some criticize it as being in 
bad taste. But whether we instinctively like it or are repelled by it, this 
is a startling scene and must provoke some thought about why Kleist 
includes it and what light it sheds on the story's thematic structure. 
Let us look at the details. 
The Marquise's mother has insisted that the Commandant come to 
his daughter, not she to him, as a sign of his contrition. As he enters 
the room, "Der Kommandant beugte sich ganz krumm, und heulte, 
daB die Wande erschallten" (137). His wife finds it hard to carry 
through with the scene, "da er sich ganz konvulsivisch gebardete" 
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(138), but leaves the two together for them to make peace after their 
quarrel. She returns after a time: "Und, wie sie durchs Schliisselloch 
bemerkte, saB sie auch auf des Kommandanten SchoB, was er sonst 
in seinem Leben nicht zugegeben hatte" (138). She opens the door, 
and the full description of an extraordinary scene follows: 
... die Tochter still, mit zuriickgebeugtem Nacken, die Augen fest geschlos-
sen, in des Vaters Armen liegen; indessen dieser, au£ dem Lehnstuhl sitzend, 
lange, heiBe und lechzende Kiisse, das groBe Auge voll glanzender Tranen, 
auf ihren Mund driickte: gerade wie ein Verliebter! Die Tochter sprach nicht, 
er sprach nicht; mit iiber sie gebeugtem Antlitz saB er, wie iiber das Madchen 
seiner ersten Liebe, und legte ihr den Mund zurecht, und kuBte sie .... Sie 
nahte sich dem Vater endlich, und sah ihn, da er eben wieder mit Fingern 
und Lippen in unsaglicher Lust iiber den Mund seiner Tochter beschaftigt 
war, sich um den Stuhl herumbeugend, von der Seite an. . .. Sie lud und 
fiihrte beide, die wie Brautleute gingen, zur Abendtafel. (138-39) 
In a story that often seems bizarre, this stands out as the strangest 
passage of all. But more than that, it is actually bizarre within the 
established terms of the story itself, for it breaks down several of the 
conventions which had been established in the text up to this point. 
To begin with, there is the general convention of economy in Kleist's 
narratives; to judge from the rest of the work, we might have ex-
pected him to get all of this over with in half a sentence: "Der Kom-
mandant, als er diese Nachricht erfuhr, versohnte sich bald mit seiner 
Tochter." Then there is the related convention of a bare style, without 
a great deal of emotive language; we should not have thought that he 
would introduce phrases like "wie iiber das Madchen seiner ersten 
Liebe, und legte ihr den Mund zurecht, und kiiBte sie." But the most 
important convention of the story that this passage violates is that of 
tact and a civilized surface, both in the manner in which the episode 
is narrated and in the substance of the events described. Coming 
from the general background of these formal, elegant people and of 
Kleist's reserved, tactful narrative that is in its way an expression of 
their civilized ethos, we are shocked to read that the father plants 
"heiBe und lechzende Kiisse" on his daughter's mouth, and later 
that "er eben wieder mit Fingern und Lippen in unsaglicher Lust 
iiber den Mund seiner Tochter beschaftigt war." 
Quite how far this passage is removed from the convention of the 
story will become apparent if we compare it to the tact and decorum 
of the description of that other act that might much more deservedly 
have been described in a grotesque and repelling fashion but is not: 
"Hier-traf er, da bald darauf ihre erschrockenen Frauen erschienen 
... " (106). Here, a dash glosses over the scene of the rape whereas 
the scene between father and daughter is treated in the opposite way. 
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We are left with a puzzling contrast between the tactful cover up of a 
potentially repelling scene that was necessary to and indeed the most 
central part of the plot, on the one hand, and on the other hand a 
gratuitously explicit description of an event that apparently lacks the 
same value in the plot of the story, and in which the descriptive 
language is in gross violation of the tactfulness that had prevailed in 
the former case. The contrast is one that must be taken very seriously 
indeed in interpreting the story; when here Kleist's explicit display of 
a socially unacceptable and even offensive scene reminds us of his 
conspicuous avoidance of any description of ·a previous event that 
was even more offensive and socially unacceptable in character, we 
may be certain that this is a clue to the point of the second scene, for 
the contrast invites a look at the parallelism. 
One feature of the parallel has obvious thematic importance; here 
we find suggestions of a second socially forbidden act and transgres-
sion against accepted mores to follow the first (the rape of the Mar-
quise): incest between father and daughter. In a story that centers on 
one illicit act, the powerful suggestions of another, equally illicit act 
must be well considered. 7 This second transgression throws a com-
pletely new light on the first and on the responses to it of all the 
characters in the story throughout. At the very least, it must raise the 
question of the Commandant's earlier motivation. Does his own re-
pressed desire for his daughter play any part in his becoming uncon-
trollably furious with her presumed sexual adventure? Is his own 
latent wish to commit a socially unacceptable act part of the emotional 
basis for his horror at her presumed immorality? And is the basis for 
his final ability to accept the Count as husband to the Marquise this 
partial acting out of his wishes, or at least his facing the reality of 
what his feelings about his daughter had been? Perhaps a more im-
portant question is how we should judge the Count now that his 
transgression is not unique in the story. We may need to rethink the 
entire question of illicit desires, and their occurrence in this particular 
social setting, among these particular people. And further, how shall 
we view and understand the Marquise's outrage at the Count after 
her own participation in this suggestive scene? 
For the moment, it is best to leave these questions and to look again 
at the story from the beginning, armed with our new awareness of 
this fundamental complication that has affected all the judgments we 
can make about the story. Once again, Kleist has introduced, nearly 
at the end of the text, a scene that has the effect of making us unsure 
of our understanding of what has preceded it and calling into ques-
tion the attitude to the whole that we had been inclined to take until 
that point. And, once more, it becomes necessary to go back over the 
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whole text to make sure that we have seen all that was there. 
From the very first, the story works with a strikingly clear notion of 
civilized behavior, which even includes civilized violence, as opposed 
to uncivilized behavior and unacceptable violence. Though the attack 
by the Russian troops on the Commandant's citadel involves death 
and destruction and is a violent act by any natural standards, it still 
counts as socially acceptable and even as perfectly understandable, 
civilized behavior. Militarily, the Russians may be enemies, but there 
is no notion that they are personally enemies, or that they are guilty 
of reprehensible behavior. The Count F. can socialize with the Com-
mandant's family, and while the immediate cause of that may be the 
gratitude of the family for his gallantry in protecting the Marquise, it 
is also true that his behavior is expected, and that it does not surprise 
the reader; how else should an officer and a gentleman behave? The 
family displays neither bitterness towards the Count as a conqueror 
nor hostility to him as one who has waged war and killed men on 
their side. The reader seems easily to accept the strange double stan-
dard in their expressing no feelings of outrage at the brutality of acts 
of war such as storming and bombing the citadel yet being shocked 
that the Count might be court-martialed for refusing to carry dis-
patches as his orders dictate. The rules of the game allow the former 
but not the latter; war is a civilized game that permits violation of 
persons and property within its artificial limits and conventions but 
not the violation of those conventions. The family's concern for the 
Count shows that while within the game he is their enemy, he is more 
fundamentally one of their own kind. 
Had the Marquise been killed through military action, that would 
have been according to the rules; but there is another kind of violence 
that is unacceptable and uncivilized. The contrast is strongly empha-
sized in the text. The Russian soldiers make "abscheuliche Gebarden," 
they are an "entsetzliche, sich unter einander selbst bekampfende, 
Rotte," and they treat the Marquise to "den schandlichsten Mi8hand-
lungen." The narrator calls them "Hunde," and as such they are 
routed by the Count. Where civilized violence ends and uncivilized 
violence begins is clear in what he does: "Er stie8 noch dern letzten 
viehischen Mordknecht, der ihren schlanken Leib umfa8t hielt, rnit 
dem Griff des Degens ins Gesicht, da8 er, mit aus dem Mund vorquel-
lendem Blut, zuriicktaumelte; bot dann der Dame, unter einer ver-
bindlichen, franzosischen Anrede den Arm, und fiihrte sie ... " (105). 
Thus the convention of the story is established: bombing, shooting, 
burning is acceptable, so gross an act as smashing a soldier in the face 
may even be gallant, but acts not covered by this agreement as to 
what will count as civilized violence are unacceptable and "viehisch." 
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The Count underlines the contrast by taking the gentleman's role in 
relation to the lady as if they were on a ballroom floor instead of in 
the middle of a battle and the two on opposing sides; he addresses 
her in French, showing himself to be a civilized man who speaks the 
most civilized of tongues. Though he is a Russian and in Italy, his 
choice of language reassures her that he knows how to behave. The 
reader gets the strong impression that the fact of the Count and 
Marquise being on opposite sides is quite artificial, and that in a 
deeper sense the division is between them and the uncivilized, lower-
class soldiers. 
From this point on, civilized behavior, politeness and formality 
prevail-with the one exception of the scene between father and 
daughter; and in view of the contrast established at this early stage, it 
is all the more worrying that in the later scene the Commandant's 
kisses are "lechzend" -a curious reminiscence of the language that 
referred to the soldiers ("viehisch," "Hunde") earlier. The absolute-
ness of the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable violence 
is driven home by the fate of the soldiers; they are shot because they 
seemed intent on rape, though they did not accomplish it, and the 
Russian commander gives the Commandant an apology, all of which 
confirms that the Count's gallant behavior was wholly expected and 
in accordance with the rules. And yet, having set up these clear 
notions of what the rules are, the story first has the Count break them 
and then later has the Commandant at least looking as if he is longing 
to break them and is partially doing so, with those "lechzende Kusse." 
The Count is linked to the bestiality of the soldiers by his doing what 
they seemed intent on doing, and the Commandant by the linguistic 
reminiscence of that bestiality. The odd fact is that both the Count 
and Commandant fight an exemplary civilized war over the citadel, 
but that both transgress against the norms of civilized behavior when 
the Marquise is the prize. 
That the two men take part in two different struggles over two 
different prizes involving two different codes of behavior is of course 
more than hinted at in the text. There are frequent analogies between 
the conduct of war and that of love, as for example when it is said that 
the family thinks that the Count "Damenherzen <lurch Anlauf, wie 
Festungen, zu erobern gewohnt scheine" (114). But the entangling of 
the different areas of love and war seems all the more appropriate 
when we notice that the Marquise's position is indeed like that of an 
overprotected "Festung." She lives under the care of her parents, "in 
der groBten Eingezogenheit" (104). In this withdrawn condition she 
is protected not merely by her father and mother, her immaculate 
reputation, and her living in the citadel of which her father is com-
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mander. To complete the ring of protection and inaccessibility around 
her, she is widowed and has sworn not to marry again. An unmarried 
daughter would normally be subject to the attention of young men; a 
young widow with small children, on the other hand, can decide not 
to marry and thus to perpetuate her protected state in a way that an 
as yet unmarried young woman could not hope to. The Marquise can 
make this decision and not risk the appearance of strangeness that a 
single woman would certainly have under identical circumstances. 
When the Count wishes to ask for her hand in marriage, he ap-
proaches her directly but very soon finds that he has to negotiate not 
with h •r, since she falls silent, but with her father; the Commandant 
speaks for her without any apparent fear of contradiction and with-
out waiting to ask what she thinks, though later on it becomes obvious 
that she does not agree with what her father has said on her behalf. It 
is the Commandant who announces to the Count his daughter's basic 
position: that she has decided not to marry again, that his great ser-
vice to her may cause her to reconsider, but that she will need some 
time to think things over. And it is he, not she, who shows signs of 
irritation when the Count persists. The Marquise seems to be entirely 
in the protective custody of her father, guarded and defended by 
him. The story proceeds as a struggle over her between him and the 
Count, parallel to the military struggle between them over the citadel. 
When reference is made to the Count's attempting to take the Mar-
quise's heart by storm, there is irony in the fact that, unknown to the 
family, he has already taken her by storm in a different sense. But 
whichever sense of "taking by storm" we think of-the superficial or 
the ironic meaning-there is a curious symmetry between that notion 
and the notion that the Marquise was previously in an overprotected, 
defensive position. Can so securely defended a position be taken in 
any way other than by storm? The story is in the main a realistic one; 
but this parallelism of the Count's storming the citadel to wrest it 
from its previous defender and his equally wresting the well-defended 
Marquise from her current protector looks more like symbolic fantasy, 8 
an arrangement of plot elements not merely for overt realistic motiva-
tion but at the same time to cast the Count' s action in a different light, 
one in which his kind of approach to her seems curiously appropriate, 
in its force and intensity, to the degree of her withdrawn, overpro-
tected state of mind. 
The text underlines the parallelism by many further details. For 
example, the Count's strictly military approach is an attack on the 
peace of the household, and it interrupts the quiet withdrawn life of 
the Marquise as well; it then subsides, and "alles kehrte nun in die 
alte Ordnung der Dinge zuriick" (109). His second arrival, this time 
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with intent to take the Marquise instead of the citadel, has a similar 
effect of disturbing the calm of the household; once more it is thrown 
into a state of being "in der lebhaftesten Unruhe" (115). As before, a 
battle of wills between Count and Commandant ensues, the Com-
mandant defending against renewed thrusts from the Count. And, 
again as before, the Count is willing to break the rules; he will dis-
obey orders from his superior in order to stay at the home of the 
Marquise until she knows him well enough to make a decision. The 
Commandant is displeased and remarks, "daB es ihm auBerst leid 
tun wiirde, wenn die Leidenschaft, die er zu seiner Tochter gefaBt zu 
haben scheine, ihm Unannehmlichkeiten von der ernsthaftesten Art 
zuzoge" (113). Here there is an ironic double meaning since, unknown 
to the Commandant, there has already been a different violation of 
the rules, also caused by the Count's strong response to the Marquise, 
and it too will cause great unpleasantness. The Commandant's re-
minding him of the consequences also has several levels of meaning, 
for the Count's military transgression will bring upon him the anger 
of those of the Commandant's rank on the Russian side; the Com-
mandant's warning is in one sense an admonition to the Count-as 
from a senior to a junior officer. But another part of the meaning of 
the Commandant's words that derives from his own identification 
with senior officers generally is a threat from the older to the younger 
man of retribution for the latter's competing unfairly for the woman 
currently in the former's possession. 
The language of the family's discussion of the proposal by the 
Count to stay at the citadel and neglect his orders continues to make 
the analogy between love and war, and particularly to stress the fact 
that this is a kind of battle between the Count and the Commandant 
for possession of the Marquise. The Commandant thinks the Count's 
announced course of action is only a "Schreckschuls beim Sturm" 
(114), just a shot to frighten them all into surrender, and his son takes 
up the metaphor, calling it a "Kriegslist." The Commandant would 
like to stand firm, and not to allow the Count's questionable tactics to 
succeed, but he has a shock in store for him. He has lost the citadel in 
a fair fight according to the rules of war but is now to find that, to his 
disgust and disappointment, he will not be able to make a firm stand 
in his defense of his daughter and her heart because the rest of the 
garrison suddenly seems to be intent on conniving with the enemy to 
surrender without a fight; his family seems eager to arrange it, with 
or without his blessing. 
When the Count decided to violate his orders, the Commandant 
realized that he would win merely by standing pat; and so he de-
mands that no one in the family speak of this matter any further in his 
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presence. But his wife has an entirely different interest in the out-
come of the battle, and she now works to arrange her husband's 
defeat, as she continues to do throughout the story. While her hus-
band has, holds, and defends his daughter, his wife clearly wishes 
her daughter were married once more and out of the house, for 
reasons that become obvious when the basic character of the Com-
mandant's attachment to his daughter appears in their final scene 
together. Without subversion from within his own household, the 
Commandant's position can be simple: all he needs to do is wait for 
the inevitable court-martial of the Count, who would then automati-
cally be no fit husband for the Marquise. Still, something about the 
young Russian's determination must be worrying to the Comman-
dant, for he paces up and down, betraying his unease and his con-
cern about a situation in which his main antagonist does not play by 
the rules as he understands them. His wife then asks her daughter 
what she thinks of the situation, and the Marquise replies: "Wenn der 
Vater bewirkt hatte, dais er nach Neapel gereist ware, so ware alles 
gut" (116). The reply is short and somewhat oblique-but shattering. 
It contains several implications, the most obvious being that in criti-
cizing her father's actions on her behalf she already gives us a sign 
that she does not accept his total control and possession of her. An-
other implication is that the Commandant is guilty himself of unfair 
play: as the older, more experienced man, he has stood by and 
watched while the younger man has made a mistake that must dis-
qualify him. The Marquise is pointing to the fact that her father must 
bear part of the blame for the Count's fate-he could have saved him 
from this obvious and unnecessary error. 
But something even more important is revealed in the Marquise's 
quiet, short remark. She has by implication made it clear that the 
Commandant has already lost the struggle: the Marquise is saying 
that she wants the Count as her husband! She is telling everyone 
what, after all the maneuvering, she wants the outcome to be, for 
what else can the oblique phrase "so ware alles gut" refer to? She 
says, in effect, that if her father only managed things properly, she 
could (and would want to) marry the young man. The Count evidently 
has taken this lady's heart "<lurch Anlauf, wie eine Festung." From 
this point on, all that the family talks about is the details of the 
capitulation, and the poor Commandant is actually criticized by his 
daughter for not having taken a more active part in it. And so, despite 
all the shaking of heads over the Count's unreasonable tactics and 
about needed patience and deference, these tactics have in fact suc-
ceeded brilliantly! In this case, at least, an unacceptable breach of 
social norms does win the lady by storm, and that makes us wonder 
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again about the earlier, more extreme case. The Commandant pro-
tests in reply that he could have done nothing to change what the 
young man wishes to do, but now the Marquise reproves him directly 
by saying "lebhafte und eindringliche Vorstellungen tun ihre Wir-
kung" (116). She then returns to her work "ein wenig unwillig," 
which, within the context of her normally silent and deferential bear-
ing towards her father, is a distinct sign of her annoyance with him. 
There is a curious irony in what occurs next, for now the theme of 
the polite observance of the social conventions and rules as opposed 
to taking what one wants directly by storm is reversed. Now it is the 
family who wants, when the Count appears, to get over with the 
necessary "Hoflichkeitsbezeugungen" quickly, "um ihn mit vereinter 
Kraft zu bestiirmen" (116); they want to make him go to Naples. But 
they cannot break through; he now turns the tables by using the 
forms of polite conversation deftly to avoid the issue being raised. He 
defeats them again, using their weapons, so that they are not even 
able to mention what they want. When the Count has finally left the 
room at the end of the evening, the Commandant is all for leaving 
things as they are; but his wife now gives the conversation a decisive 
tum by asking directly if the Marquise would accept the Count, given 
some tilme, some inquiries about him, and provided no untoward 
revelations result. She replies: "In diesem Fall, versetzte die Mar-
quise, wiird ich-da in der Tat seine Wiinsche so lebhaft scheinen, 
diese Wiinsche-sie stockte, und ihre Augen glanzten, indem sie 
dies sagte-um der Verbindlichkeit willen, die ich ihm schuldig bin, 
erfiillen" (117). This confirms our earlier understanding: she is im-
pressed by him and will accept him, and her eyes shine not from 
gratitude but from excitement. Her mother is delighted since she has 
always wished to have her daughter marry again. 
The details, once this is clear, are quickly worked out: the Count 
will go to Naples, inquiries will meanwhile be made about him, and 
all will be well on his return. All present seem pleased-but for the 
Commandant: "Der Kommandant, der alles gehort hatte, stand am 
Fenster, sah auf die Strafse hinaus, und sagte nichts. . . . Nun so 
macht! macht! macht! rief der Yater, indem er sich umkehrte: ich mufs 
mich diesem Russen schon zum zweitenmal ergeben!" (118). The 
only surface reason for this grumpy reaction is his annoyance over 
the active support of the family for a course of action opposed to that 
which he suggested; but a stronger and deeper emotional force is 
implied by his linking the two defeats, a parallel which stresses once 
more that it is the loss of the Marquise (the clear parallel to the loss of 
the citadel), not just a disagreement with his family, that upsets him. 
The real content and shape of that emotional force only becomes 
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completely apparent in that strange scene of reconciliation between 
himself and his daughter. 
After the family has learned that the Marquise is pregnant, the 
confusing of love and war becomes more than metaphor; in his inter-
view with his daughter, the Commandant actually seizes a pistol and 
fires a shot. The situation between father and daughter receives new 
emphasis and force here; after this there can scarcely be any doubt 
about the depth of emotion involved in the Commandant's attitude to 
his daughter, or that the relationship has major importance for the 
thematic structure of the whole story. He is first intensely affected by 
the news of her pregnancy and wants nothing more to do with his 
daughter. When she tries nonetheless to see him against his express 
wish, he behaves in a way that displays barely controlled violence, 
and she leaves immediately. The scene is striking in many ways. An 
added dimension to the confusion of the military and family situation 
lies in the Commandant's grasping his pistol almost in self-defense 
against the Marquise's breaking into his sanctuary and taking his 
room by storm against his command. But this quasi-military act of 
naked force is also another of those primitive acts in the story that 
break in gross fashion the civilized convention of the social relations 
among these normally elegant people. The civilized facade crumbles 
and something deeper reaches the surface, as usual something with 
distinct sexual overtones, for the strange act of firing a pistol into the 
ceiling looks like a displaced and only barely averted act of male 
aggression. Once more, what we see here is uncomfortably close in 
spirit to the Count' s original misdeed. The interpretation of the Com-
mandant's state of mind is not difficult, given all that we have seen of 
him in the story. He feels again betrayed, but this time more deeply. 
He lost the military battle to the Count, then the battle for his daugh-
ter's heart; but now he finds that he has lost even more completely to 
some unknown male. The Marquise has been guilty of immorality, it 
seems, from the point of view of the social conventions-but that 
cannot be what moves the Commandant to such violence. His reac-
tion is surely provoked by the fact that she is, from his point of view, 
guilty of extreme unfaithfulness to him. The Marquise's state indi-
cates to him that she has been involved in a forbidden relationship; 
but his response has surely more to do with his own repressed feel-
ings for his daughter, which are also of a socially forbidden nature, a 
fact which emerges even more clearly later on when, at last, those 
feelings are acknowledged and expressed. 
In characteristic fashion, the Marquise withdraws after this latest 
familial disaster and goes off to her country estate: "Sie beschloB, sich 
ganz in ihr Innerstes zuriickzuziehen" (126). This is part of her con-
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stant pattern of withdrawal from the world and its challenges. But the 
language of the text, in equally characteristic fashion, sees her depar-
ture in military terms; she seizes her "Beute" (her children) and de-
cides "sich mit Stolz gegen die Anfalle der Welt zu riisten" (126). It is 
not, as most critics have seen the matter, strength of character that is 
most conspicuous in her settling down "in ewig klosterlicher Einge-
zogenheit zu leben" (126); what becomes most obvious is that this 
constitutes yet another setting up of a protective fortress around her. 
Appropriately enough, the next event in the story is yet another 
storming of the fortress by the Count, who, having been refused 
civilized entry by the front gate, once again defies convention, scales 
the wall, and takes the Marquise by surprise. But her reaction is still 
one of withdrawal. On hearing that he still intends to marry her, she 
orders him away and rushes off herself when he will not leave; he 
tries to tell her something (presumably the truth about the origin of 
her condition), but she will not let him, insisting as she goes: "Ich will 
nichts wissen" (129). This must raise the question whether at some 
level of her mind she knows what he wants to tell her. To be sure, her 
fury later, when she finds out, is sudden and extreme, but the fact 
that she is so insistent on not knowing here must indicate that there is 
some notion in her mind that the Count is somehow connected with 
what has happened to her. A strange proposal of marriage and a 
strange pregnancy are two mysteries that her mind may well begin to 
link. 
Kleist now begins what for him is a remarkably slow-moving sec-
tion of the story that leads up to the final discovery of the truth and to 
the ending of the story. The Commandant's wife has a large role in 
this ending, for it is she who in a sense must tidy up and resolve the 
strange state that the relationship between father and daughter has 
reached. It is at her instigation that the reconciliation between the two 
takes place; and it is part of the paradox of this scene that it is in her 
interest to instigate it, for the reconciliation involves both a drawing 
together of father and daughter and a disengagement of them in a 
more fundamental sense, as an essential prelude to the Marquise 
marrying again and leaving her father. It is as if the tension in the 
relationship between father and daughter must be resolved before 
she can be effectively removed from his circle to marry again. After an 
explicit display of the Commandant's strong feelings about his 
daughter, the relationship no longer seems so threatening and in-
tense. Here, then, is one important reason for the grotesque scene 
between the two: for a brief moment, the Commandant can step 
outside the conventions that have limited him and act out what is 
forbidden; following that, he is resigned to what has happened and 
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what will happen. The scene between father and daughter is a kind of 
granting to the father of a repressed wish, as a prelude to his relin-
quishing control over his daughter. But this function of the scene as 
part of the sequence of happenings between the characters has far 
less importance than its thematic function, which is of course to make 
us rethink in radical fashion all of the story's moral assumptions, 
conventions of civilized behavior, and distinctions between what is 
permissible and what is not. 
Until now, the story has viewed as entirely separate the uncivi-
lized, socially and morally unacceptable act of the Count, on the one 
hand, and on the other hand the elegant, civilized behavior that 
predominates in the story. There have been only occasional hints, 
such as the Commandant's pistol shot, of any more complexity in the 
moral issues of the story than just this simple division. What the 
scene between father and daughter accomplishes thematically is to 
question that whole distinction, and with it what had seemed to be 
the moral values of the story. The single gross transgression suddenly 
no longer appears to be a mere isolated, freakish act but a possibility 
that is always present, in one form or another, and waiting to break 
through the civilized surface. When the Commandant embraces his 
daughter in a manner that is so clearly sexual, the narrator allows 
himself only a mild expression of surprise at her sitting on his lap, 
"was er sonst in seinem Leben nicht zugegeben hatte" (138). But 
even this characteristically muted comment adds important new in-
formation: the Commandant had evidently hidden all his life from his 
wish to embrace his daughter and even during her childhood had 
been afraid of her femininity. Now he embraces her in almost explicitly 
forbidden and incestuous fashion, and this sudden breakthrough from 
severe inhibition to a forbidden act is structurally so similar to the 
Count's lapse that it calls into question the whole assumption of the 
uniqueness of his deplorable act that had up to this point prevailed. If 
one simply views the acts themselves, the Count's transgression is 
still very much greater than the Commandant's; the degree of of-
fense, and even offensiveness, makes for a considerable difference 
between the Count's action and the scene between father and daugh-
ter, despite the incestuous nature of that scene. But there are other 
factors that complicate this judgment. First, what the Commandant 
actually does is certainly less, but the desires that are thereby re-
vealed are in their nature much more socially unacceptable than the 
Count's. And second, the entire set of circumstances of the Count's 
action must be considered. It is by no means an adequate version of 
that situation to think of it as a forcible, violent rape. If we look at 
what happens on a level that is admittedly primitive, but that is 
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certainly a real part of the situation, the Count first wins her by 
fighting off the soldiers; he then offers her his protection and is ac-
cepted in that role so totally that she faints when she knows she is 
safe with him. There is no brutal overcoming of resistance, and again 
at a primitive emotional level he has taken her only after first defend-
ing her as his own and after having her accept his possession of her 
by her fainting and thus acknowledging the sufficiency of his protec-
tion. Of course this is only one way of seeing things, and it does not 
remove the possibility of more orthodox moral judgments, which 
indeed are also required. My point in comparing the actions of the 
two men is not, however, to assess blame. It is merely to show that 
the Commandant's behavior towards his daughter functions to re-
move the sense we have had of the uniqueness of the Count' s act and 
to reveal the tension beneath the civilized elegance of the whole world 
in which these people live. The Count's rehabilitation follows only 
after the truth emerges that all those who live in this splendidly 
elegant world are vulnerable to a sudden capitulation to the demands 
of those more primitive emotions that that world attempts to ignore 
and repress. 
The story's final mixing of the conventions of warfare and court-
ship (a confusion that, as we can now see, has always been designed 
to draw attention to the arbitrariness of the rules in both spheres 
having to do with direct, forceful behavior) appears in the Count's 
coming to claim the Marquise in the very military uniform that he had 
worn when he first stormed the citadel. The analogy between Mar-
quise and citadel continues to the last; it is as if the Count still insists 
on his tactics of taking by storm, which have indeed been successful. 
The disturbing question arises: could a woman so well defended, so 
withdrawn, and so wanting to be overprotected have been taken any 
other way? Once more the Marquise's reaction is one of withdrawal, 
but now her father is supportive of the Count: "Der Kommandant 
legte seine Hand auf ihn; seine Augenwimpern zuckten, seine Lip-
pen waren weiB, wie Kreide. Moge der Fluch des Himmels von die-
sen Scheiteln weichen! rief er: wann gedenken Sie zu heiraten?" (141). 
The description of the Commandant's exterior contains no very pre-
cise guide to his emotions, but his shaky condition is surely not due 
alone to his learning simply the truth of what has happened; it must 
also have partly to do with his having faced his own illicit desires and 
seen their continuity with the actions of the Count. 
There remains the slow process by which the Marquise comes to 
accept the Count; she is cautious, as always, but after a very short 
time she makes a definite move in his direction. The reason for her 
initial refusal to accept him when the truth has finally emerged is 
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given in her own words in the much quoted final lines of the story: 
"Er wiirde ihr damals nicht wie ein Teufel erschienen sein, wenn er 
ihr nicht, bei seiner ersten Erscheinung, wie ein Engel vorgekommen 
ware" (143). But, if we take this in the context of the whole story and 
the thematic reversal near the end, there is much more to this remark 
than simply her having formed an image of the Count that resulted in 
the maximum disappointment. (She says she would have been pre-
pared instead "au£ jeden Lasterhaften.") What is really involved is a 
whole way of thinking about herself and the social group whose 
standards of behavior she accepts. She was prepared to meet a man 
comparable to the animals who originally attacked her because they 
apparently made no pretense to civilized behavior and so were irrele-
vant to her and her family's way of life. The only person the Marquise 
has suspected of being the guilty party is the employee of the family, 
Leopardo, a lower-class creature who presumably does not know any 
better. But the fact that the Count was guilty of the act calls in ques-
tion this whole way of thinking and the basis of the inhibited, civilized 
world in which she lives. The way in which the story ends does not, 
as is often said, indicate that it is about the single mistake of a basically 
good man. 9 On the contrary, it stresses the thinness of the veneer of 
civilization and the fragility of civilized conventions, both military 
and social, which are designed to contain aggression, desire, and 
violence. Nowhere does this thematic basis of the story become more 
apparent than in the grotesque and seemingly unnecessary scene 
between father and daughter; and when we consider how the Mar-
quise seemed initially to have chosen a way of life that protected her 
against her own emotions, and how her father too had never in his 
life allowed his affection for his daughter to find expression, it almost 
seems that the Count, in taking them all by storm, has finally had the 
effect of liberating them from the inhibited condition in which he 
found them. In a curious way, the degree of his unacceptable direct-
ness matched the degree of their having withdrawn behind the walls 
of a defensive emotional fortress. Could the Marquise otherwise have 
reached the happy and relaxed state, as she finally does, of having 
"eine ganze Reihe von jungen Russen" (143)? 
Das Erdbeben in Chili 
Das Erdbeben in Chili 1 has attracted more critical attention than any 
other of Kleist's stories, with the exception of the much longer Michael 
Kohlhaas, and has even been considered by many critics to be a more 
accomplished work of art. Bonafous thought that "cette nouvelle, par 
sa composition, ses nuances, son energie et sa concision nous parait 
la meilleure que Kleist ait ecrit"; Herzog maintained that it was Kleist's 
"starkste und elementarste Novelle"; and Korff considered it to be 
the thematic basis of all the other stories, "denn in allen diesen No-
vellen bebt die Erde." 2 But it is an intriguing fact about Das Erdbeben 
in Chili that one critical opinion immediately seems to provoke an-
other that contradicts it. Gundolf, for example, thought the Erdbeben a 
meaningless story in which Kleist introduced one disaster after an-
other solely to maintain the tension; this judgment is opposed by 
Bonafous, who said that it was constructed very strictly according to a 
philosophical idea. 3 There is in fact an astonishing lack of agreement 
among its critics on every aspect of Das Erdbeben in Chili-its tone and 
style, its value, its theme and meaning, and even on the judgment of 
its characters. 
Opinion is evenly divided as to whether the story is optimistic or 
pessimistic. Herzog, Witkop, Wolff, and Silz4 take the pessimistic 
view, but each stresses different aspects of the story that lead him to 
this conclusion, while Pangs, Blocker, Brahm, and Bonafous 5 believe 
it to be optimistic, though once more none gives the same reason. 
There have been many statements of the theme of the story: Wolff 
thought that it was Rousseauism, the corruption of society as against 
the inherent goodness of nature; Blocker, that the world is "ein Rat-
sel"; Bonafous, that the story shows the goodness of God to man; 
Bennett, that the incomprehensible and irresponsible forces of the 
universe break into the ordered life of man; Conrady, that "das Wi-
derspiel zwischen den Wirkungen der Naturkrafte und den Folgen 
der Menschengewalt ... bleibt ein wesentliches Thema dieser No-
velle"; Klein, that man can begin again by an act of "geistige Neu-
schopfung"; Staiger, 6 that it is about the conflict between "Geist" and 
"Gefiihl"; and there are many others. Even the question as to who is 
the hero or central figure of the story is disputed. The candidates for 
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the position are the two lovers, Don Fernando, and the child Philipp. 
Faced with this series of disagreements about the story, it is not sur-
prising that some commentators have thought the story obscure; but 
even here there is still dispute, for others insist on its lack of ambi-
guity. 7 
I have not introduced this welter of contradictory opinions in order 
to show that it gets us nowhere, and that a fresh start is needed; on 
the contrary, this confusion shows one very important fact about the 
story: that it provokes a great variety of different interpretations and 
ideas. Any interpretation of the story must certainly come to terms 
with this fact and explain why it should be so; and indeed on closer 
inspection we can see that many of these conflicting ideas are relevant 
to the story, and that it is precisely as conflicting ideas that they are 
relevant, though not as the competing complete explanations offered 
by its critics. They are, rather, thematic material that Kleist includes in 
his story, carefully structured and controlled by his overall design. In 
the Erdbeben there is a constant struggle by the narrator, and also by 
the characters, to interpret the events of the story; and so previous 
interpretations achieve a special interest for a story whose very theme 
is interpretation. This is because the point of the story lies not in the 
meaning of the events themselves but in the attempts made by the 
narrator and the characters to give them meaning. 
The setting of the story itself gives a clue to Kleist's thematic con-
cerns, for earthquakes traditionally have been occasions on which men 
have been moved to think and even quarrel about the structure and 
the precariousness of their existence. The most famous earthquake of 
modern times, the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, 8 had a profound influ-
ence on European thought; it was the occasion of a considerable 
sharpening of the dispute between differing theologies and theories 
of the universe. The most notable clash was that between the popular 
optimism of Leibniz's theory of the preestablished harmony (i.e., that 
this was the best of all possible worlds), a special case of the rational-
ist, optimistic thinking of the eighteenth century, and the pessimistic 
strain of thought represented by Voltaire's poem on the Lisbon earth-
quake and his Candide. No other natural event has ever provoked such 
intense philosophical and theological activity; this disaster made it 
pressing to think about how the universe worked, and whether 
everything that happened in it was ultimately an act of God. Kleist's 
choice of the earthquake in Chile as his subject in 1810 was bound 
then to evoke memories of the Lisbon earthquake and to have over-
tones of the debate which followed it; but even for the twentieth-
century reader, this choice of subject matter still in itself raises the 
question of what attitude we can take to suffering on such a scale or 
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to a disaster that is so uncontrollable and unpredictable, and before 
which human beings are so defenseless. Throughout his story, Kleist 
alludes to and plays on various kinds of attitudes to the earthquake; 
as the narrator describes the events of the story, his formulations 
suggest a series of such attitudes and thus the ways in which he is 
inclined to construe what he sees at any given tirne. The role of the 
narrator in creating the story is therefore crucial; and it is a role whose 
point can only be understood through close attention to the way in 
which the narrator's attitudes to the events of the story develop and 
change. 
The narrator begins on firm ground with the indisputable facts of 
the situation: the place and year of the earthquake. But when he 
comes to the description of how the love affair between Josephe and 
Jeronimo began, he cannot avoid interpreting the situation. He re-
mains at first fairly distant from the emotional tenor of the relation-
ship, describing it cautiously as a "zartliches Einverstandnis" (144). 
Yet when he relates how Jeronimo managed to see Josephe even after 
her father had placed her in a convent, he says that this happened 
"durch einen gliicklichen Zufall." It is not clear here whether the 
narrator is reading Jeronimo's reactions or giving his own, so that he 
is not yet committed to sympathizing with the lovers; but the formu-
lation is bound to arouse in us the suspicion that fortune may be on 
the side of the lovers, and that we can side with them too. The story 
at this point looks like a conventional romance, with young love 
opposed by the world; and with this would go the usual value judg-
ments in favor of the lovers and against those who oppose them. The 
narrator is noncommittal when he says that the "junge Siinderin" 
(the pregnant Josephe) was thrown into prison, for this is little more 
than a conventional phrase. Neither we nor he need feel yet that she 
is a sinner, or that she is not. But the description of the meeting in the 
garden, on the other hand, was oriented towards a picture of Jeronimo 
as a triumphant seducer; he had "in einer verschwiegenen Nacht den 
Klostergarten zum Schauplatze seines vollen Gliickes gemacht." 9 This 
is not the usual kind of language we should expect in a description of 
young love thwarted by wicked authorities. Already, then, there are 
two distinct images of the relationship emerging: young and innocent 
love thwarted on the one hand (and this is the dominant image), but 
on the other hand seduction through exploitation of the privileged 
position of teacher and subsequent defilement of the sacred ground 
on which the nunnery stands. The fact that it is on the "Fronleich-
namsfest" that Josephe "in Mutterwehen auf den Stufen der Kathe-
drale niedersank" tends to strengthen the latter image; the injury to 
the church is the greater for this. Evidently in some doubt as to how 
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he should view this matter of the guilt or innocence of the lovers, the 
narrator nevertheless is more certain when he describes the feelings 
of the women of the city. A clear evaluation is implied as the narrator 
describes their disappointment that the decision of the Viceroy is to 
change the planned death by fire of Josephe to a mere beheading. 
They are described with obvious irony as the "fromme Tochter der 
Stadt" (145), when those whose houses command a view of the place 
of execution invite their neighbors to come to see it. The narrator 
seems almost pleased to be able, at last, to give at least one clear 
judgment after his uncertainty as to how to judge the conduct of 
Jeronimo and Josephe, and of the Archbishop and the other authori-
ties responsible for their condemnation. 
The next sequence of events begins with Jeronimo in prison. He 
prays to the mother of God for help, but without results, and decides 
to hang himself with a rope that "der Zufall" (145) had left for him. 
This is not the first mention of the role of chance in the story, 10 and 
we must by now begin to ponder its significance. Could it mean that 
Providence offers him a fortunate release from a hopeless position? 
But at this point the earthquake occurs and alters our problem for 
interpretation. ForJeronimo at the time of the earthquake was trying 
to fix his rope to an iron hook let into one of the "Wandpfeiler." When 
the shock came, he clutched at the pillar, which prevented him from 
falling over and possibly being crushed under falling masonry. 11 All 
of this seems to hint at an interpretation of the chance by which 
Jeronimo got the rope. Providence seems to be at work in the lucky 
"chance" of Jeronimo's finding the rope with which he intends to 
hang himself, for only that lucky find ensured that, at the moment of 
the earthquake, he was in the one position in his cell that was safe. 
When formulated explicitly, this interpretation is implausible; but the 
point is that it is not so formulated, remaining instead as the implied 
conclusion towards which we feel almost instinctively directed as 
soon as we start to discern how the various aspects of the situation 
hang together. And this interpretation suggests an evaluation of Je-
ronimo: would a man who was to be regarded as guilty of moral 
crimes be favored in this way? 
The narrator's attitude to the earthquake is seen in the simile he 
uses to describe it: it happens "als ob das Firmament einstiirzte." This 
is one of a number of similar striking similes in the story. But these 
similes do more than just add power to the description; they show 
the narrator's construction on the events at this particular moment, 
his attempts to understand and construe his own story. 12 For the 
moment it almost seems that the earthquake is a product of divine 
intervention, for the word "Firmament" suggests cosmic significance. 
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There follows, to strengthen this suggestion, a seemingly miraculous 
series of events; the prison building starts to fall but is met by the fall 
of the building opposite so that an arch is formed. The prison collaps-
ing by itself would have killed Jeronimo, but the arch allows him to 
crawl out through it and escape. As soon as he is outside, no sooner 
and no later, the whole street collapses with a second tremor. After 
this he hurries along to get out of the city, for there is still danger on 
all sides. But the narrator describes the scene as if some unseen hand 
were guiding Jeronimo through this maze of destruction so that he 
finds the right path: "Hier stiirzte noch ein Haus zusammen, und 
jagte ihn, die Triimmer weit umherschleudernd, in eine Nebenstrafse; 
hier leckte die Flamme schon, in Dampfwolken blitzend, aus allen 
Giebeln, und trieb ihn schreckenvoll in eine andere; hier walzte sich, 
aus seinem Gestade gehoben, der Mapochoflufs auf ihn heran, und 
rifs ihn briillend in eine dritte" (146). In this description, Jeronimo 
seems to have all his choices made for him, as events around him 
force him to go first in one direction and then in another. 
So far, then, there is one issue that has been present in the earth-
quake and the preceding events: whether the lovers are morally guilty 
or not, and hence how and why Jeronimo has been allowed to es-
cape. The suggestion that seems to be contained in the way the narra-
tor describes the situation is that the earthquake announces Jeronimo' s 
innocence and frees him. But immediately another issue arises: "Hier 
lag ein Haufen Erschlagener, hier achzte noch eine Stimme unter 
dem Schutte, hier schrieen Leute van brennenden Dachern herab, 
hier kampften Menschen und Tiere mit den Wellen, hier war ein 
mutiger Retter bemiiht, zu helfen; hier stand ein anderer, bleich wie 
der Tod, und streckte sprachlos zitternde Hande zum Himmel" {146). 
It may be all very well to think of the earthquake as a kind of divine 
intervention on Jeronimo's behalf, but now we are made to face the 
fact that more people are involved than just one. To free an innocent 
man at the expense of the lives of so many others makes no sense. 
Certainly Jeronimo can make no sense of it. He oscillates between the 
good and the bad faces of the situtation three times. 13 First, he is 
seized by a feeling of delight that he is still alive, but then, seeing the 
others around him, "er begriff nicht, was ihn und sie hierher gefiihrt 
haben konnte" (146). Next he thanks God for his rescue (for to whom 
else can he attribute it?) but immediately remembers Josephe and 
changes his mind: "Fiirchterlich schien ihm das Wesen, das iiber den 
Wolken waltet" {147). Thus the concept of God has disappeared to be 
replaced by the vaguer concept of the Being, whoever he might be, 
and whether good or evil, who controls life. When he hears the 
erroneous report that Josephe is dead, he goes further in this direc-
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tion and now attributes the whole sequence of events to "die zer-
storende Gewalt der Natur"; this is as if to say that he was entirely 
mistaken to see any design or intelligence in the recent events, and 
certainly that he was mistaken to think of them as in his favor. (For 
events to favor him seems in fact to be the same thing as their having 
an intelligent design.) His last turn to an optimistic interpretation of 
what has happened is hope, and he looks again for Josephe; but his 
hope dies as he cannot find her. When at last he does find her, the 
concept of divine intervention appears again: "Mit welcher Seligkeit 
umarmten sie sich, die Ungliicklichen, die ein Wunder des Himmels 
gerettet hatte!'' (148). The favorable conclusion allows the return to 
the most optimistic of the attitudes that had passed through Jero-
nimo's mind and even permits the feeling that only our ignorance of 
the full story has made any other attitude possible. Yet we must 
remember that this has disposed of only one of the facts that did not 
seem to permit the idea of divine intervention, namely Josephe's 
having perished. There remains the stumbling block to that view of 
what has happened that so many others have died, all presumably as 
innocent as the couple were. But Josephe's story now follows and 
seems almost to provide an answer to this, for in the telling of it a 
new attitude to the earthquake seems to emerge. 
The procession to the execution had been broken up by the earth-
quake. Josephe then hurried to the nunnery to save her child, found 
the building in flames, and saw the Abbess die before her eyes; she 
also saw the cathedral in ruins and the shattered body of the Arch-
bishop. Meanwhile the Viceroy's palace was in flames, the court 
where she had been tried was demolished, and her father's house 
had completely disappeared. In the place of the house "war ein See 
getreten, und kochte rotliche Dampfe aus" (149). This seemed to Silz 
a Danteesque picture, 14 and it evidently functions to give the building 
the appearance of having been consumed by hellfire. In like manner 
the demolition of the seats of all those agencies that had condemned 
the pair-church, state, family-seems like a series of exemplary 
punishments, pointing to the cruelty and corruption of them all. And 
that would give the impression that the earthquake has not merely 
saved the lovers but had attacked a corrupt society, in which their fate 
was only an isolated example of that corruption. So Josephe's story 
suggests a reinterpretation of the entire text on the following lines: 
The Archbishop prosecuted Josephe and is now dead; the laws of the 
nunnery condemned her, and now it stands in flames; her family 
obstructed her love, and they have been destroyed. Many of the 
townspeople were delighted at the prospect of an execution, and they 
too have suffered. It begins to look fairly safe for the reader to brush 
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aside doubts about Jeronimo and Josephe, especially since the child 
that has resulted from their love is miraculously saved. Josephe rushes 
into the nunnery to collect it, and the building collapses as soon as 
she comes out, killing all inside. That kind of remarkable luck re-
minds us of Jeronimo's escape, and the tendency to view such luck as 
deserved is irresistible. The narrator produces another of his very 
strong similes: Josephe escapes "als ob alle Engel des Himmels sie 
umschirmten" (148). At this point, then, the narrator's formulations 
seem to explain the earthquake as the destruction of an evil city 
(rather like the biblical Sodom and Gomorrah) through the wrath of 
God; this is a broader view than the former one that concerned only 
the safety of the couple, and it seems a fairly comfortable judgment of 
the situation. 
But there are still one or two puzzling facts that do not allow us to 
be entirely content with this attitude. The Abbess had attempted to 
intercede for Josephe when she was being tried, and later she had 
promised to look after Josephe's child. When Josephe arrives at the 
nunnery, the Abbess stands at the door crying for help to save the 
child instead of getting clear of the building and to safety. She ought 
not to deserve to die, but does. The obvious conclusion to which we 
jump is that she dies as the symbolic head of a corrupt institution; this 
would be more or less consistent with the view that has been devel-
oping in the narrator's descriptions. Nevertheless, the narrator is 
clearly distressed by her death: while the body of the Archbishop is 
"zerschmettert," a word that implies no sympathy for him, the Ab-
bess is described as being "auf eine schmahliche Art erschlagen" 
(148). 15 And if such an attitude is taken to the Abbess, the Viceroy 
becomes an embarrassment, for if anyone should suffer an exemplary 
symbolic death, it is he who should do so, as the symbolic head of the 
whole society. But these are only disturbing details that are passed by 
without explicit comment, and meanwhile the predominantly opti-
mistic interpretation of the situation continues and even strengthens. 
Outside the city it is "als ob es das Tal von Eden gewesen ware" (149), 
and the whole tone of the story tends to make us take the view that 
what was corrupt in the society has been destroyed and left behind in 
the city while only people of good will have been saved. 
The first section of the story 16 ends with an idyllic passage showing 
the happiness of the lovers after their troubles seem to be as good as 
over. A new and perfect existence appears to be beginning; but the 
description of the idyll makes us uneasy: 
Indessen war die schonste Nacht herabgestiegen, voll wundermilden Duftes, 
so silberglanzend und still, wie nur ein Dichter davon traumen mag. Dberall, 
langs der Talquelle, hatten sich, im Schimmer des Mondscheins, Menschen 
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niedergelassen, und bereiteten sich sanfte Lager von Moos und Laub, um 
von einem so qualvollen Tage auszuruhen. Und weil die Armen immer noch 
jammerten; dieser, dais er sein Haus, jener, dafs er Weib und Kind, und der 
dritte, dais er alles verloren habe: so schlichen Jeronimo und Josephe in ein 
dichteres Gebiisch, um <lurch das heimliche Gejauchz ihrer Seelen niemand 
zu betriiben. Sie fanden einen prachtvollen Granatapfelbaum, der seine 
Zweige, voll duftender Friichte, weit ausbreitete; und die Nachtigall flotete 
im Wipfel ihr wolliistiges Lied. (149-50) 
Kayser noted that this was the one piece of its kind in all of Kleist's 
stories, and that it had the effect of a "glatter Stilbruch." 17 The lan-
guage here does indeed seem far removed from the rest of the narra-
tive, and the idyllic quality thus appears strained. The whole scene 
appears consequently unreal and too good to be true. The narrator is 
consistent in the view of the situation that he has adopted, but this 
very consistency exposes the weaknesses of that view. 
There are many other ways in which Kleist makes the calm of the 
middle section of his story an uneasy one. Consider, for example, the 
fact that the lovers try to get away from the laments of those who 
have lost possessions and family in the disaster, "um durch das 
heimliche Gejauchz ihrer Seelen niemand zu betriiben"; and the fur-
ther report that "sie dachten, wie viel Elend iiber die Welt kommen 
muBte, damit sie gliicklich wiirden" (150). Both passages emphasize 
the great discrepancy between the good fortune of the couple and the 
misery of many of those around them. But this discrepancy seems not 
to worry them at all; their sense of well-being so overshadows their 
compassion that they can even think in terms of this widespread 
suffering existing in order that they should be happy. Their moving 
out of the sight of the suffering in order not to disturb them does 
show some consideration, but it also makes clear that the misery 
surrounding them does not inhibit the happiness of Jeronimo and 
Josephe. 18 
A sense of unease continues to build up, and the entry of Don 
Fernando and his family into the story is a particularly tense moment, 
for here the past seems to catch up with Josephe. For a moment, it is 
not clear what his role is to be; the "Verwirrung" experienced by 
Josephe may well be felt too by the reader, for here a new character is 
introduced when the story seemed already to have run through a 
complete cycle of events. Josephe is confused because she recognizes 
him as someone she knows, but Don Fernando does not understand 
this: "Doch da er, indem er ihre Verwirrung falsch deutete, fortfuhr: 
es ist nur au£ wenige Augenblicke, Donna Josephe, und dieses Kind 
hat, seit jener Stunde, die uns alle ungliicklich gemacht hat, nichts 
genossen" (150). Now we are left to interpret this scene for ourselves, 
44 Heinrich von Kleist 
and it is not the only one of its kind where the narrator's comment is 
conspicuously incomplete. We naturally assume that Don Fernando 
thinks Josephe's hesitation is due to her uncertainty as to whether 
she will be able to feed both children, but that Josephe is in fact 
worried because Don Fernando knows she is under sentence of death. 
This little episode touches on the theme of the story in its compelling 
us to supply an explanation of what we see and in Don Fernando's 
jumping to the wrong conclusion. We are also reminded by Don 
Fernando that the earthquake has made everyone "ungliicklich," 
which emphasizes once more the uniqueness of Jeronimo and Jo-
sephe's position. 
One last disturbing point concerning the "wrath of God" interpre-
tation of the earthquake is the introduction of Don Fernando's two 
sisters as people whom Josephe knew to be "sehr wiirdige junge 
Darnen" (151). This sounds very reminiscent of the "fromme Tochter 
der Stadt." Could it be that worthy people, in the sense in which the 
term would have been employed in Santiago before the earthquake, 
have been saved? The feeling that they may constitute a danger sub-
sides slowly. Donna Elisabeth seems from time to time to be looking 
at Josephe, but only with a dreamy gaze (151), and we are also told in 
the same sentence that she had been invited by a friend to see the 
execution but had refused. She seems after all not to be a threat to the 
safety of Jeronimo and Josephe or-more importantly-to the inter-
pretation of the events that the narrator has made the basis of his 
descriptions. But now, having alluded to this series of mildly disturb-
ing events during his generally optimistic account, the narrator at last 
introduces further reports that make nonsense of the view of the story 
that had until recently seemed to prevail. The reports are introduced, 
characteristically, in midsentence and seem relevant only to a very 
minor consideration: Donna Elisabeth's dreamy gazing at Josephe is 
diverted by "der Bericht, der iiber irgend ein neues graBliches Un-
gliick erstattet ward." But we are then told "wie der Vizekonig in den 
schrecklichsten Augenblicken hatte miissen Galgen aufrichten lassen, 
um der Dieberei Einhalt zu tun; und wie ein Unschuldiger, der sich 
von hinten <lurch ein brennendes Haus gerettet, von dem Besitzer 
aus Ubereilung ergriffen, und sogleich auch aufgekniipft worden 
ware" (151-52). This alarming report puts the whole situation in a 
new light. Before this, the reports of the earthquake had tended to 
suggest that the guilty had been punished, the corruption of the city 
destroyed, and the innocent saved. Yet now it seems that the earth-
quake has provided new and better opportunities for thieves to flour-
ish; an innocent man has been unjustly executed; and the symbolic 
head of the state is indeed alive, exercising authority just as he did 
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before the disaster. The idyll of the Garden of Eden seems shattered, 
and with it the model of the earthquake as the destruction of a Sodom 
and Gomorrah. To make matters worse, Josephe is still untouched by 
this account: "Josephe diinkte sich unter den Seligen. Ein Gefiihl, 
das sie nicht unterdriicken konnte, nannte den verfloBnen Tag, so 
viel Elend er auch iiber die Welt gebracht hatte, eine Wohltat, wie der 
Himmel noch keine iiber sie verhangt hatte" (152). 19 This is a dis-
turbing piece of self-centeredness on her part; fully conscious of the 
sufferings of the rest of the world, she still calls "den verfloBnen Tag" 
(all of it) "eine Wohltat." It is important to note that any optimistic 
attitude to the earthquake depends heavily on the lovers' having 
been worth saving; this devaluation of Josephe is thus something of a 
blow to such an attitude. 
The distinction between author and narrator is very important here. 
While the author in his selection of material is alienating our sympathy 
from Josephe, the narrator seems not to want to abandon her. He 
now has one last attempt to produce a favorable interpretation of the 
story-favorable both to Josephe and to a belief that the world is 
rationally designed: 
Und in der Tat schien, mitten in diesen gra.Blichen Augenblicken, in welchen 
alle irdischen Giiter der Menschen zu Grunde gingen, und die ganze Natur 
verschiittet zu werden drohte, der menschliche Geist selbst, wie eine schone 
Blume, aufzugehn. Au£ den Feldern, so weit das Auge reichte, sah man 
Menschen von allen Standen durcheinander liegen, Fiirsten und Bettler, Ma-
tronen und Bauerinnen, Staatsbeamte und Tagelohner, Klosterherren und 
Klosterfrauen: einander bemitleiden, sich wechselseitig Hiilfe reichen, von 
dem, was sie zur Erhaltung ihres Lebens gerettet haben mochten, freudig 
mitteilen, als ob das allgemeine Ungliick alles, was ihm entronnen war, zu 
einer Familie gemacht hatte. (152) 
This passage no longer formulates in terms of miracles or direct action 
by God to correct the human situation but refers in broader terms to 
the beneficial effects of the earthquake. Men rediscover their common 
humanity and can now bridge what had before seemed important 
differences of class and status. The brotherhood of man is reestab-
lished. Society's trivial conversations have been replaced by "Beispiele 
von ungeheuern Taten" carried out by people who had shown "Ro-
mergroBe" in self-sacrifice and courage. The important things in life 
have been rediscovered. All this results in the summing up, "daB 
sich, wie sie meinte, gar nicht angeben liefs, ob die Summe des allge-
meinen Wohlseins nicht von der einen Seite um ebensoviel gewach-
sen war, als sie von der anderen abgenommen hatte" (152-53). After 
so much confidence in the past, the formulation is now very cautious 
indeed, preceded as it is by "daB sich, wie sie meinte, gar nicht 
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angeben liefs . . . " Kleist' s narrator is evidently becoming more care-
ful in the way in which he suggests general attitudes to the story. 
Nonetheless, there emerges here a recognizably different attitude to 
the events so far. A moderately optimistic attitude is now maintained 
by weighing the good and bad effects of the earthquake and taking 
the sum of the whole; this new way of seeing things does not ignore 
the indubitable evil that has been caused by the earthquake but can 
find that it is made up for by the impressive reawakening of the better 
side of human nature. The earthquake can still seem to be part of a 
world that is on the whole rational and benevolent instead of cruel 
and chaotic. This is reminiscent of Leibniz's theory of the preestab-
lished harmony, popularized as the view that this is the best of all 
possible worlds; for there, too, the problem of evil is dealt with by 
putting it in the scale and weighing it against all that is good in the 
world. And Kleist's text also allows here the impression of a slow 
progress towards a better state in which evil is a necessary mecha-
nism, which further allows us some confidence in the continuation of 
the moral progress of the community and in the future safety of 
Jeronimo and Josephe. Another of the basically optimistic group of 
ideas that appear in this central section is the Rousseauistic notion 
that man in nature is innately good and innocent while only his 
institutions corrupt him. 
The last section of the story now begins after this new attitude has 
reoriented our view of all that has happened so far. The news is heard 
that there is to be a solemn mass "in der Dominikanerkirche, der 
einzigen, welche das Erdbeben verschont hatte" (153). The inference 
from this is clear enough; indeed the narrator has drawn it for us in 
his formulation. The church is not just the only one left standing; it 
has actually been "verschont." The narrator fits the bare event into 
his adopted framework and attributes purpose to the fact that this 
church and no other was left standing. When, therefore, there is the 
suggestion that Don Fernando's party should take part in this mass, it 
seems natural that they should do so. This church seems to have been 
singled out as the only religious institution worthy of remaining as a 
place of worship; it surely cannot be, as the others were, a place of 
bigotry. We are not surprised that the party, including Jeronimo and 
Josephe, decide to attend the church. Critics often have said that the 
lovers act unwisely, 20 but this is only true in the sense that they do 
something that eventually turns out badly; at this moment they seem 
to be justified in doing what they do, and the narrator shares their 
conviction. 
Yet as before, the narrator, having once made up his mind, begins 
to have doubts. He gives considerable space to the description of 
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Donna Elisabeth's anxiety before the party sets off-approximately 
one-twelfth of the story, an unusual amount of space for Kleist to 
dwell on such a trivial incident. Usually Kleist's narrator describes 
action rather than reactions. On this occasion, there are no further 
reports of the earthquake to make us rethink our view of it; there is 
simply an uneasy atmosphere. Donna Elisabeth's misgivings are ex-
pressed three times: first, when she reminds the company of the 
dangers of going back to the church; second, when she gets ready to 
go "rnit heftig arbeitender Brust" and says that she has "eine un-
gliickliche Ahndung" (154); and third, after she has decided to stay, 
when she calls to Don Fernando and whispers to him something that 
neither Josephe nor the reader is allowed to hear. All of this recalls a 
number of previous incidents in the story: for example, Jeronirno's 
three times turning from hope to despair and the exchange between 
Don Fernando and Josephe in which the reader had to interpret for 
himself what the real content of the conversation was. Both previous 
incidents occurred as the narrator's interpretation of his story was 
about to change, a factor which must be borne in mind here too. 
This all seems to weigh on the narrator, and accordingly his de-
scription of the entry into the church is full of foreboding: "Die Pfeiler 
warfen, bei der einbrechenden Darnrnerung, geheirnisvolle Schatten" 
(155). We may well remember here the ambiguity of the "Pfeiler" in 
Jeronirno's prison cell. 21 But the narrator puts his doubt aside firmly: 
"Niernals schlug aus einern christlichen Dorn eine solche Flarnrne der 
Inbrunst gen Himmel, wie heute aus dern Dorninikanerdorn zu St. 
Jago; und keine rnenschliche Brust gab warrnere Glut dazu her, als 
Jeronirnos und Josephens!" (155). The genuineness of that religious 
fervor strikes a safer note, but immediately the sermon begins, and it 
sets in motion the final sequence of events that ends in the disaster. 
The real catastrophe is not just the death of Jeronimo and Josephe, 
together with Donna Constanze and little Juan, the son of Don Fer-
nando; this is its smallest part. The larger issue is that there remains 
no way to see any coherence in all that has happened. 
The most shocking thing about the disaster is that it is set in motion 
by nothing more than the priest's letting his tongue run away with 
him: "Hierauf karn er, irn Flusse priesterlicher Beredsarnkeit, auf das 
Sittenverderbnis der Stadt" (155). The phrase "irn Flusse priester-
licher Beredsamkeit" is among the most important in the whole story. 
For after the narrator's many attempts to see some kind of shape in 
what has happened, it is eventually nothing more important than this 
on which the outcome turns. How much more trivial could the trigger 
event have been? How can reason deal with it? The only explanation 
now left is that the whole story has been a series of coincidences, 
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sometimes looking as if they had a purpose but being in reality blind 
chance. By letting everything turn on a preacher's loquacity, Kleist 
makes the disillusion as extreme as it could possibly be. 
To make matters worse, there is a final sequence of events that 
several times raises our hopes for the escape of the party and then 
dashes them again in the next line. After the preacher has condemned 
Jeronimo and Josephe in his sermon, Don Fernando takes command 
of the situation and tells Donna Constanze to pretend to faint so that 
they can all leave. But after this moment of hope, the situation im-
mediately deteriorates again as a voice cries out, "Hier stehen diese 
gottlosen Menschen!" (156), and Josephe is seized. Don Fernando is 
at Josephe's side and holds up any action by claiming, rightly, that he 
is not Jeronimo, allowing thereby the implication that the woman at 
his side is not Josephe. Again there seems to be hope, but now Master 
Pedrillo appears, a cobbler who knows Josephe because he has worked 
for her. He asks who the father of her child is, but since she can say 
that it is not her child that she carries in her arms, another moment of 
confusion ensues, and again there are chances of an escape. Another 
reversal occurs as the child suddenly reaches for his father, which is 
immediately seen as confirmation that Don Fernando is Jeronimo. 
Don Fernando is seized, whereupon Jeronimo cries that he is the man 
they all want. But just as quickly hope appears again, as a "Marine-
Offizier von bedeutendem Rang" (157) appears who knows Don Fer-
nando and addresses him as such. All these turns of fortune seem to 
have eventually resulted in the party's escape, for they are now able 
to get out of the church unharmed. If the reader were not by now 
fearful of making any more predictions, he might think that they 
could not possibly survive all this only to be killed outside the church; 
but that is just what happens. Jeronimo is struck down by a man who 
says that he is Jeronimo's own father; characteristically, it is never 
shown whether he really is or not. There now follow in quick succes-
sion the deaths of Donna Constanze, Josephe, and Don Fernando's 
child. The reader is almost dizzy after this succession of changes of 
fortune; they are so many, seem so fortuitous, but are so serious in 
their eventual consequences, that he can make no sense of this be-
wildering sequence. 
Once again the question of interpretation appears in the series of 
misinterpretations made by the bystanders concerning the identities 
of the members of Don Fernando's party: a series of misleading im-
ages, such as Josephe's walking with Don Fernando and carrying his 
child, instead of walking with Jeronimo and carrying her own, leads 
to these misinterpretations. Could it be that we have been similarly 
misled all the way through the story by images that are equally de-
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ceptive? It is as natural for the crowd to reach its conclusions as it 
seemed for the narrator to suggest his, but both were equally wrong. 
There now seems to be no design in this confused and contradictory 
series of happenings where innocent and guilty suffer alike and mi-
raculous escape is followed by brutal murder. Finally the naval officer 
appears again, to say, "dais seine Untatigkeit bei diesem Ungliick, 
obschon <lurch mehrere Umstande gerechtfertigt, ihn reue" (158). By 
now Don Fernando is too tired to ask why this was so; even to ask for 
the "Umstande" would be to maintain a faith in the rationality of 
events that neither he nor the reader still has. 
But Kleist will not let us rest here, for the story closes with an 
account of the way in which Don Fernando adopts Philipp, the child 
of Jeronimo and Josephe. At the beginning of this epilogue, there is 
yet one more chance event. Don Fernando wishes to conceal the 
death of their son from his wife until she is well, and he is in any case 
worried about what she will say of his conduct: "Doch kurze Zeit 
nachher, <lurch einen Besuch zufallig von allem, was geschehen war, 
benachrichtigt, weinte diese treffliche Dame im Stillen ihren mutter-
lichen Schmerz aus, und fiel ihm mit dem Rest einer ergliinzenden 
Trane eines Morgens um den Hals und kiifste ihn" (159). The story 
then ends with the words: "Und wenn Don Fernando Philippen mit 
Juan verglich, und wie er beide erworben hatte, so war es ihm fast, 
als miifst er sich freuen." Kleist does not even leave us the belief that 
we can believe nothing, for the story seems to end on a note that at 
least raises the possibility of optimism again. The ending with the 
words "es war ihm fast, als miifst er sich freuen" is, when compared 
to the narrator's previous formulations involving "als ob," very cau-
tious indeed. 22 And it is still not entirely clear how much of Don 
Fernando's reaction is due to a resigned acceptance of what he cannot 
change, and how much is because there is really something to be glad 
about, taking events as a whole. Perhaps it is just that to remain alive 
we must structure the events of our lives and thus act as if they had 
an overall design; as we look back, for example, we are often aware of 
the fact that an earlier disaster had the effect of pushing us in a 
direction which had some satisfactory results, and it even seems that 
the disaster was a necessary part of the fundamental shape of our 
lives. 
It is, however, the fact that the story ends with a child whose life is 
still to come that makes it so open, and gives the greatest impression 
of questions still to be answered, events still unseen that will also 
need interpretation. What will the child become? Will he be worth his 
survival, whether or not this was accidental? What will be his effect 
on Don Fernando's life? Hindsight brings with it the familiar illusion 
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that everything has conspired to secure the child's existence and to 
keep him alive. He owes his existence to the coincidences through 
which Jeronimo and Josephe met and were able to continue meeting. 
The earthquake allowed Josephe to take him from the nunnery only a 
moment before the building collapsed. He had been saved in the final 
scene by a number of accidents, beginning with the fact that Juan 
cried when given to Donna Elisabeth and so was taken to the church 
and ending with Master Pedrillo' s killing the wrong child and not 
making sure that he had the right one by killing both. And the effect 
of all this has been to give the child as foster parents the admirable 
Don Fernando and Donna Elvire. What is his destiny to be? The 
question is posed but not answered. By now it must be obvious that 
every new event will raise new questions, however many existing 
questions it may answer. We shall never be in any better position than 
we are in now, because to interpret the present we must know the 
future, which we never do. In a sense the story could now begin all 
over again, and this is why it comes to an end. 
What, then, are we left with at the end of the Erdbeben? Is any 
notion of the world adequate, is there any attitude to it that is appro-
priate, or is there any character in the story whose behavior is wisest 
or most admirable? Great care must be taken in answering these 
questions since we have seen the narrator suggest a series of different 
answers to them throughout the story, each one being rejected as 
events have moved on and made nonsense of it. All of the critical 
disagreements over the themes, values, and characters of the story 
result, in fact, from a particular critic seizing on something that is 
strongly suggested on one page of the text and thinking that it is valid 
for the whole text, not realizing that the text and its narrator move on 
to different attitudes. Bonafous's benevolent God of the story seems 
indeed to be there on one page, Braig's Rousseauism on another, and 
Gundolf's meaninglessness of the world on still another; but all are 
equally wrong about the meaning of the story. Similarly, the story 
seems sometimes to approve of the relationship of Jeronimo and Jo-
sephe and sometimes to be uncertain of their value. The narrator's 
attitudes are always tentative and easily abandoned under the pres-
sure of new events that render them obsolete. 
But still, we are left at the end of the story with Don Fernando and 
the child, and our impressions of them and what they represent are 
the final ones of the text, beyond which there is nothing else to 
consider or reconsider. Most critics have seen the ending in a positive 
light, stressing the magnificence of Fernando, and seeing in the in-
nocence and purity of the child an opportunity for a new beginning;23 
but that is to miss the subtlety of the story's final sentences. So 
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unambiguous a conclusion is of course impossible in a story that has 
treated all attitudes to the world and expectations of it so roughly; 
and it misses entirely the tone of the much hedged and exceedingly 
cautious final phrase "so war es ihm fast, als mi.ifst er sich freuen," in 
which no less than four qualifiers ("es war ihm," "fast," "als ob," and 
"mi.ifsen") distance us from the simple "er freute sich." Don Fernan-
do's instinctive flicker of hope cannot be made into a full-fledged 
gesture of confidence in the future or a guarantee of the success of the 
child's life to come. The point of the ending is that even after so many 
attempts to construe the world in a positive way have failed, despair 
is impossible too; the instinct to begin again, to construct a new shape 
for one's life, is too strong for it to be destroyed. Throughout, the 
story has moved us from one view of the world to the next; its ending 
serves not as a turn towards hope but as a reminder that the continual 
process of coming to terms with the world cannot ever stop, however 
futile it may on occasion have seemed to be. 
The value of Don Fernando himself is another matter. Even if we 
do not know what to make of the world as the story ends, it has 
seemed to many critics that our attitude to Don Fernando can be one 
of unambiguous admiration. And this is an important point for the 
interpretation of the story because he contributes a new idea to the 
series of possible attitudes to the design of the world and to the 
behavior appropriate to that design: the stoic ideal. Implicit in his 
behavior is the feeling that the structure of the world is unknowable, 
and that its blessings and disasters are equally unpredictable. The 
stoic learns to bear the latter with fortitude and to accept the former 
without forming any unreal commitment to them, but he seeks above 
all to preserve something that has a unique value and does not de-
pend on the unpredictability of fate: dignity and self-respect. Don 
Fernando is indeed an impressive embodiment of the stoic ideal, and 
it is significant that he comes to the fore at the very point in the story 
when all other possible attitudes to the world have been destroyed by 
the sequence of events. When no other value remains, and when 
nothing else seems enduring or reliable, his character gives to the 
scene the only stability it has and the only thing that can still be relied 
upon. He defends himself and the children with courage and skill, 
always behaves with impeccable tact, courtesy, and even chivalry, 
and accepts what fate offers without complaint. On the death of his 
child he is silent, only raising his eyes, "voll namenlosen Schmerzes" 
(158) to heaven. Several meaningful contrasts are established between 
Don Fernando and the couple, Jeronimo and Josephe. 24 Compare 
with Don Fernando's calm acceptance of disaster, for example, Je-
ronimo's instability and despair as he escapes from the earthquake, 
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unable to control his thoughts or attitudes; compare, too, Josephe's 
enthusiasm and unreal optimism with Don Fernando's cautious 
search for the positive side of what remains in the story's last line. 
The couple seems completely overshadowed by this powerful, attrac-
tive figure. The narrator finds him so impressive that during the 
struggle outside the church he calls Fernando "dieser gottliche Held" 
(158); at no other point does the story seem to give so unambiguous a 
judgment in favor of one of its characters. Gunter Blocker draws from 
this what he thinks to be the moral of the whole story: "Nur wer 
bereit ist weiterzuleben mit dem, was das alles verzehrende Schicksal 
iibrigliefs, und noch das Fremde als das Seine anzuerkennen, jades-
sen Wert vermehrt zu sehen um das Gewicht des eignen Leides-nur 
der besteht die schwere Priifung des Lebens." 25 Yet again, the point 
must be remembered that no single comment of the narrator is au-
thoritative in this story; and a closer look at the text shows how Kleist 
has undermined the stoic answer to its world too. 
Near the end of the text, we are told that Don Fernando was un-
easy about seeing his wife and finding out "wie sie sein Verhalten bei 
dieser Begebenheit beurteilen wiirde" (159). The worry turns out to 
be groundless in the sense that "diese treffliche Dame" does not 
criticize him, and we may even wonder why it was mentioned at all. 
The answer must surely be found in the earlier passage in which 
Donna Elisabeth whispered to Don Fernando as the party set off to go 
to the Church: "Donna Elisabeth naherte sich ihm hierauf, obschon, 
wie es schien, mit Widerwillen, und raunte ihm, doch so, dais Jo-
sephe es nicht horen konnte, einige Worte ins Ohr. Nun? fragte Don 
Fernando: und das Ungliick, das daraus entstehen kann? Donna 
Elisabeth fuhr fort, ihm mit verstortem Gesicht ins Ohr zu zischeln. 
Don Fernando stieg eine Rote des Unwillens ins Gesicht; er antwor-
tete: es ware gut! Donna Elvire mochte sich beruhigen; und fiihrte 
seine Dame weiter" (154-55). The clues to the meaning of this enig-
matic passage are in the two mentions of Josephe: Elisabeth says 
something that Josephe is not to hear, and Fernando's response is to 
lead Josephe forward with a flourish, to which the narrator gives a 
particular character by using "seine Dame." Evidently, these words 
reassert the dignity of Josephe so that what was said was felt by 
Fernando to call it in question; and we can conclude that Elisabeth's 
worry is about Don Fernando's going into the town with Josephe at 
his side. His asking what harm can come of this is answered by the 
later events of the story. Don Fernando is here confronted with exactly 
those dangers in the situation that later prove disastrous, and the 
important thing is that he does not weigh them at all; he simply 
refuses to think in any way that will dishonor Josephe, even by im-
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plication. Many critics have said that he makes an error of judgment 
here, but it is important to see that this is not the case: he makes no 
judgment at all. 26 He relies on the stoic ideal: disaster can come at any 
time and is not predictable, but dignity and chivalry can be preserved. 
In this veiled way-a suggestion from a whispered exchange and a 
brief allusion on the last page-the story makes that same complex of 
behavior that is so impressive at the end also lead directly to the final 
disaster. Don Fernando was put in a position where the future disas-
ter confronted him, and he was the one man who might have averted 
it; but that very ethic that we later admire prevents him from doing 
so. Small wonder, then, that he becomes aware that his behavior can 
be questioned. And thus the story's last possible answer to the ques-
tion how the world should be faced is itself called into question: 
attempts to think about the structure of events can lead to disaster-
but failing to think can just as easily have the same result. 
Kleist's Erdbeben is, then, one of those works that, like Voltaire's 
poem, though in a very different way, reflect on the structure of the 
world and the possibility of the existence of providence. Throughout 
the story the characters and the narrator struggle to understand the 
earthquake in these terms; the reader too is led to find an explanation 
of what is happening, and the excitement of the story lies to a large 
extent in his constantly having his explanations overturned, some-
times quite gradually and almost unobtrusively, sometimes with a 
violent shock. At the end we have almost given up trying to see 
coherence when a new possibility emerges, and so we are left skepti-
cal but still wondering whether the world is patterned or chaotic. 
Finally, we are skeptical even of skepticism as a reaction to the world. 
In a way the Erdbeben is like a detective story on a cosmic scale. 
Always facing us are the questions "Who (or what) did it?" and 
"What was his motive?" There are many suspects and many false 
trails. The act being investigated is not an ordinary crime but the 
whole shaping of human existence, so that the identity of the culprit 




Kleist's Der Zweikampf1 might appear to be a uniquely optimistic 
work and to be quite unlike any of the other Erziihlungen in that 
respect. The hero and heroine of the story both survive, are married, 
and seem set to live happily ever after while the villain is punished by 
a particularly unpleasant death. Truth and justice may seem in dan-
ger for a while, but perhaps the suspense only makes their eventual 
triumph the more satisfying. Faith and virtue are rewarded while sin 
is punished. The framework of the story assumes a simple faith in an 
omnipotent and benevolent God, and if He seems to be obscured for 
a time, that may only be because He is preparing what turns out to be 
a remarkably accurate resolution of the duel. From a narrow, techni-
cal point of view, the duel concerns Friedrich's accusation that Count 
Jakob lied when he said Littegarde had been with him on the night of 
the Duke's murder. But the broader issues that eventually lead up to 
the duel are the murder itself and the question of Littegarde's virtue. 
It is clear that Littegarde is innocent, and that the Count is guilty of 
arranging his brother's murder, but he happens not in fact to be 
guilty of telling a lie when he says that he spent the night with 
Littegarde-he believes that he did. Technically, therefore, the Count 
must win, but morally he ought to lose. The solution to the problem 
is very precise: the Count wins the duel only to die of an infection 
resulting from a superficial wound received during it. This is just the 
technical victory and moral defeat needed to meet the situation. 
To be sure, the hero and heroine have suffered cruelly. But we can, 
with apparent justice, look on this as the essential prelude to the 
greater awareness of God's goodness and so think of the ending in 
terms used by Heinrich Meyer: "die Vereinigung des schwergepriif-
ten Paares." 2 This account of the story sounds very attractive yet 
somehow unlike Kleist. Unhappily, this clear and sunny outline be-
gins to break down as soon as the text is examined more closely; it 
turns out to be utterly deceptive. As we shall see, in Der Zweikampf 
Kleist uses even the familiar suspense-and-happy-ending melodrama 
and the medieval framework of a naive belief in God as an ironic 
vehicle for his skepticism. 
The story obviously invokes a stereotyped situation: the good, 
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chivalrous, gallant, courageous (etc.) knight confronting his treacher-
ous, wicked adversary. In the stereotype, we admire and identify 
with the knight as he struggles against his evil opponent. But though 
the story invokes this stereotype, it does not seem to respect it, for we 
very soon find elements in the text that undermine it. These are the 
first disturbing signs that all is not as it might seem to be in this story. 
Friedrich often does not seem to be well suited to his role as male 
romantic hero, for example. Our first impression of the contact be-
tween Littegarde and Friedrich scarcely suggests that he is a very 
attractive figure; Littegarde apparently likes him but decides not to 
marry him "aus Besorgnis, ihren beiden, auf die Hinterlassenschaft 
ihres Vermogens rechnenden Briidern dadurch zu miBfallen" (235). 
The narrator here deals something of a blow to Friedrich's mascu-
linity: he reveals that the impression made upon Littegarde by her 
brothers' displeasure is greater than that made by Friedrich. There 
does not even seem to be much of a conflict; the word "Besorgnis" is 
distinctly low-key for the situation. And when after the birth of her 
brother's son she decides to make the matter more definite, the nar-
rator once again adds details which are mildly insulting to Friedrich: 
"So nahm sie, durch manche deutliche und undeutliche Erklarung 
bewogen, von Herrn Friedrich, ihrem Freunde, in einem unter vielen 
Tranen abgefaBten Schreiben, formlich Abschied" (235-36). Even un-
clear factors had helped to outweigh any feeling she might have for 
Friedrich, the reference to him as her "Freund" is less than it might 
have been, and the phrase "formlich Abschied" is strangely blood-
less. Friedrich apparently did not have the resourcefulness to fight 
the influence of the grasping brothers and seems to have accepted the 
situation, which in turn may imply something about how it arose in 
the first place; a certain lack of impressiveness on his part seems 
common to all phases of this sequence of events. All of this leads us 
to a fact that, given the prominence of the relationship between the 
two in the story's plot, is surely very strange: at no time, not even 
towards the end, are we told that Littegarde loves Friedrich, and it 
would even be hard to abstract that fact from any event that is re-
ported. The only reference to her emotions regarding Friedrich is the 
statement that he was, among her other suitors, "der Teuerste und 
Liebste" (235). 
The first occasion on which we see the two together gives us some 
further impressions of Friedrich that help to explain the absence of 
any strong feelings for him on Littegarde' s part. After being thrown 
out of her home by her brothers, Littegarde is led to Friedrich, "der in 
Akten, womit ihn ein ProzeB iiberschiittete, versenkt, an einem Tische 
saB" (239), by his sisters (he seems always to be surrounded by his 
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female relatives). The narrator conveys the impression that Friedrich 
belongs at a desk, buried in papers; he looks more like a clerk than a 
knight. As Littegarde had set out to go to him, she had thought of him 
once more as her "Freund" (239), and Friedrich himself uses the 
word in his offer to help her. Rather than offer himself as her cham-
pion, protector, or even possessor, he describes his help in terms that 
are consistent with our view of their relationship so far; he will be to 
her as brother to sister: "Nehmt mich, weil Eure ungerechten und 
ungroBmiitigen Bruder Euch verlassen, als Euren Freund und Bruder 
an, und gonnt mir den Ruhm, Euer Anwalt in dieser Sache zu sein" 
(240). If her brothers had been available, they would have sufficed, 
apparently. This pointed avoidance cf the fact that a woman might, in 
the circumstances, want somthing beyond a brother's support is em-
phasized by the almost comic juxtaposition of "Ruhm" and "Anwalt": 
to be her "Anwalt," we feel, is not quite what is needed to earn 
"Ruhm" here and simply calls to mind Friedrich's being buried in a 
different set of "Akten," still at his desk. 
There is no development of the relationship beyond the terms used 
for it here; even at the end of the story, just before the two are 
married, the word "Freund" occurs again, as Littegarde appears "an 
der Hand Herrn Friedrichs, ihres Freundes, dessen Kniee selbst, unter 
dem Gefiihl dieser wunderbaren Rettung, wankten" (259-60). Thus 
Littegarde, our heroine, ends the story at her valiant knight's side; 
the trouble is that he seems to be the one whose knees sag, and she to 
be holding him up, a comic reversal of the convention in which the 
strong knight supports the swooning girl. But the story does have an 
attractive male figure whom we are tempted to admire, a dashing 
romantic figure, who might even seem more suited to the hero's role 
than Friedrich if he did not occupy the position that, in the stereo-
type, belongs to the villain. Count Jakob the Redbeard is a "grofser 
Liebhaber von der Jagd" (231), not a man who sits buried under 
papers at a desk; his red beard suggests a flamboyant and exciting 
character, and even when acting badly he seems altogether to be on a 
grander scale than Friedrich. He may arouse revulsion in Littegarde 
(but that may reflect on her too, and I shall return to this point), but at 
least he arouses strong feelings. To be sure, no one could feel revul-
sion for Friedrich, but on the other hand we cannot imagine even a 
"Kammerzofe" expending the ingenuity to get Friedrich to spend the 
night with her that Rosalie must employ for the Count. 
Once we have begun to notice Friedrich's inadequacy for the role in 
which he is cast by the plot outline, additional evidence piles up. His 
performance in the duel is conspicuously unheroic, and he defends 
until the spectators are so bored that they complain: 
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Schon hatte der Kampf, die Augenblicke der Ruhe, zu welcher Entatmung 
beide Parteien zwang, mitgerechnet, fast eine Stunde gedauert: als sich von 
neuem ein Murren unter den auf dem Geriist befindlichen Zuschauern erhob. 
Es schien, es gait diesmal nicht den Grafen Jakob, deres an Eifer, den Kampf 
zu Ende zu bringen, nicht fehlen liefs, sondern Herrn Friedrichs Einpfahlung 
auf einem und demselben Fleck, und seine seltsame, dem Anschein nach fast 
eingeschiichterte, wenigstens starrsinnige Enthaltung alles eignen Angriffs. 
Herr Friedrich, obschon sein Verfahren auf guten Grunden beruhen mochte, 
fuhlte u.mnoch zu leise, als dafs er es nicht sogleich gegen die Forderung 
derer, die in diesem Augenblick iiber seine Ehre entschieden, hatte aufopfern 
sollen. (246) 
The narrator shows puzzlement here, 3 as if he cannot understand 
why Friedrich is not attacking; he feels bound to suggest that there 
may have been "gute Griinde." But the fact reported next (his fall) 
and Friedrich's prior defensive reaction to the groans answer the 
question of his motivation in a perfectly adequate way: he is a poor 
swordsman. He is not the proverbial knight in shining armor, and he 
knows it. Throughout this passage the discrepancy between Fried-
rich's stereotype role and his actual performance is underlined by the 
narrator's giving us the stock value judgments of the former and the 
facts of the latter, with the contrast then causing him embarrassment. 
The Count's blows, for example, are described as "tiickisch," since 
the stereotype demands that the villain fight treacherously, but the 
facts reported show the Count conducting a spirited attack, an attrac-
tive, aggressive fight, while Friedrich is passive and dull. The best 
example of this, however, comes with Friedrich's fall; having justly 
been criticized for his poor performance and having bored all the 
spectators, he now tries an aggressive move at last and immediately 
makes a fool of himself by tripping over his own spurs and falling! 
The narrator ignores the ludicrousness of Friedrich's performance 
and still speaks from his official stance, but his preserving that stance 
so rigidly only widens the gap between it and the events he talks 
about; when we visualize the situation for ourselves and compare it 
to the narrator's commentary, the discrepancy becomes comic. He 
seeks an explanation in the absence of the "higher powers" that 
should have been watching over the contest, not in Friedrich's la-
mentable incompetence, and he supplements this with the notion 
that the villain was treacherous once more, as villains always are: 
Aber schon in den ersten Momenten dieses dergestalt veranderten Kampfs, 
hatte Herr Friedrich ein Ung!iick, das die Anwesenheit hoherer, iiber den 
Kampf waltender Machte nicht eben anzudeuten schien; er stiirzte, den 
Fufstritt in seinen Sporen verwickelnd, stolpernd abwarts, und wahrend er, 
unter der Last des Helms und des Harnisches, die seine oberen Telle be-
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schwerten, mit in dem Staub vorgestiitzter Hand, in die Kniee sank, stieB 
ihm Graf Jakob der Rotbart, nicht eben auf die edelmi.itigste und ritterlichste 
Weise, das Schwert in die dadurch bloBgegebene Seite. (246) 
As the gap between the situtation reported and the narrator's stereo-
typed commentary becomes more apparent, we cannot avoid won-
dering whether it is really so ignoble of the Count to act on the 
assumption that the will of God is revealed in Friedrich's fall. By now, 
Kleist' s design for the narration of the story is becoming clear; the 
narrator in telling the story adopts a rather simple, optimistic view of 
its events, but the events themselves are such as to make it more and 
more difficult to retain the narrator's view of them. 
One feature of the text might appear to save Friedrich's heroic 
stature: did he not save Littegarde from a wild boar? Unhappily (but 
characteristically) the relevant passage serves only to remove heroic 
overtones from the event and even to detract further from Friedrich's 
stature generally. For the phrase used to qualify Friedrich's feat in 
saving Littegarde from the charge of a wild boar is, in the context, 
strange: "tiichtiger Weise" (235). He apparently did a neat and com-
petent job, but there is no mention of danger or of a show of courage, 
so that the text seems to preclude admiration of him. 4 Worse, the 
event supplies a basis for Littegarde's regard for him that detracts 
even more from his personal attractiveness-mere gratitude. 
In the light of his weakness as a heroic figure, our attitudes to his 
faith in Littegarde must be, at best, ambiguous. 5 It is true that his 
faith is vindicated. But the reader must at least on occasion wonder 
whether this is not the good luck of the simpleton rather than the 
sound intuition of a strong character. Is his constancy to be regarded 
as saintliness-or just foolishness? Friedrich's general ineffectualness 
does not allow us to ignore the latter possibility. 
Some events that suggest Friedrich's imagination is very limited 
must be taken into account in evaluating his unshakeable faith since it 
cannot be regarded in a completely positive way if he appears only to 
understand events and people in very simple and limited terms. For 
example, he is surprised that Littegarde does not want to see him in 
her dungeon. Consider the position: she knows she is innocent, and 
she has been assured by Friedrich that he will protect her. His per-
formance in the duel was very weak. Before his offer of help, she had 
merely been slandered; as a result of that help, she is condemned to 
death, and the slander seems proven. Friedrich has in effect made 
things much worse for her, and she has good reason not to be well 
disposed toward him. To approach the matter from the other side: 
Friedrich is now condemned to death, and Littegarde's innocence has 
not protected him. She might well feel guilty about her part in his 
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downfall. Yet, in spite of all this, he cannot imagine why she should 
not wish to see him! 
Another significant means of undermining Friedrich's expressions 
of faith in Littegarde can be seen in the entire set of circumstances 
surrounding the most important occasion of those expressions, the 
scene in the dungeon. Here, the details of Kleist's description con-
stantly harp on Friedrich's mental and physical weakness, just as his 
declaration of faith in Littegarde is at its most ardent. Friedrich is here 
in the middle of a group of women-his mother, sisters, and Litte-
garde-and is somewhat bullied by all of them, even abused by Litte-
garde. He is held up by his mother (250), who also fusses over him 
and plants a kiss on his forehead as if he were still a little boy (252); 
and he allows his mother to insult Littegarde without protesting, 
faints, and finally allows himself to be taken back to his cell when his 
family becomes anxious about his condition. Even though Friedrich· 
turns out to be right, we are still left with the impression that his faith 
was based on weakness rather than strength, 6 that his simplemind-
edness is what makes it easy for him to continue believing in what he 
does, and that this is not to be regarded as a display of the kind of 
courage that would be needed to stand by a conviction derived from a 
less feeble imagination. 
At this point it becomes interesting to consider some common criti-
cisms of the story, in particular of its thematic structure and language. 
Erich Schmidt speaks of its "wohlfeile Abrechnung zwischen Tugend 
und Laster," 7 while Crosby maintains that there are flaws in the 
language of Der Zweikampf: "Striking, however, is the too-frequent 
repetition of certain phrases, a symptom of haste, one suspects, and a 
flaw which could easily have been corrected if Kleist had lived to 
revise the work." 8 The observations involved here are at least in part 
accurate; but the features observed, far from being weaknesses of the 
story, are crucial aspects of its design, used by Kleist for his thematic 
purposes. The point becomes clearer when we see that both features-
the too-easy separation of vice and virtue, and the repetition of stock 
phrases-are almost exclusively associated with our supposed hero 
and heroine; these two facts of the story are related, and one explains 
the other. Friedrich is thematically a cliche, and thus the language 
used to describe him is full of cliches too. He is a cardboard "good" 
character with all the standard good responses but no depth. Yet he is 
also too weak to be adequate to his cliche role, a fact that the language 
brings out by the repetition of certain phrases that sound forced and 
unreal. Two common ingredients of the stock phrases used in con-
nection with Friedrich are "iiufserst" and "trefflich." For example, he 
is termed "iiulserst betroffen" (229) and "der treffliche Kammerer" 
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(239), suffers "auiserste Besorgnis" (249), and is Littegarde's "edler 
und vortrefflicher Freund" (250); and at the end the two become "die 
beiden trefflichen Brautleute" (261). Littegarde is "auiserst ermiidet" 
(239) after her journey, and her being found by the villagers had made 
them "auiserst bestiirzt" (238). This is only a sample of the stereo-
typed verbal characterization of the two; an example of a complete 
situational cliche occurs when Littegarde arrives at Friedrich's castle. 
She is received by Friedrich with the words "Meine teuerste Litte-
garde! ... was ist Euch widerfahren?" (239) and then tells her story. 
The key to Friedrich's long response is provided by the way in which 
repetitions of stock phrases function in the story's language, for 
Friedrich begins with a phrase identical to the one he first used: 
"Genug, meine teuerste Littegarde!" rief Herr Friedrich, indem er mit edlem 
Eifer ihre Hand nahm, und an seine Lippen driickte: "verliert kein Wort zur 
Verteidigung und Rechtfertigung Eurer Unschuld! In meiner Brust spricht 
eine Stimme for Euch, weit lebhafter und iiberzeugender, als alle Versiche-
rungen, ja selbst als alle Rechtsgriinde und Beweise, die Ihr vielleicht aus der 
Verbindung der Umstande und Begebenheiten, vor dem Gericht zu Basel for 
Euch aufzubringen vermogt." (240) 
Littegarde responds, appropriately, with "Tranen var Dankbarkeit 
und Riihrung" at such "edelmiitigen Auiserungen." But these noble 
expressions are too obviously standardized and contrast too plainly 
with the signs both of Friedrich's weakness and of the bloodless 
character of their relationship; and, in view of later events, the re-
mark that Friedrich's faith is stronger than any proof she may be able 
to bring before the courts at Basel must even count as heavily ironic. 
By contrast, the Count is more individual, more credible and un-
derstandable, and more likeable; we are always in danger of admiring 
the wrong man. His red beard contrasts with Friedrich's colorless-
ness, his love of hunting with Friedrich's life at a desk, and his attrac-
tiveness to women with Friedrich's conspicuous lack of success in 
impressing Littegarde. The text contrasts every aspect of the perfor-
mance of the two men, and the results are always the same: the 
Count is always more impressive. Unlike Friedrich, the Count is quick-
thinking and resourceful. He weighs the circumstances of his brother's 
death and the succession of his nephew carefully, shrewdly deciding 
not to pursue the matter of the legality of that succession; and when 
the letter from the duchess arrives he thinks only for a moment before 
he seizes accurately and firmly on his best course of action. Judging 
that he will not be able to ignore the matter of the arrow and the news 
of his absence from the castle, he decides to face the issue squarely 
and thereby to choose the most favorable conditions under which to 
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do so. In both these cases, he has made a quick and accurate appraisal 
of the realities of the situation and subordinated what he might wish 
to be the case to those realities; this is most unlike Friedrich. The 
Count is as resolute and courageous in battle against Friedrich as he is 
in facing his own death. He faces a just punishment calmly whereas 
there seems to be something abject about Friedrich's acceptance of an 
unjust fate. The Count is admired by the people, and when the mes-
senger arrives at his castle, the atmosphere is pleasant and convivial: 
"Der Graf der eben mit einer Gesellschaft von Freunden bei der Tafel 
sals, stand, als der Ritter mit der Botschaft der Herzogin, zu ihm 
eintrat, verbindlich von seinem Sessel auf; aber kaum, wahrend die 
Freunde den feierlichen Mann, der sich nicht niederlassen wollte, 
betrachteten, hatte er in der Wolbung des Fensters den Brief iiber-
lesen: als er die Farbe wechselte" (232). This is a relaxed Count, 
courteous to his visitor, described in terms that demand a positive 
response. On the other hand, when we first meet Friedrich, he seems 
lonely and joyless. The same suggestion of the Count's being in the 
good company of those whom he likes and who like him is contained 
in the description of his arrival at Basel "mit einem glanzenden Ge-
folge von Rittern" (234). Friedrich's gathering seems more prosaic; he 
sets out "mit einem zahlreichen Gefolge von Reisigen und Knappen" 
(241). Where the Count has companions, Friedrich has only retainers. 
Nor is the authority of the Count matched by Friedrich; when the 
Count's sons express their greed and resentment at having been 
cheated of the succession to the Dukedom, he simply silences them 
"mit kurzen und spottischen Machtspriichen" (230). For purposes of 
symmetry, and therefore juxtaposition and comparison, the story 
gives a pair of unpleasant young relatives to the hero and heroine 
too, but their unpleasantnesses are not checked in this authoritative 
way. Littegarde is weak in dealing with her brothers and does not 
check their greed. Friedrich seems not to be able to control the ex-
pressions of doubt and fear on the part of his female relatives, al-
though they are by implication insulting to Littegarde. 
That the "wohlfeile Abrechnung zwischen Tugend und Laster" does 
not apply to the Count emerges clearly at the end of the story when 
he tries to save Littegarde and Friedrich from execution: "Ich will 
nicht, ohne eine Tat der Gerechtigkeit veriibt zu haben, sterben!" 
(258). The Count's candid admission that his sins are growing with 
his age (230) makes them sound less dangerous, and pride (257) at his 
having made an important conquest (of Littegarde) at his age seems 
more like a human failing than wickedness. The Count's demise is, 
however, announced with a ringing phrase, "Er ... hauchte seine 
schwarze Seele aus" (260), and the description of his funeral pyre is 
62 Heinrich von Kleist 
the most vivid part of the story's end-not the marriage, which is 
quickly dismissed, nor the happiness of the couple, which is not even 
mentioned. The result of this series of contrasts between the two men 
is that the Count, in spite of his misdeeds, appears human, colorful, 
attractive, forceful, resourceful, and thoroughly impressive, while 
Friedrich, for all his "noble" sentiments and faith, strikes us as a 
weak and irresolute simpleton. Here Kleist is invoking a situation not 
uncommon in literature, one which seems to imply considerable 
skepticism about morality; it can be seen in the many versions of the 
Don Juan theme and in more modem times in film roles typically 
played by Errol Flynn. In Mozart's Don Giovanni, for example, we 
grudgingly acknowledge that Don Ottavio is a "better" man than 
Don Giovanni but find him (and his music) shallow and uninterest-
ing in comparison with the villain. 
Littegarde, too, is an uninteresting paragon of virtue, described in 
the same stock language as Friedrich. She is weak and unintelligent 
in dealing with her brothers; how could she have failed to recognize 
their real motives in opposing her possible remarriage? She never 
displays a romantic attachment to Friedrich at any point in the story, 
and it is almost a surprise that they are married at the end, for never 
do they express any intent to do so. The text studiously avoids any 
scene after their ordeal in which declarations of love might occur. 
In some ways Littegarde and Friedrich are differentiated, but hardly 
to her advantage or to the advantage of the conventional framework 
of the narrator. Her being a widow makes her rather less appropriate 
to the role of the helpless princess in need of a champion and tends to 
make Friedrich look more inexperienced and ineffectual than he other-
wise might. Her greater experience even takes on an unpleasant as-
pect when she turns to Friedrich for help; the phrase "immer noch 
ergeben" discreetly underlines her previous refusal of the man whose 
devotion to her she will nevertheless now rely upon and use: "Und 
niemand schien ihr des Vertrauens, zur Verteidigung ihrer Ehre auf-
gerufen zu werden, wiirdiger, als ihr wackerer, ihr in Liebe, wie sie 
wohl wuBte, immer noch ergebener Freund, der treffliche Kammerer 
Herr Friedrich von Trota" (239). It never occurs to her to ask whether 
her previous refusal has placed in question her ability to call on Fried-
rich, and far from being hesitant on that account she seems almost 
arrogant in thinking only of the honor she bestows on him by think-
ing him worthy to defend her honor. 
In general, then, the story offers a stereotyped situation of hero, 
heroine, and villain, and at the same time raises the question of the 
real human worth of the three in such a way as to reverse our normal 
attitudes to them and to allow the morally skeptical possibility of the 
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"good" people being dull, the "sinner" more interesting and humanly 
valuable, a possibility that would effectively devalue the "happy" 
ending. But there is a further, hidden and insidious level of the story's 
skepticism; for besides questioning the equation of moral correctness 
and human value, the story also blurs and complicates the issue of 
moral right and wrong so that it becomes difficult to make unequivo-
cal moral judgments. There is a sense in which Friedrich and Litte-
garde are themselves agents of villainy while, on the other hand, the 
Count's position has a kind of justice of its own. This is the paradoxi-
cal result of the device of the outer frame and its being the apparent 
occasion for the story of Friedrich and Littegarde; to this aspect of the 
text we must now turn. 
The frame has seemed to many critics to be only loosely connected 
to the main story. It might at first sight seem that the duel had begun 
as a small part of a plot concerning the succession to the throne and 
the murder of the Duke and had then gotten out of hand, so becom-
ing the main issue of the story while the original main issue of the 
plot-the murder-is only briefly mentioned at the end to tie up the 
loose ends created by this untidy and undisciplined narrative. But we 
should be cautious about such a judgment; Kleist uses this technique 
of apparently losing the thread of his plot elsewhere in his stories, 
always as a way of making us see the events of the story in a new 
light. If we look carefully at what happens in the outer frame and 
juxtapose the issues of that frame to those of the central story of 
Friedrich and Littegarde, we shall have to conclude that the first part 
of the story, far from being a mere "Sprungbrett" for the rest, is 
thematically essential to it. 9 
The most important thing about the outer frame is that it touches 
on a number of issues that are centrally involved in the duel itself, in 
a way that undermines the system of values that is the subject of the 
duel. For example, extramarital affairs are outrageous in the context 
of the duel; the occasion of the total breakdown of Littegarde' s way of 
life is simply the accusation that she has spent a night with a man, 
though that man is of such high social rank that he is first in line of 
succession to the throne. Even if the accusation were true, it would 
scarcely be evidence of a generally immoral way of life, and the rela-
tionship would be, for her, a considerable move up the social scale. 
But once we put the possible relationship of the Count and Littegarde 
in these terms, we must be reminded of the story's opening words, 
where the Duke and the (eventual) Duchess (who had been "unter 
seinem Rang") seem a parallel instance. In fact, they seem to be a 
more extreme case; they had had a child before the marriage, which 
suggests that the relationship must have lasted some time. It is an 
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amusing comment on the ostensible issue of the duel (a slander 
against Littegarde's moral purity) that the present occupant of the 
throne is the result of just such a situation as that which is so un-
thinkable for the purpose of the duel. But this is only one example of 
the thematic continuity between the frame of the story and the duel 
and the uncomfortable nature of that continuity when closer atten-
tion is brought to bear on it. A more important aspect of this continuity 
consists in the fact that if we now take the story as a whole, we can 
see an original antagonism between two people becoming trans-
formed several times, each time concerning itself with a new issue 
and involving new people yet always preserving aspects of its previ-
ous shape. 
The dispute between the Count and the Duchess concerning the 
investigation of the murder of the Duke is recognizably the continua-
tion of the struggle between the two brothers over the succession to 
the throne. The Duke had been trying to maneuver his brother out of 
the succession by legitimizing his illegitimate child, and the Count 
had responded by arranging his brother's murder. After the Duke's 
death, the uneasy maneuvering between the Duchess and the Count 
fundamentally concerns the same issue of the succession. The Duch-
ess fears that she might only succeed in provoking a popular move in 
the Count's direction if she prosecutes him; he waits for her to make 
the mistake that may have the effect of putting him on the throne. But 
next, in a further transformation of the original antagonism, the 
Duchess's part in the struggle is assumed by Friedrich and Littegarde 
and they become the means by which Count Jakob is prosecuted for 
the murder of his brother. Thus the Duke, the Duchess, Friedrich, 
and Littegarde are all successively involved in a struggle against the 
Count. It is a delightful irony of the story that Littegarde in her 
struggle against the Count to vindicate her honor is the lineal de-
scendant and in a sense the instrument of the original attempt to 
promote to the throne the child who is the issue of that very sin at 
which she recoils! As a coprosecutor of the Count, she places herself 
in the same camp as the kind of woman from whom she wishes to 
distinguish herself-the Duchess. Her struggle for her moral values 
indirectly, but importantly, rewards their opposite; in this way she is 
really achieving the opposite result to the one she thinks she is achiev-
ing. 
The ending of the story can only be regarded as a resolution of all 
its issues if an important fact is ignored: that in the whole course of 
the events of the story, the first sin and the first injustice were both 
committed by the Duke. The narrator points out that "Jakob der 
Rotbart verschmerzte, in kluger Erwagung der obwaltenden Um-
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stande, das Unrecht, das ihm sein Bruder zugefiigt hatte" (230). The 
Count was guilty of murder but was at least provoked by a great 
"Unrecht" and thus not motivated simply by his own greed. And at 
the end of the story he performs an action that has no other motiva-
tion than a concern for justice. By contrast, the Duchess never seems 
to act for any reason other than her own advantage, and she subor-
dinates to that consideration any possible wish to bring her husband's 
murderer to justice, even though she has good reason to believe that 
the Count is the murderer. All of this means that Littegarde and 
Friedrich, in their pursuit of justice and virtue, are allied with (and in 
the long term serve the interests of) a woman who is less concerned 
with those values than any other person in the story. 
The last words of the text provide a final, and decisive, undermin-
ing of its apparently positive ending: "Der Kaiser aber hing Herrn 
Friedrich, nach der Trauung, eine Gnadenkette um den Hals; und 
sobald er, nach Vollendung seiner Geschafte mit der Schweiz, wieder 
in Worms angekommen war, liefs er in die Statuten des geheiligten 
gottlichen Zweikampfs, iiberall wo vorausgesetzt wird, dafs die 
Schuld dadurch unmittelbar ans Tageslichte komme, die Worte ein-
riicken: 'wenn es Gottes Wille ist'" (261). An acceptance of the con-
vention of the trial by combat and its revelation of God's judgment is 
of course unavoidable, for that convention is an integral part of the 
story. Just as there is no point in reading ghost stories unless we are 
prepared to accept the convention used (in spite of our normal unwil-
lingness to believe in ghosts), so here we must accept the framework 
of a simple medieval faith, for otherwise we can make no sense of 
what happens in the duel, why Friedrich and Littegarde are in such 
distress about it, or why as readers we too should be puzzled at the 
apparent outcome and then satisfied when further developments 
show that after all no mistake was involved. 10 We see the convention 
threatened and then surviving apparently intact. Why, then, the 
change in the statutes of the duel? That the change is dealt with in the 
last sentence of the story is a guarantee that it is of some importance; 
and in fact this apparently insignificant change of wording has the 
effect of destroying any possibility that the duel can be relied upon to 
reveal the truth in future.11 Once the possibility is granted that the 
truth may not come to light "unmittelbar," the question then arises, 
"How long must we wait?" And we cannot know. It may be two 
days, two weeks, two months, two years, two decades. Once it is 
granted that the truth may not always be immediately visible on the 
conclusion of the duel, we have lost everything that the duel was 
supposed to guarantee; its whole point was that one could rely on it. 
Once it is assumed that in some cases we may not know right away 
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what the truth is, it follows that we cannot know for certain in any 
case. It will never be possible again to look at the outcome of any duel 
and say simply: there is the truth. Since we never know God's will 
(even granted the convention of the story that this will exists and is 
benevolent), the phrase "Wenn es Gottes Wille ist" is as good as 
saying "Perhaps." The truth-discovering function of the duel had 
seemed to be saved after being doubted for a while; but the apparently 
innocuous change of wording now destroys it. The paradoxical posi-
tion results: even granted a faith in the truth-revealing function of the 
duel, we still cannot see what it reveals! 
In Der Zweikampf, Kleist uses a conventional framework that is built 
on simple and familiar ideas such as the vindication of faith, the 
triumph of virtue and justice, the presence of an omnipotent and 
benevolent God, and the hero and heroine after their trials living 
happily ever after, to do something very intriguing with it: he assimi-
lates it to a pessimistic and skeptical outlook. The end result is not a 
story that attacks these stereotypes directly but one that accepts them 
only to question whether, even granted that acceptance, they have 
real positive value. We cannot of course ignore the interpretation of 
the story that seems to be there at its surface level and that I have set 
out at the beginning of this chapter. Yet neither can we ignore another 
interpretation that offers itself just as persistently throughout the 
story: the tiresome and ineffectual simpleton, more by good luck than 
good management and not without having made a fool of himself, at 
last wins the priggish girl in a marriage that looks to be uninteresting 
and to be based less on love than on her dutiful acceptance of the 
savior of her reputation-the only thing that seems to concern her. 
Virtue and faith not only look unattractive as a result, but worse still 
their representatives assist the larger triumph of immorality and in-
justice and help to keep the scheming Duchess and her son, the issue 
of her immoral behavior, on the throne. An alliance of ambition, 
immorality, and injustice on the one hand and priggish simpletons on 
the other has indeed eliminated the villainous Count from the scene. 
But he was the one character in the story who, for all his faults, had 
any human warmth, dignity, or impersonal concern for justice; and 
the wrong done him-that which set the whole sequence of events in 
motion-goes unavenged. Falsehood and trickery have prospered 
while God's truth and goodness, even granted they exist, have be-
come inaccessible and obscured. Perhaps the story is not so untypical 
of Kleist after all. 
V 
Michael Kohlhaas 
Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas is among the most celebrated works in Ger-
man literature, and it has been the subject of extensive critical discus-
sion that is, however, far from producing any consensus. 1 Two much 
disputed issues are always at the center of the critical discussion: 
first, the question of how we should judge Kohlhaas and his actions-
positively, negatively, or some combination of the two and with what 
emphasis-and second, the question of the gypsy episode's place in 
(or even relevance to) the story or, to be more precise, the place of the 
sequence of events that in the narrative begins with Kohlhaas' s jour-
ney to Brandenburg and ends with the conclusion of the story itself. 
The first of these two questions can have a deceptive simplicity that 
has often allowed its interpreters to think they were making state-
ments that were self-evident-only to be contradicted by others 
equally convinced of their own correctness in a diametrically opposite 
view. And it seems that the debate is becoming sharper: recent studies 
have been more uncompromising both in negative and positive judg-
ments of Kohlhaas than ever before. Karl Schultze-Jahde's very plau-
sible positive evaluation of Kohlhaas in one of the earliest studies of 
the story provides a good introduction to the focal point of the discus-
sion. Schultze-Jahde explained carefully that Kohlhaas's violence in 
the story had a legal basis; since the law is ultimately an agreement 
between people to regulate their dealings with each other, and gov-
ernmental power is also the result of an agreement entered into for 
the protection of individuals, society's action in denying him justice 
breaks its agreement with Kohlhaas and releases him from his obliga-
tion to keep to his side of the bargain. He is then back in a state of 
nature, in which each man is the protector of what is rightfully his, 
and must respond to any forcible seizure of it with an attempt to seize 
it back again by force. 2 Gerhard Fricke in a later article rounded out 
this picture of the wholly admirable Kohlhaas by stressing that Kleist 
goes to some lengths early in the story to show Kohlhaas as a man of 
great patience and reason. Fricke points to the number of provoca-
tions that Kohlhaas ignores, the careful way he proceeds, and stresses 
that Kohlhaas takes matters into his own hands only after all other 
possible remedies are exhausted; and with a great deal of textual 
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evidence at his disposal, by no means taken out of context or misin-
terpreted, he makes a very good case for the conclusion: "So hat der 
Dichter alles nur Mogliche getan, um seinen Helden als das Gegenteil 
eines Rechtsfanatikers, Absolutisten oder radikalen Weltverbesserers 
zu erweisen." 3 Richard Matthias Miiller, in one of the most recent 
articles on the story, and well aware that this view has in the mean-
time provoked much dissent, takes the most uncompromising posi-
tion to date, insisting that Kohlhaas does nothing for which we might 
even partially disapprove of him. The obvious textual reasons for 
doubt over the thesis of Fricke or Schultze-Jahde had been that Kohl-
haas takes the law into his own hands by violent means that involve 
the death of innocent people. Muller sees this as merely "ein Stuck 
Pathologie und Naturgeschichte der Revolution" and says that Kleist 
wants to show us just what can result from even the noblest mo-
tives. 4 But this begins to sound considerably less plausible than 
Schultze-Jahde or Fricke did: can Kohlhaas's indiscriminate lashing 
out at bystanders in his search for the Junker be separated from his 
intent and his moral stance when the results of his actions are visible 
to and predictable by him? 
Small wonder, then, that critical voices have been raised that are 
very much less sympathetic to Kohlhaas. Many have viewed him as a 
basically good man with a good cause who, degenerating under strain, 
does regrettable things in pursuit of that cause. But recently a much 
more totally negative view of Kohlhaas has appeared. R. S. Lucas 
argues that Kohlhaas is not a reasonable man at all, accuses him of 
dishonesty, opportunism, and of breaking the amnesty agreement; 
and his general view is that Kleist, in Kohlhaas, has "laid bare, one 
after another, the illusory objective grounds of revenge and shown 
the thing up for the personal and irrational satisfaction it is." 5 
This kind of view is the complete counterpart of Muller's; it can 
find some genuine support in certain passages of the text (what hap-
pens at the Tronkenburg and at the convent, for example), but like 
Muller, though coming from the opposite direction, Lucas tries to 
make the whole text consistent with the impressions legitimately 
gained from particular parts of it, and that leads again to some highly 
implausible interpretation. It is very hard to deny that there is some 
justice in Kohlhaas's case, but that is what Lucas feels he has to deny. 
The text contains a great deal of evidence that the Saxon government 
is repeatedly corrupt and unjust in its dealings with Kohlhaas; Lucas 
either disregards the evidence or twists it beyond recognition. The 
Elector of Saxony promotes his corrupt officials after he has been 
confronted with their corruption, but Lucas argues that since Nagel-
schmidt's letter is the occasion for the Elector's action, Kohlhaas bears 
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this responsibility for sending the government from bad to worse. 
And whereas the text makes it clear that Kohlhaas only writes to 
Nagelschmidt after the amnesty has been broken, Lucas rewrites this 
by saying that "the amnesty is not broken until Kohlhaas puts him-
self in the wrong by fresh association with the new crimes of Nagel-
schmidt." 6 Now such blatant misreading of Kleist's text would be of 
no interest were it not for the fact that the simultaneous appearances 
of Muller and Lucas underline an important fact about the story that 
will not go away and must be faced: it is that a great deal of the text 
seems to show Kohlhaas as an exemplary man with a patient and 
reasonable attitude to justice, while other parts of it seem to show 
him as vengeful and indiscriminately violent; we must not lose sight 
of this apparent inconsistency by attempting, as Muller and Lucas do, 
to ignore or distort either set of passages in order to simplify the text 
and to allow the interpreter to rely wholly on the one as if the other 
did not exist. This may make life easier for the interpreter, but it 
avoids the real point of the story. The challenge it presents to us as 
readers is precisely that Kohlhaas is both exemplary and repellent in 
the story: how can a man who displays such genuine respect for the 
law, such patience and such honorableness, also be capable of indis-
criminate violence, of killing innocent people, and of descending at 
the end of the story to a vengefulness that in his final words to the 
Elector of Saxony ("Ich aber kann dir weh tun, und ich wills!" [86]) 
looks almost petty? 7 What is Kleist doing in giving us such a clash 
between these two appearances of Kohlhaas? What thematic point 
underlies this conflict in the text? 
It is of course clear from the first that the conflict is a central and 
well-considered feature of the story. Kleist' s narrator makes the point 
for us in his opening sentence when he says that Kohlhaas is "einer 
der rechtschaffensten zugleich und entsetzlichsten Menschen seiner 
Zeit," and when he claims a little later, "Das Rechtgefiihl aber machte 
ihn zum Rauber und Morder" (9). But after this summary opening 
evaluation, the narrator does little more to help us solve the problem 
of how to conceive of the relation of the two sides of Kohlhaas. He 
does indeed continue to express attitudes; the clear negative evalua-
tion of Kohlhaas' s "Mandat" as a "Schwarmerei krankhafter und 
mifsgeschaffener Art" {36) is an obvious case, but that this cannot be 
used as any kind of final judgment is shown when somewhat later in 
the text the narrator is still calling him "den ehrlichen Kohlhaas" {58). 
The inconsistency shows that here Kleist's narrator, as always, judges 
impressionistically and not in an authoritative way that might pro-
vide a secure point of orientation for the reader. 8 
Some critics have attempted to do justice to both images of Kohl-
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haas, but have done so in a way that seems curiously inappropriate to 
the intensity of Kleist' s texts. They have tried to take a judiciously 
balanced view of the whole and to reconcile the two extreme posi-
tions by seeing Kohlhaas as a basically good man who admittedly 
makes some mistakes. Ludwig Buttner, for example, in an article 
entitled "Michael Kohlhaas-eine paranoische oder heroische Ge-
stalt?" cautions against either simple view but then goes on to say 
that Kleist gives us here" ein Bild des wirklichen unverfalschten Men-
schen mit seinen Tugenden und seinen Lastem." 9 But this -keeps 
negative and positive aspects of Kohlhaas in sight only at the cost of 
removing the crucial tension between them; they are not so easily to 
be reconciled without losing much of the story's force, for in Kleist's 
text they are felt to be contradictory and apparently irreconcilable. 
Kohlhaas is both scrupulously just and blind to justice, both con-
spicuously patient and conspicuously impatient, both grand and petty 
in his actions. An easy compromise between the two is too complacent 
a solution; the story has been made to seem much more tame than it 
is. Kohlhaas is drawn on too grand a scale for us to regard him as an 
ordinary man with the same faults and virtues as the rest of us. 
One way to sharpen the issues here is for the reader to ask himself 
what he would have done in identical circumstances to those in which 
Kohlhaas finds himself. Not surprisingly, there is rarely any easy 
answer. Would it have been best to take the horses back at the begin-
ning and accept the fact that there is no way to get justice where the 
nobility is an adversary, or instead to take them back after the law-
suits failed and accept the fact that the courts are irrevocably corrupt, 
and that two horses are not worth the total disruption of one's life? 
Assuming, on the other hand, that the matter should not be dropped, 
was it then best to pursue the Junker while scrupulously avoiding 
harm to the innocent? Alternatively, was Kohlhaas' s mistake writing 
the letter to Nagelschmidt or perhaps his refusing the possibility of 
saving his life by giving up the "Kapsel"? This seems to be a fairly 
complete list of all major points where different decisions were pos-
sible, but there are obvious objections to all of the alternative courses 
of action. To drop the matter is to acquiesce in and encourage a 
corrupt system, and we commonly regard men who have taken on 
and beaten corrupt systems as heroes. Carefully limited force is prob-
ably impossible-the Junker has an established place in the society, 
and his using that position to protect himself will mean that an attack 
on him will automatically involve others. When Kohlhaas wrote to 
Nagelschmidt, he seemed to be without resource in face of a broken 
amnesty, and failure to act could easily have seemed like a passive 
acceptance of death. As for giving up the "Kapsel," after so much 
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suffering it would seem like a very unsatisfying surrender, an anti-
climactic event leaving Kohlhaas and the reader at least with a strong 
sense of unfinished business and of a continuation of corrupt govern-
ment. There is, then, no easy answer to the question "What should 
Kohlhaas have done?" -but that does not remove the sense that he is 
indeed "entsetzlich" nonetheless. 
Having set out the dimensions and the issues of the first of the two 
major interpretative problems of the story, I wish now to consider the 
second, that of the relevance of the gypsy episode. In so doing I do 
not mean to abandon the first, because ultimately the two problems 
become the same and require the same solution; the apparent dis-
crepancy between the two faces of Kohlhaas has much to do with that 
other apparent discrepancy between the earlier and later parts of the 
story. 
The chief problem of the gypsy episode has always been that it is 
not clear how this episode could or should occur at all with the rest of 
the text. 10 Late in the story-four-fifths of the way through it, in 
fact-we go from a text that has been concerned exclusively with 
realistic description and problems in the real world of real people into 
a strange world of supernatural events; the story begins firmly with 
the kind of motivation that we can all understand and relate to the 
world in which we live, and yet suddenly, near the end, that is no 
longer true. One kind of critical response has been the view that, 
quite simply, the unity of the work is disturbed by this sudden change: 
Heinrich Meyer-Benfey says that the two parts of the story are "mit-
einander unvertraglich," Karl Otto Conrady that they are not organi-
cally related. 11 A common explanation of this mismatch is derived 
from the genesis of the text: when writing the ending of the story, 
Kleist apparently forgot what his convention at the beginning had 
been, since he wrote the ending much later than the earlier part. But 
the contrast in the two parts is so strong that it is hardly plausible to 
suggest that Kleist did not notice it. 
The first significant attempt to look at the relation of the gypsy 
episode to the rest of the text in terms of a possible thematic function 
was by Schultze-Jahde. He thought that Lisbeth introduced a divine 
perspective to emphasize that justice could not be achieved in this 
world; meanwhile, from a divine perspective, Kohlhaas is a good and 
just man. Interesting as Schultze-Jahde's account is, it is not convinc-
ing. The means chosen by Kleist (soothsaying, magic, etc.) are not 
Christian; Kohlhaas's concern with vengeance at the end of the story 
is most un-Christian; most important of all, the explanation offered 
seems too lame to do justice to the radical jolting that Kleist inflicts on 
his readers as the style and kind of motivation of the story abruptly 
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change. A shift from a human to a divine perspective could surely 
have been achieved by other and clearer means. Moreover, the means 
chosen seem to be very much concerned with this world, rather than 
the next; that is, with the issue of the Elector of Saxony's succession 
and Kohlhaas's receiving and satisfying the justice of this world. 
Schultze-Jahde's has remained the only serious and reasonably 
well-developed attempt to interpret the function of the gypsy episode 
in the story. 12 Fricke explicitly decided to keep it out of his discussion 
on the grounds that it contributed nothing to the central question: 
"Wer war und was wollte Kohlhaas?" 13 But, on the contrary, the 
confusion sown by this episode is a confusion in just those issues 
which Fricke wants to talk about. Instead of waiting until the issues of 
Kohlhaas' s character and actions have been settled and only then 
facing the issue of the function of the gypsy, we must take the two 
issues together and ask at the outset: what kind of confusion does the 
gypsy introduce into the judgment of Kohlhaas and why? 
The full extent of the change in the story bears careful attention-it 
involves much more than merely the introduction of magical elements. 
There is, first of all, a change in the principal antagonism, which now 
becomes Kohlhaas against the Elector rather than against the Junker. 
The second change is in the object that is the ostensible focus of the 
antagonism; this was the pair of horses but now becomes the "Kap-
sel." Third, the search for justice becomes a pursuit of vengeance in 
that Kohlhaas seeks now to harm the Elector rather than achieve a fair 
settlement of his dispute with the Junker. Fourth, there is a change in 
the kind of events admitted into the story; these can now include 
supernatural and irrational events whereas formerly they had been 
restricted to objective businesslike dealings in the everyday world of 
ordinary people. Fifth, the narration begins to include fairy tale ele-
ments: for example, fortune telling and the kind of rags-to-riches 
transformation (of Kohlhaas's children) that frequently occurs in fairy 
tales. 
It is important to see that we have here not merely a change of style 
or a sudden inclusion of the supernatural but a series of changes at all 
levels of the story (including significantly its dominant issues and 
principal characters) that must be taken together, each one seen as 
part of the whole complex of changes. It is perhaps natural that one 
element in the complex has caused the most puzzlement-the magic 
associated with the gypsy-and that this has deflected attention from 
the others. And yet the first of the changes to appear is not the 
introduction of magic; before that happens, there has already begun 
the process of changing the focus on the main characters and on the 
dominant antagonism of the story. It is, in fact, the scene of the hunt 
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at the estate of Aloysius von Kallheim that clearly opens the final and 
markedly different episode of the story: 
Es traf sich dais der Kurfiirst von Sachsen auf die Einladung des Landdrosts, 
Grafen Aloysius von Kallheim, der damals an der Grenze von Sachsen be-
trachtliche Besitzungen hatte, in Gesellschaft des Kammerers, Herrn Kunz, 
und seiner Gemahlin, der Dame Heloise, Tochter des Landdrosts und Schwe-
ster des Prasidenten, andrer glanzenden Herren und Darnen, Jagdjunker 
und Hofherren, die dabei waren, nicht zu erwahnen, zu einem groBen Hirsch-
jagen, <las man, um ihn zu erheitern, angestellt hatte, nach Dahme gereist 
war. (79) 
There follows a description of the festivities, but soon the text re-
turns to give us even more information about Lady Heloise: "Der 
Kurfiirst, der mit halboffener Brust, den Federhut, nach Art der Jager, 
mit Tannenzweigen geschmiickt, neben der Dame Heloise safs, die, in 
Zeiten friiherer Jugend, seine erste Liebe gewesen war ... "(80). In a 
fashion typical of Kleist, there is here much cramming in of circum-
stantial detail: some overly precise description of the Elector's hat, 
some throwaway comments about the numbers of splendid lords and 
ladies present at the hunt. All this creates the familiar impression that 
the narrator is eager to get on with the main outline of his story, 
pausing for a brief descriptive comment only in order to help us 
visualize the scene. But the odd thing is that both these passages, 
which look as if they aim only to give a colorful impression of the 
immediate scene, give us vital information about the relationships 
among the main actors that is unexpected and that had curiously 
been withheld from us until so late a stage in the story. In both cases 
the focus on Heloise is striking. Almost as a cover, the narrator stresses 
that many other lords and ladies are there, but it is she that is singled 
out in both passages, and each time a new piece of information is 
dropped in about her relationship to the Elector, the Tronkas, and the 
Kallheims. Why are we suddenly given this information about a hith-
erto unseen woman, and why is it slipped into the text as part of the 
irrelevant detail used to evoke a colorful scene? These questions will 
test just how carefully the reader has followed the details of the 
alliances between various families; if he has been attentive to those 
details and to the conclusions that they seem to have suggested, he 
will now see that this new information changes everything. What we 
learn about Heloise may not be immediately striking, but if we con-
sider its bearing on how and why the major events of the story have 
taken place, its impact is shattering. It changes the whole thematic 
basis of the story. This almost hidden but enormously significant 
change ushers in all the more obvious changes because it is really the 
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basis of them all. To see how this is so, we must go back into those 
earlier parts of the story to which this new one is directly relevant; 14 
we must be clear about the kinds of impressions that had been built 
up of the central issues and personalities of the story before we can 
see just how this new information renders those impressions seriously 
inadequate. 
A central question throughout the story has been the reason for the 
failure of justice in Kohlhaas's lawsuit. In general, we have been 
given an impression of a conspiracy of a few interrelated families who 
cooperate to their mutual advantage by forming a corrupt establish-
ment that is able to deny justice to any outsider if he is in conflict with 
an insider. But this impression does not arise from any one point in 
the story, nor does it occur in explicit form. On the contrary, it is an 
impression gained from various small pieces of information spread 
out over the text, and it develops and is rounded out slowly with each 
new textual detail that is added to it. Just as in Kleist's other stories, 
the notion of a sequence of impressions is a very important one; as 
readers, we are actively involved in reconstructing what they all add 
up to, and we must always be prepared to see that later information 
will show a tempting conclusion earlier in the story to have been a 
mistake. It is important, therefore, to trace carefully the sequence of 
our impressions of the nature of Kohlhaas's cause. 
Our very first impression is that of a simple legal struggle against 
the Junker, but very soon it begins to seem that what he is really up 
against is a shadowy establishment network. As our understanding 
of that larger and more sinister adversary develops, our view of Kohl-
haas's moral position develops with it, since the two are interdepen-
dent: our judgment of the appropriateness of Kohlhaas's response to 
his adversary depends on just how we conceive of that adversary. 
The first hint that Kohlhaas is up against something much bigger and 
more important than Junker Wenzel occurs when Kohlhaas inquires 
as to why his first complaint to the Dresden tribunal has been rejected 
and learns in reply; "dais der Junker Wenzel von Tronka mit zwei 
Jungherren, Hinz und Kunz von Tronka, verwandt sei, deren einer, 
bei der Person des Herrn, Mundschenk, der andre gar Kammerer sei" 
(22). Here is no statement of motives or of who stood to gain and 
how; we get the bare fact and must imagine the rest. Kohlhaas then 
turns to Berlin, taking his case to the ruler of his own state, and when 
it is rejected again, he finds out as before not how or why it happened 
but just the bare fact, "dais der Graf Kallheim mit dem Hause derer 
von Tronka verschwagert sei" (24). The long arm of the estab.lishment 
reaches even further, we now assume, crossing even state lines. The 
illusion starts to grow of the mafialike quality of the establishment, 
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with eyes and arms everywhere, a quiet but efficient network of men 
whose collective power can ensure that the interests of any one of 
them are protected against outsiders. 
We have no more information about the establishment until much 
later, and it is against the background of his and our knowing only 
this much that Kohlhaas sets out in pursuit of justice; we (and he) 
therefore see the situation now not as Kohlhaas against the Junker 
over two horses, but instead as Kohlhaas against the governmental 
establishment over large-scale corruption and injustice. This change-
a major broadening of the issues-makes all the difference in the 
world to our judgment of Kohlhaas's actions and motives, and we 
must recall this important fact when Lady Heloise enters the picture. 
It may seem foolish to disrupt his life and family from the first point 
of view but heroic to do so from the second. What Kohlhaas does next 
requires a feeling that the issues are on a sufficiently grand scale; 
Kohlhaas himself says that he is "auf grofse Dinge gestellt" (25), and 
his conversation with his wife again stresses the scale of what he is to 
do. What is at stake is not his own personal situation but the nature of 
the society in which he and others live. Others have suffered and will 
suffer, and it might be Kohlhaas' s duty to take up the fight on behalf 
of all. So far so good: the stakes are high, the extent of the evil looks 
great, the courage to take on so large an issue is admirable. 
But even so, we, and the narrator, still find Kohlhaas's next series 
of acts disturbing. Those comments of the narrator that betray this 
disturbance are in fact concerned with just this question of the scale 
of importance of Kohlhaas's mission. The series of manifestoes that 
Kohlhaas publishes shows a constant escalation of his sense of its 
importance. The first is a simple set of instructions to the people of 
the state not to harbor the Junker "bei Strafe Leibes und des Lebens" 
(34), which shows that Kohlhaas has arrogated to himself the power 
of the law to judge and punish. Later he calls himself "einen Reichs-
und Weltfreien, Gott allein unterworfenen Herrn" (36), which seems 
to imply a claim to act in accordance with God's law. The narrator 
clearly displays anxiety over Kohlhaas's exaggerated sense of his mis-
sion and terms the wording of this manifesto a "Schwarmerei krank-
hafter und mifsgeschaffener Art." But the claim becomes more explicit 
in the next manifesto, where Kohlhaas calls himself "einen Statthalter 
Michaels, des Erzengels" (41). Whenever anxiety over Kohlhaas's 
grandiose claims emerges, it raises with it the nagging question: were 
two stolen horses worth all this? Or, to be more correct, but even 
more disturbing: two forcibly borrowed horses. We need more to 
justify the grandiosity of the claim to be a "Statthalter Michaels." If 
Kohlhaas succeeds in overthrowing a corrupt government, his sense 
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of himself and his mission might seem justified; he would have 
achieved something magnificent. But still, Saxony is not the world, 
so that Kohlhaas's signing the last manifesto "auf dem Sitz unserer 
provisorischen Weltregierung" will still seem disproportionate to 
what he is doing, even on the most favorable interpretation of what 
that is. The stage is not big enough for this language. 
The violence of Kohlhaas's pursuit of the Junker also makes it nec-
essary for the reader to think about the scale of importance of his 
cause. Some of the Junker's servants die a brutal death; some of the 
inhabitants of Wittenberg have their houses burned. According to the 
more trivial view of Kohlhaas' s mission, these are innocent bystanders 
who have no connection with the Junker's stealing the horses, and 
they are the victims of Kohlhaas's indiscriminate, senseless rage. Ac-
cording to the grander view, they could be seen as the people who 
serve and acquiesce in the corrupt regime and so allow it to continue; 
the violence may be necessary for the social change that is the real 
point of what Kohlhaas is doing. Kohlhaas' s apparent readiness to 
burn the convent at Erlabrunn might seem needlessly savage. But 
since its abbess turns out to be Wenzel' s aunt, Antonia von Tronka, 
the same issue arises of how we are to conceive of what is at stake. 
Would this be the destruction of an arm of the corrupt establishment 
that seems to be everywhere and the removal of a part of the system 
by which the Tronka network maintains its oppressive power-or the 
senseless burning of a convent over a few horses by a man crazed 
with indiscriminate anger? 
The next occasion on which we learn more about what it is that 
Kohlhaas opposes occurs when the Saxon court considers the letter 
from Luther. Another member of the establishment appears, a Count 
Kallheim who is the Saxon "Prasident der Staatskanzlei." Kleist does 
not even bother to tell us precisely who he is, to whom he is related, 
or how he fits into the corrupt network. We know that a Brandenburg 
official named Kallheim has been instrumental in dismissing Kohl-
haas' s complaint there, and that he is related by marriage to the 
Tronkas; all the narrator needs to do is to bring out another Kallheim 
without even giving him a first name (we never do learn it), and the 
reader simply raises his eyebrows and thinks: "Another one of them." 
And the more extensive the system of the corrupt establishment, the 
better Kohlhaas's cause looks. The narrator's giving us no informa-
tion on this Kallheim seems to suggest that what we have seen is as 
yet only a small part of what there is to know-the mere tip of the 
iceberg. 
At this point in the story Kohlhaas and his cause in any case begin 
to look better for other reasons. He disarms himself and his men, 
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goes back into the courts, and a clear distinction begins to emerge 
between the honest men of the Saxon court, Count Wrede and Prince 
Christiern von Meissen, and the criminals, the Tronkas and Kallheims. 
His mission seems even to have been partly successful already: he 
has indeed forced the issue of corruption out into the open and in so 
doing may already have weakened the power of the Tronka-Kallheim 
complex. 
The next development in our conception of Kohlhaas's adversary 
comes with the introduction of a new name: von Wenk. A von Wenk 
appears in the market place (60), and he is said to be a friend of Kunz. 
It is therefore distressing when we learn that after Prince von Meissen 
goes to spend some time at his estates his duties have been given to 
"dem SchloBhauptmann Freiherrn Siegfried von Wenk; einem Vetter 
des oben erwahnten Herren gleiches Namens" (70). What is most 
disturbing about this is not just that the man who appeared to be 
Kohlhaas's chief protector is replaced for the moment by a friend of 
Kunz; the darkest and thematically most important aspect of this fact 
is that one more arm of the establishment has appeared, another 
strand in the net of friends and families forming the system that 
Kohlhaas is up against. Another gloomy aspect of the situation is that 
the appearance of one honest man in a high position seems to have 
been a rare and temporary phenomenon on which we cannot rely. 
Behind such men, waiting to take their place and close the breach in 
the wall of the establishment, there are, it now seems, countless 
cousins, brothers-in-law, and cronies. The establishment network 
looks tighter and more menacing than ever. Kohlhaas seems to be in 
great danger, but on the other hand the reader is now more inclined 
to view him in a positive light, since the more extensive the corrup-
tion of the establishment, the more Kohlhaas' s mission can be seen as 
a heroic and valuable one. Kohlhaas is understandably anxious when 
he sees that the character of the guard on him has suddenly changed 
from a few men acting as his bodyguards for his own protection to a 
greater number watching over him as if he were under arrest (72). His 
interview with Siegfried von Wenk establishes that their orders have 
indeed been deliberately changed, and thus that the amnesty has 
been broken. When Kohlhaas asks whether he is a prisoner, von 
Wenk confirms that he is. 15 
At this point we have the impression that the establishment easily 
bounces back just when great effort by dedicated men had managed 
to get it even partly under control. Kohlhaas's letter to Nagelschmidt 
is sometimes seen as a fatal error, but from Kohlhaas's point of view, 
and even that of the reader at this point in the story, it seems quite 
reasonable. It now appears that the establishment will never honor its 
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promises or play by any rules, and that Kohlhaas made a mistake in 
divesting himself of the one thing that the corrupt system ever took 
seriously-armed force; and that impression only makes his earlier 
behavior seem the more justifiable. 
What happens next only serves to reinforce this attitude. When the 
letter is captured, it shows clearly that Kohlhaas has written it only 
because he believes that the amnesty is broken. The Elector can now 
be in no doubt that his subordinates have broken the agreement 
between himself and Kohlhaas, and that Kohlhaas's action is not a 
breach of the agreement but a response to one on the Elector's side. 
But he seizes the excuse to proceed against Kohlhaas as if he were at 
fault. And instead of proceeding against those who broke the agree-
ment and so dishonored him and his word, he promotes them and 
rids himself of one of the only two honest men in his administration! 
Wrede is removed, Kallheim is given his position, and Kunz is pro-
moted to Kallheim' s old post. 16 It is as if a flaw in the establishment 
network had been seen and quickly repaired. 
The effect of all this is to allow the grand view of Kohlhaas's cause 
(a heroic challenge to a corrupt system) to gain ground at the expense 
of the more trivial version (excessive vengefulness over a few horses). 
And yet, we have curiously little information about the network of 
the establishment; its members seem to interlock by friendships and 
marriages and to conspire to protect their common interests, and so 
we assume that their motive is that of any corrupt oligarchy-the 
preservation and further aggrandizement of the power and wealth of 
those who already have it in great measure. 
It is against this background of where the story and the reader 
stand that the revelations that open the strange final episode must be 
seen. We suddenly see the real shape of the relationships and motives 
that had seemed to constitute an evil, ever-present establishment of 
greedy and corrupt men, and we now realize that that impression 
was completely wrong. Kohlhaas is dealing not with an extensive and 
sinister network but with a few silly, weak people whose motives are 
trivial. From an interpretative standpoint, nothing could be more 
serious than this change; it alters everything. 
The first important piece of information we are given is that Heloise 
is the wife of Kunz and sister of Count Kallheim of the Saxon court. 
At last we see the link between the Tronkas and the Kallheims, and it 
turns out not to be another greedy establishment power broker but 
instead a flirtatious woman. Instead of our former vague impression 
of a far-flung circle, we now have precise knowledge of one particular 
individual who is the actual link, and who turns out to be not another 
of the powerful male governmental figures but only a woman with-
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out office or personal power. 
The establishment already seems much smaller and less threaten-
ing as a result of this first piece of information about Heloise; yet the 
second changes not merely our view of the extent of the alliance 
against Kohlhaas but more importantly still our impression of its 
nature and its motivation. That irrevocably changes the entire story. 
The information itself is simple: merely that Heloise had been the first 
love of the Elector's youth. But whereas Kohlhaas's whole moral 
position has depended on the gradual build-up of the impression that 
the state of Saxony was dominated by an evil and avaricious govern-
ment mafia, we now see instead that the source of all the trouble is 
only the vague affection which the Elector feels for his first love, 
Heloise. There is no organized avaricious conspiracy. And as for the 
extent of the network of allegiances of interlocking families-it really 
goes not much further than Heloise's closest possible personal ties: 
her husband, her brother, her former lover. What lies behind Kohl-
haas' s troubles is not even a strong relationship with any great pas-
sion in it-it is only a vague warmth. Kleist deliberately makes the 
basis of the whole situation a trivial emotion and a trivial set of cir-
cumstances. The motive is not power or wealth but merely a weak 
man's sentimental attachment. The source of the Tronkas' and Kall-
heims' power lies not in their being part of a conspiratorial network 
but in their being the closest relatives of Heloise. This, then, is the 
reason for the Elector's always seeming strangely embarrassed by the 
Tronkas' and Kallheims' misdeeds instead of being wholeheartedly 
behind them: he is not a cruel tyrant but only a man trying weakly not 
to do anything to upset the Tronkas and Kallheims because he wants 
to protect his warm sentimental relationship with Heloise. 
The information about Heloise, therefore, causes a wholesale retro-
spective reinterpretation of the value of Kohlhaas's cause and of the 
appropriateness of his behavior. But for the reader who has retained 
all the details of the earlier part of the story in his mind, things are 
now much, much worse than this; he will see with alarm that Kleist 
now shows that the trouble all arose because the Tronkas have essen-
tially exploited a set of circumstances almost identical to circumstances 
that Kohlhaas himself tried to exploit earlier-and we did not think of 
that as corruption when it happened. That Wenzel's cousin secures 
favorable treatment at court by exploiting the Elector's still warm 
feelings towards his wife has a very uncomfortable precedent involv-
ing Kohlhaas himself. For Kohlhaas had happily acquiesced in his 
wife's plan to exploit a former admirer's similarly still warm feelings 
towards her to gain access to the Elector of Brandenburg. The parallel 
is frighteningly exact. Lisbeth told Kohlhaas that "der Kastellan des 
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kurfiirstlichen Schlosses" (29) had formerly wooed her; that though 
she and he were now married to others, "sie aber immer noch nicht 
ganz vergessen ware"; and that Kohlhaas should leave it to her "aus 
diesem und manchem anderen Umstand ... Vorteil zu ziehen." At 
that earlier point in the story, the reader had been inclined to think 
that this was only taking advantage of a fortunate accident; but we 
must now accept the fact that Kohlhaas himself has readily agreed to 
become tainted by an attempt to exploit an old flame's connection in 
order to get a more favorable hearing at court. And this is exactly how 
the Tronkas had managed to cheat him in the first place! Not only is 
Kohlhaas guilty of the same shoddy morality that was the ultimate 
source of the bad treatment he received in the courts, but that kind of 
offense had seemed at worst a minor one when it had been reported 
in Kohlhaas's case early in the story. And aside from Kohlhaas's 
similar culpability, the scale of the offense is a vital issue in itself. 
Even if we do condemn the Tronkas' behavior as corrupt, and even if 
we overlook Kohlhaas' s involvement in the same kind of behavior, all 
of this now looks far too much like a question of human weakness 
and far too trivial to support the notion of Kohlhaas's grand pursuit 
of justice, his "grofse Dinge" that were needed to justify his total 
commitment to a cause. The introduction of Heloise has changed the 
entire thematic structure by opening up a huge disproportion be-
tween Kohlhaas's avenging angel behavior and the target against 
which it is directed. Kohlhaas set out heroically to slay a dragon and 
to root out corruption, avarice, injustice, and great evil, but instead 
he finds a mouse and a mild weakness for a former love. After this, 
the question of judging Kohlhaas as just or unjust simply cannot be 
raised in the same way any more. The disproportion between his 
actions and the real situation he was up against is not one that invites 
a judgment about the justice of his position at all: what is most strik-
ing here is simply the absurdity of the discrepancy. An avenging 
angel must have a grand opponent, but Kohlhaas, we now find, has 
only a trivial man with a trivial motive. Was this something that could 
justify the setting up of a new provisional world government? 
A nicely calculated point is that there is not even an affair between 
Heloise and the Elector, for that might seem a stronger factor in the 
situation. Instead, a low-key situation is all Kleist allows to exist: the 
Elector still feels affection for Heloise and likes her company, but that 
is all. The Elector is a weakling in all that he does, bowing to pres-
sures rather than making decisions, and his relationship with Heloise 
is evidently much less than passionate. When Heloise wishes to see 
the captive Kohlhaas, the Elector seems powerless to do anything 
other than indulge her whim; and as he does so, he pronounces the 
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most important truth in the whole story: "Torheit, du regierst die 
Welt, und dein Sitz ist ein schoner weiblicher Mund!" (81). This ap-
parently insignificant remark is the key to what was wrong with 
Kohlhaas's view of the world, and all the actions that sprang from 
that view. Foolishness does indeed rule the world and is the source of 
Kohlhaas's troubles; yet his whole stance has required that injustice 
rule the world. He has set out on a grand mission with sword in hand 
to root out injustice, bringing fire and destruction to those who resist, 
but all that is there to be rooted out is foolishness and susceptibility to 
the whims of a pretty woman. He seeks a tyrant to make a terrible 
example of him-but how can a frivolous weakling match up to the 
role that Kohlhaas's attitude assigns to him? The problem here is not 
that the Elector is guiltless, for he is not; what is thematically vital is 
that he operates on too trivial a level to be an appropriate target for 
Kohlhaas's righteous fury. The tragedy of Kohlhaas at the end of the 
story is not that he falls from being a model of perfect justice, or that 
he is sacrificed in the name of justice. It is that the world is too 
inconsistent, too disorganized, and too much influenced by whims 
and foolishness to be able to find a place for Kohlhaas' s grandiose 
sense of mission. 
It is, then, the introduction of Heloise and the consequent revela-
tions about Kohlhaas's adversary-what had seemed to be the cor-
rupt establishment-that produce a fundamental change in our con-
cept of the story's thematic structure. The series of radical changes at 
all levels of the text that now follow serve to dramatize the point that 
this is no longer the story we thought it was. A profound conceptual 
change is reflected immediately in many changes at the surface level 
of the text. And the point of the bizarre impression of the story's later 
parts lies surely in its stressing that the world, society, and even 
Kohlhaas himself are not organized in so logical and consistent a 
manner as had seemed to be the case: the inconsequential and irra-
tional are now allowed to appear. 
Kohlhaas had always behaved as if the world were rational and 
consistent: if it misbehaves, it can be called to account; if it malfunc-
tions, the malfunction must be located, diagnosed, and corrected; 
somewhere, there are people who are clearly in the wrong, and they 
can be distinguished from those who are not. The conversation with 
his wife (27) spelled out a logical and compelling case for his acts of 
protest and for the impossibility and even immorality of remaining 
silent, of allowing the defect in the state to go uncorrected. Kohlhaas's 
concern in that conversation was with the magnificent abstraction 
"Recht," but whenever there was any mention of the person who was 
withholding it from Kohlhaas, it was the impersonal "man" who 
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seemed to be responsible. Later, Kohlhaas's conversation with Luther 
is again a clear and logical exposition of his reasoning; he argues that 
the individual gives up some of his own freedom in return for the 
protection of law, and if that protection is withdrawn, it follows logi-
cally that the resulting situation "gibt mir, wie wollt 1hr das leugnen, 
die Keule, die mich selbst schiitzt, in die Hand" (45). But Heloise's 
appearance changes everything; no longer can we think of what has 
happened as an individual's struggle against a cohesive group that 
acts consistently and with a clear understanding of what it is doing, 
as well as with a clear motive for doing so. Instead, there is only a 
disorganized, incoherent situation, in which the actors are just indi-
viduals who do not think very clearly, and whose motives are rather 
haphazard and trivial. It no longer seems possible to abstract from 
them an impersonal "man" who has a single-minded intent to deny 
"Recht" to Kohlhaas. And suddenly, the world looks very different: it 
is now a place full of strange irrational events, where superstition, 
coincidence and unexplained oddities prevail, 17 where men act on 
whim or out of sentiment rather than on the basis of consistent rea-
soning, where actions result not from grand principles but from smal-
ler scale-even petty and trivial-motives, where anger and a desire 
to get even predominate, instead of a pursuit of abstract justice. The 
"magical" elements may at first sight make this world seem less real-
istic than it had formerly seemed, but that is an illusion; the point of 
the change is that that plausible earlier world is the unreal one that 
does not exist, and that the second world, for all its surface oddities, 
is the real world in which we and Kohlhaas live. As a result Kohlhaas 
himself does not seem to be the man he was-one who acted con-
sistently and always on the basis of clear principles; that too was part 
of an illusion. 
It is in the character of what Kohlhaas seeks that he seems most 
changed. Formerly he seemed to seek only justice: a just punishment 
for the Junker and a more just condition for society, one in which the 
legal system operates fairly. But the last section of the story has Kohl-
haas doing something very different; 18 here he refuses to buy his own 
life by giving the Elector the capsule and tells him instead: "Ich aber 
kann dir weh tun, und ich wills!" (86). The emphasis is not on Kohl-
haas's having abandoned his former regard for the principle of jus-
tice; the punishment the Elector will suffer is certain and is in the 
future, and Kohlhaas's act has nothing to do with bringing that pun-
ishment about. This is not an unjust action, then, but it is a petty 
action and as such contrasts with the formerly grand and noble pur-
suit of justice. All that is involved here is the Elector's anxiety about 
when and where he and his line will die out; Kohlhaas simply enjoys 
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the thought that the Elector will suffer anxiety over what his punish-
ment is to be. Kohlhaas himself has not necessarily changed, but the 
image presented of him does, and in just the same way that the story 
has changed. Formerly, he seemed to be above all a man who was 
ruled by an abstract idea of great importance, and who sought per-
sonal satisfaction in the notion that he was making the world a better 
place. Now he seems merely to be a human being capable of enjoying 
a much more local and immediate kind of satisfaction. 19 
To say that the Elector of Saxony is an insufficiently grand villain to 
allow room for Kohlhaas' s grand heroism, and that the former in a 
way removes any place in the world for the latter, is not of course the 
same thing as saying that the Elector of Saxony is not the villain of the 
story-he is more centrally responsible than anyone and is the ulti-
mate source of the injustice to Kohlhaas. Some critics have radically 
misconceived this scaling down and trivializing of the nature of his 
motivation and have seen it as absolving the Elector from responsi-
bility. 20 But all that is changed here is the way in which he bears 
responsibility, not the fact of that responsibility. It is made abundantly 
clear that the Elector knows of the misdeeds committed in his name, 
that he does nothing to stop them, that he promotes those who com-
mit them, that he avoids steps that will set things right at the cost of 
jeopardizing the wrongdoer, and that he takes steps that correspond 
to a just course of action only when he is compelled to or has no 
alternative that is not immediately more dangerous for him. The dis-
cussion at court of Luther's letter to the Elector, for example (49), 
makes clear that the Elector knows everything, that he is not sur-
prised or outraged by it, and that he is concerned to protect the 
wrongdoers, while never once expressing disapproval of what they 
have done. Kohlhaas's letter to Nagelschmidt makes clear to him that 
the amnesty has been broken by his subordinates. This is further 
confirmed when he fails to use the Nagelschmidt letter in his com-
plaint against Kohlhaas to the Imperial court "wegen der zweideu-
tigen und unklaren Umstande, unter welchen er geschrieben war" 
(79). Yet he had earlier had no scruples about those "unclear" cir-
cumstances when using the letter as a pretext to condemn Kohlhaas 
and to remove the honest Wrede from the government. The clearest 
demonstration of the fact that weakness is not the same as innocence 
of responsibility can be seen in his response, which is only embar-
rassment, when he learns of the crimes committed in his name; again 
and again he is "verlegen." When Christiern von Meissen asserts 
bluntly that Kunz must be brought to trial, the Elector "wandte sich, 
indem er iiber das ganze Gesicht rot ward, und trat ans Fenster" (51). 
He clearly does not like what Kunz does; but how would he face 
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Heloise if he had to prosecute her husband? The thought is evidently 
too much for him. 
When the Elector decides to take the course of action proposed by 
Count Wrede, he might seem to side with the opinions of a just man, 
but the text makes it clear that his motives are very different from 
Wrede's. First and foremost, he thinks this the best way to avoid the 
prosecution of Kunz. And in other respects, Wrede's view seems to 
him the most expedient ("zweckma.Big" [52]); military confrontation 
with Kohlhaas could be dangerous since the "Unziemlichkeiten" of 
Kunz's rule had caused much unrest in the state, and that could work 
to Kohlhaas's advantage. Remarkably enough, then, the Elector's 
reasons include a clear recognition of Kunz's corruptness quite apart 
from Kohlhaas' s case and a desire to protect Kunz and keep him in his 
office nonetheless! The Elector evidently has no political judgment, 
no concern with justice, and would really like people to stop bother-
ing him with issues that interefere with what he really cares about: 
his friends, his parties, and Heloise. As such, he is really very like 
Wenzel von Tronka. Both sin through omission more than through 
commission. Both know of their corrupt subordinates' acts and try to 
protest that they were not responsible. Both are weak men, who 
when called on to face issues become "verlegen," or blush, or go pale. 
Both are more worthy of contempt than hate; and both are usually 
seen to be interested in trivial pursuits. Like the Elector, Wenzel is too 
concerned with a hunt in the company of his cronies to accept re-
sponsibility for what is being done in his name. 
The Elector of Brandenburg is in clear contrast to the Elector of 
Saxony. He can make a mistake (in his appointment of Kallheim) but 
moves to correct that mistake as soon as he knows of it. To argue that 
Brandenburg's mistake makes the two Electors comparable would be 
to miss the point that the initial similarity (a corrupt official in the 
court of each) is used precisely to distinguish them. Brandenburg's 
Kallheim is an isolated instance and is quickly removed. By contrast, 
the Elector of Saxony makes a practice of hiring corrupt officials-the 
Tronkas, the Kallheims, the Wenks-and does not regard them as 
mistakes when their corrupt actions become visible; he promotes them 
in light of their characteristic kind of service, and roots out his few 
"mistakes" -the appointment of an honest man now and then-as 
soon as he has an excuse to do so. 21 The execution of Kohlhaas might 
at first sight seem a disappointing action on the part of the Elector of 
Brandenburg in that it distances him from Kohlhaas. But precisely the 
reverse is the case, for it is by this act that the Elector shows himself 
fully to share Kohlhaas's perspective. Like Kohlhaas, he is a man who 
places principles before people. Consider, for example, the narrator's 
Michael Kohlhaas 85 
saying that Kohlhaas's sentence was one, "das die ganze Stadt, bei 
dem Wohlwollen das der Kurfurst fur den Kohlhaas trug, unfehlbar 
durch ein Machtwort desselben, in eine blofse, vielleicht beschwer-
liche und langwierige Gefangnisstrafe verwandelt zu sehen hoffte" 
{94-95). We see the point of this comment if we remember the narra-
tor's prior remark about the Elector of Saxony having a "fiir Freund-
schaft sehr empfangliches Herz" (52), and we realize that the Elector 
of Brandenburg will act out of pure regard for justice and not be 
swayed at all by his liking for Kohlhaas. If he acted otherwise, he 
would be doing what the Elector of Saxony has done and distancing 
himself from Kohlhaas in a more fundamental way. Kohlhaas himself 
recognizes this and, far from protesting, is at last at peace in his last 
few days. He even acknowledges that he is satisfied with the actions 
of his ruler-more, he is overcome with joy by them. The ending is 
not simply pure justice-it is Kohlhaas's own kind of justice, admin-
istered by Kohlhaas' s own kind of man. The Elector even speaks to 
Kohlhaas in his own language: "Nun, Kohlhaas, heut ist der Tag, an 
dem dir dein Recht geschieht!" (101). Small wonder that Kohlhaas is 
satisfied with a ruler who is almost a copy of himself. It is an impor-
tant paradox that this man of meticulous principle is the one who 
finally executes Kohlhaas; his severity has of course something 
dreadful about it, but that just shows again that all men of principle 
can be, like Kohlhaas, both "rechtschaffen" and "entsetzlich." 
The Martin Luther of the story may not seem like Kohlhaas, but his 
place in the thematic structure also depends on a certain kind of 
similarity with him. Clifford A. Bernd is certainly correct in arguing 
that Luther's positions in his argument with Kohlhaas are inconsis-
tent and illogical, emotional and altogether indefensible. 22 His letter 
confuses the two Electors, his offer to Kohlhaas of conditional absolu-
tion is theologically and morally indefensible, and his reasoning is 
confused when he equates Kohlhaas's forgiving Wenzel with drop-
ping the lawsuit against him. But why does Kleist use such a Luther 
in his story? The answer lies surely in Silz's perception that Luther 
himself is a kind of former Kohlhaas, a man who followed his own 
sense of what was right in spite of opposition from the organized 
church, and who led a rebellion against the establishment on grounds 
of conscience. 23 Kohlhaas and Luther both defy the system because 
of a strong conviction within themselves of what is right. But there is 
an ironic side to this identity of the two, for Luther is a successful 
rebel whose rebellion against the system has now become the system, 
and he is now just as resentful of and impatient with any challenge to 
the status quo as any of his former foes were. The just rebellion has 
become the establishment, and it too soon begins to lose sight of its 
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first concern with natural justice; Luther responds to Kohlhaas's sim-
ple logic with confused and muddled emotional arguments for expe-
diency and conformity. How to get rid of an embarrassing problem is 
now the main concern of this man who once believed in following 
one's conscience wherever it may lead. How soon would Kohlhaas 
too become complacent if he were to be as successful as Luther? The 
thematic significance of Luther in the story lies in yet another under-
mining of the demand implicit in all that Kohlhaas does that the 
world and everyone in it behave consistently and logically. If Luther, 
of all people, can tell Kohlhaas that he should not have rebelled 
against higher authority, how can we hope that Kohlhaas will retain 
his keen sense of justice once his own crusade is over, and when he 
has no personal stake in a given situation? Inertia, confusion, and 
simple comfort-not necessarily evil and injustice-are the real prob-
lems with which idealists like Kohlhaas cannot deal, but they are so 
much part of the human scene that even a man conspicuously like 
Kohlhaas in temperament can embody them, whereby they represent 
a major problem for him. Luther's response can be summed up as a 
feeling that Kohlhaas, however much right is on his side, is a nui-
sance; and that he should feel so means that the text has given heavy 
stress to the notion that human beings find great causes a disturbance 
to their comfort. 
Yet even if the end of Michael Kohlhaas seems to drive a wedge 
between Kohlhaas' s grandiose sense of mission and the trivial reality 
of the Elector's weakness and frivolity, and to stress the disproportion 
between the two and therefore the inappropriateness of what he 
does, it still expresses a different and more positive judgment on him 
by means of a curious and surprisingly consistent series of rewards 
and punishments for the main actors of the story: his behavior may 
not be vindicated, but he is still, in a way, admirable. Wenzel's punish-
ment is trivial and ignominious, entirely in keeping with his character 
and his offense. For Kohlhaas himself, the situation is complicated 
but still intelligible. There is for him a grand final scene: its grandeur 
is a comment on him and his having aspired to something that might 
have been a great mission. Yet he is still executed, which underlines 
the sad fact that what he aspired to was not ultimately well directed. 
The most appropriate judgment of Kohlhaas's actions is not that they 
were just or unjust, but that they were inappropriate for the disor-
ganized world that exists, one in which the adversary he required to 
make sense of his actions could not be found. In an unjust world, 
Kohlhaas could have been a hero; but in the much more normal 
situation of a foolish world, he is out of place. It may be partly a 
matter of luck: Kohlhaas might have run into one of those historically 
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much rarer situations (much more recent German history provides an 
example) in which a sinister and evil conspiracy really existed, but 
instead he could only find a group of weak, inconsistent people. Even 
so, in the contrast between his end and that of the Elector of Saxony, 
the story gives full weight and value to his grandeur as opposed to 
the Elector's triviality. In contrast to the magnificent scene of Kohl-
haas' s death, the Elector suffers a slow and ignominious fading from 
the scene, a fitting end for an ignominious man who never could face 
up to issues squarely, always avoiding them and trying to put them 
off. Now his own death, though certain, eludes him, and he suffers 
the anxiety of not being allowed to face that issue squarely either, as 
though it were temporizing with him just as he had always tempor-
ized with every serious issue that had come before him in the past. 
An even more important element in the final rewards and punish-
ments is seen in the fates of Kohlhaas and the two Electors: it con-
cerns the future of their names and their descendants. The Elector of 
Brandenburg will reign long, as will his whole line; his descendants 
will "zu Macht gelangen, var allen Fiirsten und Herren der Welt!" as 
the gypsy says (91). Meanwhile, Kohlhaas's sons are knighted, and 
the last words of the story tell of the long survival of his family into 
the eighteenth century. The Elector of Saxony, on the other hand, will 
have his line die out. This set of punishments and rewards is a classic 
one in the Old Testament. 24 The God of the Old Testament is at His 
most severe when He not only destroys a man but obliterates all 
traces of him by having him leave no descendants and therefore no 
name behind him. On the other hand, His greatest reward is a 
prophesy that a man's children and his children's children will pros-
per; a long and thriving line is the highest sign of God's blessing. 
Without necessarily bearing any theological weight, this system of 
punishment and reward is peculiarly appropriate to the kinds of good 
and bad features displayed by the characters throughout the story. 
The Elector of Saxony is a weak man who allows his government to 
operate corruptly, but though he is as a ruler ultimately responsible, 
he is not guilty of direct malicious action; and so he meets no direct 
and immediate punishment other than being made to suffer all the 
anxiety that he had tried to avoid by ruling carelessly and thought-
lessly. Ultimately, however, he suffers a punishment that is severe 
and appropriate: he is to fade away without a trace, into the oblivion 
that so trivial a man richly deserves. He and his descendants are to be 
removed from the throne and disappear from sight. Kohlhaas is a 
misfit who badly misjudges how the world works, and whose pursuit 
of a clearly diagnosable fault causes havoc in a world that is too 
disorganized and inconsistent to present him with a target worthy of 
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his mission; his execution is a necessary result of that discrepancy. 
And yet he does make an impact on the world; he might in different 
circumstances even have been a legendary hero. It is fitting then that 
he will have an impact on posterity, and that he will be remembered. 
Though his actions were so inappropriate to the world as it was that 
he was justly executed by his alter ego, the Elector of Brandenburg, 
the story registers its admiration for him by allowing him a future 
comparable to that of the Elector-his name and his line will flourish 
well into the future. 
VI 
Prinz Friedrich von Homburg 
Few other works of German literature have aroused as much critical 
interest as Prinz Friedrich von Homburg, 1 but even fewer can have been 
the subject of such persistent and basic disagreement among its inter-
preters. Nevertheless, there has at least been a kind of consensus as 
to where the focus of debate should be; what has always divided the 
critics has been the question whether the values represented by the 
Elector or those associated with the Prince prevail at the end of the 
play, and what those contrasting values are. A majority have seen the 
Elector's values as prevailing, but a significant minority judge that the 
Prince's are really the dominant values; and even those who have 
preferrred a compromise solution in which both sets of values con-
tribute to the play's solution, while avoiding the usual choice, have 
still accepted the terms of reference of their predecessors-that is, a 
concern with the question who of the two men is right and who is 
wrong. 
The outlines of the main attitudes to the play so far can be set out 
easily enough in terms of the debate about the predominance of the 
values of one or the other of its main figures. The Elector has been 
praised as a wise and farsighted man, as a representative of impartial 
justice, as the embodiment of the law, as an advocate of self-discipline 
and restraint, as one who acts prudently and responsibly while en-
couraging others to do likewise, as a clever educator of the Prince, as 
a great leader and statesman, as a champion of reason, as one who 
shows the claims of the state to be higher than those of the indi-
vidual, as a splendid example of the Kantian ethic, as an embodiment 
of the best Prussian values, and as a German national figure. The 
Prince is then judged to be irresponsible, impetuous, selfish, undis-
ciplined, careless of his duty to society, imprudent and foolish, im-
mature, and the Elector's apprentice. The Prince, in the contrasting 
view, has been valued as the gifted individual who is above the dic-
tates of society, as one who respects the spirit rather than the letter of 
the law, as a man who values human feeling more than cold reason, 
as an advocate of the superiority of individual judgment over mere 
obedience, as a human being who refuses to be a mere pawn in the 
Elector's game, as a figure who shows the need for the exercise of free 
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will, as a colorful personality instead of a lifeless abstraction (which, 
by implication, the Elector is), as a creative rather than an imitative 
person, and (also) as a German national figure. 
Both sides have been able plausibly enough to claim some support 
from the text, but that also means that both have found it hard to deal 
with those parts of the text usually cited by the other side. The first 
view has never really been able to explain away the fact that the 
Elector we see in the text is often "verwirrt," sometimes displays 
unwarranted anger, plays a dubious joke on the Prince that evidently 
embarrasses him enough to make him want to conceal it, and takes 
no action to remove from an important command a commander who 
is obviously unreliable. The second view has even more trouble with 
the Prinz Friedrich of the text, who is too obviously selfish and ego-
centric for him to be plausibly considered the central figure in the 
value system of the play. Gerhard Fricke, by far the most dominant of 
this group of interpreters, justifies his stance by a retreat into a meta-
physical discussion that is mostly woolly, abstruse, and often incom-
prehensible;2 it is all too obvious that his discussion would not have 
been easily conducted in close proximity to Kleist's text. 
The regrettable fact is, however, that both sides in this perennial 
dispute have tended to lead the discussion away from the detail of 
what Kleist wrote-Fricke into general metaphysics and those more 
sympathetic to the Elector into equally general discussions of legal 
issues (e.g., should one always obey orders?) that have also soon lost 
sight of the context of Kleist's play. The result is that all kinds of 
details of the text-those that were not of immediate relevance to a 
rather narrowly rationalistic discussion of the question which of the 
two men was to be preferred to the other-have been completely 
ignored. A dramatic example of this can be seen in a remarkable set of 
parallel passages from the first and last acts of the play. In the first, 
the following scene takes place: 
DER KURFURST iiber ihn gebeugt. 
Was fur ein Laub denn flicht er?-Laub der Weide? 
HOHENZOLLERN. 
Was! Laub der Weid, o Herr!-Der Lorbeer ists, 
Wie ers gesehn hat, an der Heiden Bildern, 
Die zu Berlin im Rustsaal aufgehangt. 
DER KURFURST.-Wo £and er den in meinem markschen Sand? 
HOHENZOLLERN. Das mo gen die gerechten Gotter wissen! 
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DER HOFKAVALIER. Vielleicht im Garten hinten, wo der Gartner 
Mehr noch der fremden Pflanzen auferzieht. 
To this there is a striking parallel in the last act: 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. 
Ach, wie die Nachtviole lieblich duftet! 
-Spiirst du es nicht? 
Stranz kommt wieder zu ihm zuruck. 
(46-53) 
STRANZ. Es sind Levkojn und Nelken. 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. 
Levkojn?-Wie kommen die hierher? 
STRANZ. lch weiB nicht.-
Es scheint, ein Madchen hat sie hier gepflanzt. 
-Kann ich dir eine Nelke reichen? 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. Lieber!-
Ich will zu Hause sie in Wasser setzen. 
(1840-45) 
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Among the many parallels between the first and last acts of the 
play, this is surely one of the most intriguing. Both passages are 
seemingly irrelevant, occur in a garden setting, and include a discus-
sion of plants. Both are question-and-answer sequences in which one 
character mistakes the identity of a plant, is corrected by the other, 
and then asks how the plant came to be growing there; and in both 
the answer given is strangely vague. Equally striking are the changes 
highlighted by these parallels: in the first passage the plants are trees, 
in the second, flowers; the questioner in the first is the Elector, in the 
second, the Prince; the "Gartner" of the first exchange has become a 
girl in the second; and the use made of the plants in the first is absent 
in the second. It would seem that this very obtrusive and apparently 
systematic series of similarities and differences is intended to provide 
some clue to the meaning of the play. 
But, obtrusive as this is, only one of the many hundreds of critics of 
the play has ever seen and commented on it, and he wrote over forty 
years ago. 3 There is in fact a great deal in this play that is not directly 
and immediately relevant to the debate over the moral and legal 
rectitude of the Prince and Elector, and it has received scant attention 
from critics whose main concern was that debate. 
There is, of course, a level of the play that is concerned with the 
rational discussion of moral and legal issues, and if we read the play 
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only on that level, we can easily reach conclusions such as the follow-
ing: when the Prince is ordered to play a certain part in the battle, his 
duty is made clear to him, but he disobeys orders, thereby endanger-
ing the outcome of the battle. Whether he does so wilfully or through 
misunderstanding would not matter, for a general ignorant of his 
orders is guilty of gross negligence, and in any case the Prince is 
reminded of them. The result of his disobedience is to frustrate the 
Elector's plan that no significant p~ut of the opposing army will be 
able to escape. The Prince's action may have necessitated a further 
battle, and hence caused the loss of many lives in the army of Bran-
denburg. The Elector wished to save these lives; the Prince is respon-
sible for them. He is therefore accused by his commander in chief and 
found guilty in a court of his fellow officers. The accuser, and the jury, 
could not have acted otherwise without endangering the state; the 
Elector ·would have failed in his duty to protect his subjects and 
soldiers had he not prosecuted the Prince. The Prince is pardoned 
only when it becomes clear that he is no longer a danger to the state 
but will instead be a useful part of its protective apparatus. 
There is nothing wrong with such an argument as far as it goes; yet 
the crucial point here is that this is not an interpretation of the play 
but instead only one element of the text, a part to be taken together 
with other parts if an overall interpretation is to be achieved. The play 
constantly hints that this is only one of its levels, and that another 
level contrasts with it and has an equal right to be taken into account. 
In a great variety of ways, Kleist makes it clear that his play has a dual 
structure, and that the overt, rational discussion of moral and legal 
issues represents only one side of that structure. 
The first and most obvious way in which the contrasting levels are 
suggested lies in the settings of the play, which place the middle part 
of the drama in strong contrast to the first and final scenes. The 
former, which includes the major plot events of the play, takes place 
in the daytime; the latter at night. The contrast is between light and 
dark both physically and metaphorically. In the daylight scenes the 
actions of the characters seem to be in plain view with no conceal-
ment; but in the garden at night a darker side of human nature be-
comes visible. In these two settings are also contrasted the realm of 
nature and that of civilization. The setting of buildings and battle 
orders is harshly real and linked with the existence of the state and its 
security; the garden scene is one of exotic fantasy. In the one sphere 
things are apparently orderly and predictable, man-made and given 
shape by his conscious planning; in the other sphere there is growth 
according to the laws of nature, which are less predictable. As we 
shall see, natural growth serves as a symbol of that area of human 
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behavior that can never be controlled. A further contrast implicit in 
this division of scenes lies in the behavior of the characters. Outside 
the garden there is much rational discussion guided by apparently 
clear and conscious motivation: the plans for the battle, the argu-
ments toward the end of the play, the analysis of the battle, and so 
forth. By contrast, we see in the garden a display of emotions, de-
sires, and unconsciously held attitudes. 
It is commonly observed that the Prince allows his unconscious 
mind and emotions to be seen in the garden; but the same is no less 
true of the otherwise highly rational Elector. He is at first curious, 
then plays an odd and tantalizing, even cruel jest; after that he speaks 
aggressively with his admonition "Ins Nichts" (74) and later seems 
embarrassed at how he has behaved. Once out of the garden, his 
rational side asserts itself and he sends a message to Hohenzollern 
not to tell the Prince anything of what has happened. Both Prince and 
Elector were unaware of themselves, behaving irrationally, and al-
lowing their deepest feelings and attitudes to come to the surface. 
The difference-a very interesting and important one-is that the 
Elector immediately moves to cover up what has appeared in the 
garden with his message to Hohenzollern. 
Part of the play's concern with the coexistence of two levels of 
behavior can also be seen in the way that relationships between two 
characters always have a private and a public aspect. They relate to 
each other as one state or military functionary to another but are also 
conspicuously friends and relatives. They have public duties and pri-
vate loyalties, responsibilities involved in their positions but also re-
sponsibilities to friends and relatives. The former are comparatively 
clear and easily formulated while the latter are more complex and less 
easily understood. That the double relationships complicate matters 
in the play is obvious. Consider Natalie's relationship to the Prince: 
he is to her a loved one, a brother officer, and a relative. That of the 
Prince to the Elector is even more complex, in fact intolerably com-
plicated: they are commander in chief and subordinate officer, rela-
tives, head of state and subject, and also judge and accused. Even 
more important are two strands of the situation that are matters of 
attitude rather than of hard fact: the relationship is similar to that of 
father and son (e.g., lines 67 and 1784) and as a result creates the 
impression of also being that of head of state and heir apparent (e.g., 
lines 585-86). Part of the strategy of the play is evidently to introduce 
so many elements into their relationship that the personal and the 
public interests cannot be separated from each other. 
Once again, it is most clearly the Prince who allows personal mat-
ters to interfere with public duties. But, equally, a somewhat closer 
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look at the Elector's behavior shows a similar situation. Take, for 
example, the scene in which the orders for the coming battle are read 
out. We may well wonder why the Elector allows a family group to be 
present at a conference of his general staff. But even more strange is 
the fact that he intersperses a series of questions, commands, and 
exclamations during the reading of the battle orders, all having to do 
with the family group (267, 285, 287, 289, 312, 315), and that in so 
doing he persistently diverts the Prince's attention from his orders, 
for these interruptions always occur at key points in the instructions 
to the Prince. Take the first example of those cited: 
FELDMARSCHALL. Der Prinz van Homburg-
DER KURFURST erhebt sich gleichfalls. -1st Ramin bereit? 
(267) 
Just as the Prince's orders are to begin, the Elector interrupts; in lines 
281-83 the Prince's position on the battlefield is being dictated, and in 
line 285 the Elector causes another diversion by interrupting to ask 
what is troubling Natalie; and as he is moving offstage with the 
women, he draws attention to the glove, which leaves the Prince 
completely confused and repeating, but not understanding, the line 
"Dann wird er die Fanfare blasen lassen" (322). 
Just as in Act I, it is the Elector who creates the situation that leads 
to the Prince's downfall; here he draws the Prince's attention away 
from the battle orders three times, and previously he had given added 
impetus to the Prince's dreams of glory. We must surely wonder what 
the Elector is doing, for he seems to be inviting the behavior for 
which he will condemn the Prince. 
Another indicator of the play' s dual structure can be seen in the 
two different ways in which it moves forward. On the one hand, 
there is a clear plot outline, a story of a subordinate who disobeys an 
order and is condemned to death for it. It is possible to give a scene-
by-scene resume of the way the plot moves forward and tells this 
story, very much as one might summarize the historical source. Yet 
on the other hand, this clear outline is interspersed with numerous 
enigmatic episodes that do not (apparently) contribute to the devel-
opment of the plot and are not even clearly motivated. From the 
standpoint of the "objective" plot events (disobedience, judgment, 
battle, state, etc.), they might be and sometimes have been considered 
redundant. They certainly arrest the main action. Examples of such 
episodes are the parallel question and answer sequences that I have 
cited above; another outstanding example is the conversation between 
the Prince and Hohenzollern in which the former relates his sup-
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posed dream (Act I, Scene 4). This conversation is concerned mostly 
with the Prince's failure to remember the identity of the figure in the 
dream, who was in fact Natalie. The scene lasts from lines 87 to 218, 
and the question comes up repeatedly from line 146 to 203. After the 
eventful but much shorter first scene, this one seems slow and per-
haps irrelevant. It moves in a halting and confused way: 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. 
Der Kurfiirst und die Fiirstin und die-dritte, 
-Wie heiBt sie schon? 
HOHENZOLLERN. Wer? 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG er scheint zu suchen. 
Jene-die ich meine! 
Ein Stummgeborner wiird sie nennen konnen! 
HOHENZOLLERN. Die Platen? 
DER PRINZ voN HOMBURG. Nicht doch, Lieber! 
HOHENZOLLERN. Die Ramin? 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. 
Nicht, nicht doch, Freund! 
(146-50) 
This confused search for the name continues, is dropped, is then 
picked up again (165-70), is dropped again, and then taken up once 
more (192-94). All of this looks aimless, repetitive, and unnecessary; 
but if we are attentive, we can discover an underlying logic. In lines 
146-56, the Prince denies that the name he seeks is Platen or Ramin, 
but after his cry "Lieber" (164) things change; he then consistently 
says it may be one of those two, while Hohenzollern badgers him for 
the correct name. What this exchange really shows is the Prince first 
trying to remember, finally succeeding in line 164, now realizing that 
it is dangerous to admit the name, and covering up what he has 
remembered. Meanwhile, Hohenzollern is anxious because he knows 
the name, does not want the Prince to remember, and is alarmed 
because there are signs that he has. Thus Kleist makes us concerned 
with what is happening in the minds of his characters when odd, 
inconsequential exchanges occur; if we confine ourselves to the ra-
tional, explicit argument of the play without careful attention to the 
many odd little episodes that apparently arrest its action, we shall 
miss the entire other level of its meaning. 
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The play itself draws attention to the question how oddness of 
behavior in its characters is to be regarded. Already in Act I, we see 
contrasting attitudes taken to the Prince's sleepwalking. Natalie and 
the Electress both take it very seriously and say that the young man is 
sick. But Hohenzollern retorts that this is "eine blolse Unart seines 
Geistes" (39), a narrowly rationalist disregard for the possible signifi-
cance of irrational behavior. It is of great importance that Hohenzol-
lern, of all people, should later become the chief spokesman for the 
opposing point of view, that the odd behavior in the garden should 
have been taken much more seriously; the play shows him learning 
to understand much more of what is happening than he was at first 
willing to see. But by contrast, the Elector is shown to be very reluc-
tant to progress beyond his rationalist disregard for the significance 
of the oddities of the Prince's behavior-or of his own. He regards his 
action in the garden as merely a "Scherz" (83) in the first act and still 
sees it as a harmless joke in the last act (1717). But his attempt to cover 
up what has happened shows that he is really more worried by what 
he has done than he will admit, and his uncharacteristic anger in the 
last act shows that he is still worried then; he surely senses that his 
making fun of the Prince had a serious side to it because it related to 
his own sensitivity to the Prince's grandiose dreams and his wish to 
cut them down. 
The very language of the play constantly stresses it dual structure. 
Passages constituting prosaic accounts of military or legal matters 
alternate with striking imagery; and clear, explicit, and well-formed 
language expressing coherent reasoning can alternate with obscure, 
enigmatic, and dislocated language whose unstated implications must 
be thought over carefully. 
By a variety of means, then, the play makes us aware that much is 
happening beneath the surface in the relationship of the Prince and 
the Elector, and that we should be careful to see through that surface 
and the simple view of the Prince's guilt that it suggests. The play's 
dual structure requires us to take the explicit, legalistic argument over 
the Prince's action in the context of all that is less clear and explicit in 
the text. If we wish to gain a more inclusive view of the central 
relationship that does justice to both levels of the play, there is no 
better way to begin than by looking at all that is implicit in the situa-
tion with which the play begins. 
By the end of the second scene of Act II, the Prince has disobeyed 
orders, but even earlier, in Act I, his disobedience seems not im-
probable. How does this initial situation come about, and who is 
instrumental in producing it? In Act I, the Elector complains that the 
Prince has recently thrown away ("verscherzt") two victories (349-52). 
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But this judgment by the Elector contrasts strangely with Dorfling's 
announcement that the Elector will entrust the cavalry to the com-
mand of the Prince, "ruhmvoll, wie bei Rathenow" (274). Why does 
the Elector persevere with so irresponsible a commander? His be-
havior continues to suggest irresponsibility (21); and Dorfling obvi-
ously thinks that his failing to follow his orders is likely once more 
(340-42). Quite apart from his proven and continuing lack of respon-
sibility, there is also some question as to the Prince's suitability for 
a tactical role in the battle. All that we see of the Prince at this early 
stage suggests that he is a bold and vigorous leader in a direct assault 
(e.g., line 3) rather than a shrewd tactician, and this is entirely con-
sistent with his later actions, in which we see him lead a cavalry 
charge with more gusto than intelligence. The Prince is neither disci-
plined nor skilled in strategy, but he is a brave and inspiring fighter; 
he should obviously be used to lead a frontal assault, not given a 
tactical waiting role. 
By contrast, the Elector himself is an older and wiser man, an 
experienced strategist with a wide vision. He has an eye not merely to 
this battle but to past and future ones. He is the opposite of the Prince 
in his usefulness to the army. He is unlikely to be a good leader in a 
spearhead attack and is much better employed in a strategic role. 
Their roles are naturally opposed. 
If we were to ask which role is the most vital, the answer would 
have to be that of the Elector; an excellent strategist is worth far more 
to an army than one courageous and inspiring attacker. If, on the 
other hand, we ask which is the more appealing role, which is more 
celebrated when victory occurs and wins the admiration of the public, 
the answer will be that of the Prince. The image of the vigorous, 
courageous young cavalry leader has greater appeal than that of the 
schemer who controls the battle from behind the lines. 
We must bear all this in mind when considering a very strange fact 
about the Elector's battle plan: he reverses what, according to their 
abilities, would be the natural order of their roles. The Prince is placed 
in a waiting role; the Elector, on the other hand, takes a leading part 
in the main assault. 4 The battle will be decided by the time the Prince 
comes into it, and he and his men are to be used not in a spearhead 
attack on the enemy but as a tactical reserve with which the broken 
remnants of the Swedish army are to be finished off. The Prince's 
efforts are to be directed not toward the victory of this particular day 
but to preventing the possibility of a future Swedish army arising to 
regroup and attack again. The opposite is true of the Elector, who 
must lead the glorious main assault that will win or lose the battle. 
The Elector's reversal of their roles is puzzling behavior; the Prince 
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behaves strangely too, but, unlike the Elector, his oddities are more 
obvious. The oddness of the Elector's behavior only becomes fully 
apparent when we think about it. Why should such a brilliant strategist 
make such a bad mistake in using the various talents available to him? 
The inappropriateness of the initial positions assigned to the Prince 
and the Elector in the battle is emphasized by the fact that both re-
verse their positions during the course of the battle. It is more obvi-
ous that the Prince does not finish the battle as he was intended to. 
But equally, the Elector does not remain the leader of the main as-
sault. Froben sees how unwise this is and persuades him to dismount 
from his conspicuous horse, after which he "kehrt zuriick, wohin 
sein Amt ihn ruff' (672). His "Amt" is commander in chief, not front-
line attack, and he fades out of the battle. Both, then, revert from 
their initial inappropriate roles to their natural roles. Sparren's later 
account stresses how unwise it was for the Elector to be in this con-
spicuous position, and how he was "jeder Warnung taub" (641). And 
this surely gives the game away: the Elector wants the glamorous 
role for himself, and his battle plan is in part designed to keep his 
dashing young relative well clear of that role, waiting on the sidelines 
until the main part of the battle is over. And we should notice also 
that a small detail of Sparren's account ("wie bis heut noch stets 
geschah" [644]) emphasizes that this attempt to seize the center of the 
battle is a compulsive habit of the Elector's; he always wants to be 
there. The answer to the question why so shrewd a strategist should 
make such a bad mistake in his command assignments-and indeed 
the key to all the other strange things the Elector does-must lie in 
the considerable competitiveness and rivalry revealed in the Elector's 
attitude to the Prince. The older man is jealous of the public acclaim 
that the dashing young cavalry leader receives. It is obvious on the 
surface that the Prince's dreams of glory make him neglect his duty to 
the state; what is less obvious but no less true is that the Elector's 
personal ambitions and feelings cause him to fail in his responsibility 
to the state. The Elector may seem at first to be a man who represents 
law, reason, and public responsibility, and at the conscious level he 
may be; but at a deeper level his behavior is as irrational and irre-
sponsible as that of the Prince, and just as dangerous. 5 The legal 
argument as to the Prince's guilt for disobeying his orders is of course 
absolutely watertight; but the point is that the Elector has, consciously 
or unconsciously, set up a situation in which that would almost pre-
dictably happen. He assigns to a habitually disobedient and irrespon-
sible general a role in which he can only exercise his natural abilities 
(and win the acclaim that those abilities would naturally earn) if he 
disobeys his orders. The Prince deceives no one but himself into 
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believing that the interests of the state and his own coincide; but 
when the Elector confuses his own wishes with the good of the state, 
he is indulging in a far more subtle form of self-deception that is more 
plausible to everyone else, and so deceives them too. His irrational 
acts have at their service a superb rationalism that can cover and 
defend them, and the Prince is by contrast quite defenseless. The 
play is in fact built on the contrast between the obviously irrational 
and irresponsible man and the highly rational, responsible ruler 
whose underlying irrationality is the real source of the trouble. 
The very excuses which some critics have made for the strangeness 
of what the Elector does in his battle assignments only underline their 
irrationality. 6 Some have argued that his placing the older Kottwitz at 
the Prince's side is a safeguard against the young man's irresponsi-
bility. But that only draws more attention to the Elector's ineptitude; 
he knows Kottwitz well, and it can surely be no surprise that Kottwitz 
is so like the Prince that, far from restraining him, he joins in the 
charge with gusto. To assign Kottwitz to the Prince's side is more 
likely to bring out irresponsibility in the Prince than suppress it. 
Antoher excuse sometimes put forward has been that the Elector is 
magnanimously giving the Prince another chance after his two prior 
failures. But that only makes us ponder another oddness of what the 
Elector does: a third chance is a big risk, and a commander in chief 
who does such a thing takes upon himself a big responsibility. How 
strange it is that so lucid and reasonable a man as the Elector never 
considers his own record of command, his own misjudgment, his 
own repeated failure to serve the state by managing its military affairs 
competently, his own risking the security of the state over and over 
again with a commander who has a proven record of irresponsibility! 
A third debacle must surely be more the responsibility of the Elector 
as commander in chief than that of the Prince himself. 
The fundamental basis of the clash between Prince and Elector lies 
in their both wanting to occupy the same position, a fact that is 
emphasized by their both bearing the name "Friedrich"; and this is 
obviously the reason for the Elector's curiosity about the Prince's 
ambition in the first act ("Ich muls <loch sehn, wie weit er' s treibt" 
[64]) as well as the emphatic and contemptuous rejection of that am-
bition: 
Ins Nichts mit dir zuriick, Herr Prinz von Homburg, 
Ins Nichts, ins Nichts! In dem Gefild der Schlacht, 
Sehn wir, wenns dir gefallig ist, uns wieder! 
Im Traum erringt man solche Dinge nicht! 
(74-77) 
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The Elector's final comment here is not only completely discrepant in 
tone with his later characterization of the whole incident in the gar-
den as a "Scherz" (1709); it is also discrepant with his plan for the 
battle. Having taunted the Prince with the fact that he must win fame 
and glory in the harsh reality of the battlefield, not in dreams, the 
Elector then assigns him a role in the battle that effectively precludes 
his winning "solche Dinge." 
The early scene in the garden is unique as far as the figure of the 
Elector is concerned; we do not see his emotional response to a situa-
tion displayed to the same extent at any other point in the play. Yet 
this early scene should make us skeptical of the Elector's rational 
exterior, and if we look closely at his actions, we can see remarkable 
inconsistencies. Take, for example, his attitude to the law. Many cri-
tics have thought him admirable in his placing respect for the law 
above personal considerations, even to the extent of condemning his 
young cousin to death. But he is actually very inconsistent in this 
respect. Natalie forges an order from him without authorization (1486-
97), but he covers up this deliberate act of insurrection on his niece's 
part and does not allow it to come to a court-martial. A little earlier, 
the Elector has good reason to suspect Kottwitz of mutiny but in 
relaxed fashion says that there is no reason here to talk of a death 
sentence (1414), which only a tyrant like the "Dei von Tunis" would 
do in such circumst~nces: 
Doch weils Hans Kottwitz aus der Priegnitz ist, 
Der sich mir naht, willkiirlich, eigenmachtig, 
So will ich mich auf marksche Weise £assen: 
Von den drei Locken, die man silberglanzig, 
Auf seinem Schadel sieht, fals ich die eine, 
Und fiihr ihn still, mit seinen zwolf Schwadronen, 
Nach Arnstein, in sein Hauptquartier, zuriick. 
(1417-23) 
But where the Prince is concerned, the Elector reverses this argument; 
the way of a ruler who acts "auf marksche Weise" is here impartial 
application of the law without favor to anyone and total respect for 
the law in itself; he tells Natalie that he could only act otherwise if he 
were a different kind of ruler: "War ich ein Tyrann ... "(1112). The 
references to tyrants in both cases make it unavoidable that we should 
compare the two and see the Elector's inconsistency; and the similar 
description of the offenses of Kottwitz and the Prince by the Elector 
("eigenmachtig" refers to the Prince in line 1562, to Kottwitz in line 
1418) further stresses the need to compare the two situations. In 
Kottwitz's case, his argument is that only a tyrant would take so strict 
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a view of the law as to prosecute; in the Prince's case, it is instead that 
only a tyrant would not consider himself bound to apply the law 
strictly. Evidently the Elector is not impartial at all in his application of 
the law. His condemnation of the Prince occurs not in spite of their 
personal relationship but because of it. The full apparatus of the law 
need not be invoked to deal with rebellion or dishonesty on the part 
of those he loves unambiguously; but it is invoked with a great dis-
play of righteousness if a young man steals honor and glory in battle 
when the Elector had tried to prevent this. 
There is no reason to believe that the Elector is not sincere in his 
action. The point of Kleist' s making his motivation not at all obvious 
and of his allowing the Elector to seem eminently reasonable on the 
surface (at least after the first scene) is precisely that the Elector must 
seem reasonable to himself. His feelings of resentment and rivalry 
cannot be construed as conscious malice, and his part in bringing 
about the situation in which the Prince stands condemned must not 
be thought of as conscious entrapment. Kleist's Elector is a man who 
sees things very plainly on the surface but is subject to pressures that 
he does not fully understand. His conscious sense of doing right and 
his well-meaning handling of situations obscure his instinctive re-
sponses to challenges to his prerogatives. And this is why by the end 
of Act II he has produced the situation in which he can respond to 
these challenges by prosecuting the Prince and have an objective 
reason for doing so. 
The Prince is in some ways a more simple and easily understood 
character. He is a young man behaving expansively and trying, so to 
speak, to increase his personal territory. In his dream he tries to gain 
prestige as a victor in battle, and on the following day he forcibly 
takes the dominant position in that battle. On the report of the Elec-
tor's death he quickly assumes the role of the Elector as Natalie's 
protector and as the protector of the state. It is this pressure to ex-
pand and extend his sphere of influence and acclaim that produces 
the crisis; the dispute over the Prince's disobedience is a late symp-
tom, not a cause, of the underlying conflict between the two men. 
The most general context of the disobedience is the classic situation in 
which the status quo of the older generation is disturbed by a vigor-
ous young man who instinctively exerts pressure to make it yield a 
more important place for him. As a result the older man is torn 
between his regard for the younger as a loved son and his fear of him 
as an aggressive competitor. Part of the Elector's instinctive reaction is 
a destructive one, and yet he cannot react unambiguously and con-
sciously; even when he condemns the Prince for his entry into the 
battle, he still has the Prince named as the victor in that battle (810-12). 
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The Prince, too, is no more aware of the complexities of their rela-
tionship than the Elector; he naively only expects praise from the 
Elector for assuming the role of the hero-figure in the battle and is 
obviously unaware of pressure to which the Elector is being subjected 
by his ambitions. His danger is that he uses only the superficial con-
cepts of everyday consciousness ("Edelmut und Liebe" [785]) in 
thinking about his relationship with the Elector and never senses its 
competitive undercurrents. 
The irrational side of the relationship between Prince and Elector is 
significantly elucidated by the play's striking imagery, which often 
shows deeper motives and attitudes than the surface level of the 
dialogue can convey. The importance of the images can be seen most 
dearly if they are taken in groups, and the most significant and strik-
ing group is that involving plants and their cultivation. The enigmatic 
parallel passages that I have cited above are part of this group, and 
their meaning can only become clear if we place them in the context 
of the entire group of such images. Take, for example, the odd refer-
ence to the gardener and the strange plants he raises (52-53); this 
takes on added meaning when we see the Prince's comment on his 
relationship to the Elector following his arrest: 
Schien er am Wachstum meines jungen Ruhms 
Nicht mehr fast, als ich selbst, sich zu erfreun? 
Bin ich nicht alles, was ich bin, durch ihn? 
Under, er sollte lieblos jetzt die Pflanze, 
Die er selbst zog, blofs, weil sie sich ein wenig 
Zu rasch und iippig in die Blume war£, 
MiBgiinstig in den Staub daniedertreten? 
(833-39) 
The development of this imagery becomes even more interesting 
when Natalie, pleading for the Prince's life, says to the Elector: 
lch will nur, dafs er da sei, Heber Onkel, 
Fur sich, selbstandig, frei und unabhangig, 
Wie eine Blume, die mir wohlgefallt. 
(1087-89) 
It seems that the Elector is the gardener and has raised a plant-the 
Prince. The Prince acknowledges his dependence on the one who has 
raised him, but Natalie emphasizes the independence of the flower, 
arguing that it must be allowed to exist for itself. And the Prince too 
thinks that the trouble lies in the plant's flowering before the gar-
dener was ready for it, thus asserting its independence of the garden-
er's control. When he is crushed at the thought of death, he suggests a 
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complete withdrawal from the scene and of his claim to Natalie, and 
the withdrawal is put in terms of his going to his own garden, that is, 
removing himself from the Elector's sphere of influence and from 
competing within that sphere: 
Nataliens, das vergiB nicht, ihm zu melden, 
Begehr ich gar nicht mehr, in meinem Busen 
Ist alle Zartlichkeit fiir sie verloscht. 
Ich will au£ meine Giiter gehn am Rhein, 
Da will ich bauen, will ich niederreiBen, 
Oafs mir der SchweiB herabtrieft, saen, ernten. 
(1023-32) 
The horticultural imagery has an obvious general place in the the-
matic structure of the play: it is the sphere where reason and nature 
meet. Gardening may be a science but not an exact one; plants can be 
guided but not controlled. One would expect "der Gartner" to be 
identifiable as the Elector, the planner and reasoner who attempts to 
control and direct everything; and he does in fact appear in the role of 
the gardener in the plant imagery throughout the play. He plans the 
battle, in which his soldiers are a "Saat" (533), victory is the carefully 
nurtured blossom (1788), and he "mows" the flags of the enemy 
(753-54). But his battle plans go wrong as the "Eisenregen" mows 
down his men (531). A more important aspect of his activity as the 
gardener is his control of people. The image of the Prince as a flower 
planted and nurtured by the Elector, but one which cannot be totally 
controlled by him, occurs twice in the play. The image suggests that 
the Elector's treatment of the Prince and expectations of him do not 
reckon with the laws of nature. He has vainly tried to prevent the 
growth of the Prince in an unwelcome direction. In the language of 
the image, personalities and flowers can be encouraged but not 
molded; their independence of the gardener is a fact he must ac-
knowledge. 
The gardener must have a garden, and here the horticultural images 
broaden to include the question of sphere of influence. When the 
Prince turns to thoughts of escaping from his sentence, he must, at 
some level of his mind, realize that his attempt to expand his influ-
ence within the Elector's sphere of authority has been the cause of his 
downfall, for he now proposes to avoid the problem by going off to a 
country estate to sow and reap there; he knows that he must get out 
of the master-gardener's territory to leave the latter's authority there 
undisputed. 
The general background of plant imagery in the play has provided 
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several obvious clues to the interpretation of the parallel sequences in 
the first and last acts. In general, the question-and-answer sequences 
are indicative of the confusion of both Prince and Elector: each, in 
tum, is the questioner and is mistaken about the plant's identity. But 
the particular mistake in each case, and the kind of confusion it indi-
cates, is instructive. The Elector mistakes the laurel for a willow and 
in so doing shows an instinctive tendency to associate the Prince with 
a symbol of mourning rather than one of victory. In a curious way this 
foreshadows Act II, for here he first condemns the Prince to death, 
only later acclaiming him as a victor in the battle. This aspect of the 
exchange in Act I, coming as it does before the Prince's crime, sug-
gests again that the later developments involve the Elector's predis-
positions as well as those of the Prince. 
When corrected, the Elector questions the right of the offending 
plant to be in "meinem markschen Sand." The slightly strange use of 
the possessive here makes this query also a complaint against an 
encroachment on his personal sphere of authority. But he is told that 
it was "der Gartner" who put it there, together with other "fremde 
Pflanzen." There is much in the play that identifies "der Gartner" as 
the Elector, and this suggests that he is actually querying his own 
action. He has taken two children into his house who are not his own 
and are therefore in a sense "fremd"-that is, Natalie and the Prince, 
the latter twice referred to metaphorically as a plant "raised" by the 
Elector. While the laurel functions as the symbol of the Prince's ambi-
tion, it seems also to symbolize the unacceptable side of the Prince. 
When all this has been considered, the imagery suggests that it is the 
Elector who has nurtured this challenge to himself within his own 
sphere, without realizing what he was doing. 
The second of the parallel sequences is more s::omplex and difficult. 
It is in some ways similar to the first sequence, and in other ways 
contrasted with it. As before, there is confusion and then recognition, 
the replacement of one name by others, and a question of the hand 
behind it all. The changed identity of the gardener from the Elector to 
"ein Madchen" suggests that some aspect of Natalie or something 
associated with her has become dominant to the point of replacing 
the equivalent aspect of the Elector. This change will be important for 
an understanding of the play's ending, and I shall return to it. The 
change from trees to flowers seems to be consistent with the change 
from Elector to Natalie. There is, however, a change within the Prince: 
he had used the laurel as the symbol of his aspirations in the first 
scene, but he now admires flowers for themselves; they are no longer 
fashioned into a crown. This links with Natalie's earlier demand that 
a flower be allowed to grow "frei und unabhangig," and with the 
significance of the Prince's intention of putting them in water; they 
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are now to exist purely for their beauty. All this suggests the rejection 
of the notion of spheres of influence and of the authority and control 
over others associated with the Elector in the plant imagery. In the 
language of the symbol, the second of the parallel sequences rejects 
the Elector's theory of gardening and the relation of gardener to plant 
and switches to Natalie's. 
What now of the three flowers and their confusion? In Act I an 
identification is suggested by the Elector and then rejected in favor of 
another. This time it is the Prince who thinks he smells the "Nacht-
viole," a deep purple flower that smells strongly at night. One obvi-
ous factor that links this with the corresponding plant in Act I is 
mourning, traditionally associated with both deep purple and the 
willow. On both occasions, sadness and mourning are first impres-
sions that are then rejected. In Act I the first impression is the Elec-
tor's; in Act V it is that of the Prince, who at this point wishes to die. 
But the Prince's suggestion and its basis are rejected in favor of the 
bright colors of the "Nelke" (primarily red)-the brightness of life 
rather than death. At the same time the darkness of night associated 
with the "Nachtviole," both by its name and by its smelling sweetly 
primarily at night, is rejected in favor of the light of day: the "Levkoje" 
is a white pseudoviolet (the Greek word is literally "white violet") 
just as the "Nachtviole" is a dark pseudoviolet. Thus the flower of 
death and darkness is replaced by flowers of life and light. 
There is one other major group of images that tells us a good deal 
about the quality of the relationship between the Prince and the 
Elector-that involving horses and riding. There are three horses in 
the play. The first is that of Kottwitz; the second is the "Schimmel" of 
the Elector, which he exchanges under pressure from Froben for an-
other of a different color; and the third is that of the Prince, which 
causes an accident that is variously reported, and which seems to 
change color in the process. The links among the three are themati-
cally very interesting. 
Having asked for help in dismounting from his horse, Kottwitz is 
assisted by Golz and Hohenzollern and then utters these interesting 
lines: 
Habt Dank!-Ouf! Dais die Pest mich! 
-Ein edler Sohn, fur euren Dienst, jedwedem, 
Der euch, wenn ihr zerfallt, ein Gleiches tut! 
Ja, auf dem Rois fiihl ich voll Jugend mich; 
Dach sitz ich ab, da hebt ein Strauls sich an, 
Als ob sich Leib und Seele kampfend trennten! 
(368-73) 
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Kottwitz feels full of youth and vigor when mounted but feels his age 
when he dismounts. To understand the point of what Kottwitz says 
here, we must look at two further passages. In the first, Sparren gives 
his account of how Froben persuades the Elector to dismount from 
his "Schimmel": 
Er naht, voll heiBer Sorge, ihm und spricht: 
"Hoheit, dein Pferd ist scheu, du mufst verstatten, 
Oafs ichs noch einmal in die Schule nehme!" 
Mit diesem Wort entsitzt er seinem Fuchs, 
Und fallt dem Tier des Herren in den Zaum. 
Der Herr steigt ab, still lachelnd, und versetzt: 
"Die Kunst, die du ihn, Alter, lehren willst, 
Wird er, solang es Tag ist, schwerlich lemen." 
(661-68) 
In the second, the Elector complains that Kottwitz does not under-
stand how the security of the state must be served: 
Mit welchem Recht, du Tor, erhoffst du das, 
Wenn auf dem Schlachtenwagen, eigenmiichtig, 
Mir in die Ziigel jeder greifen darf? 
(1561-63) 
The point of the whole series is that for the Elector, the Prince's 
disobedience is an attempt to seize from him the reins, and therefore 
the overriding control of the situation. He cannot accept, as Kottwitz 
can, that a noble son should help him down from this central position 
and assume the reins of power when he is too old ("Wenn ihr zerfallt" 
[370]). All that enables him to abandon his foolish insistence on a 
dangerous central position in the battle is that the advice to dismount 
comes not from a young rival but from the old man, Froben: the 
Elector addresses him as such, and the situation seems to become one 
in which the Elector is the headstrong youth, to whom the older man 
gives wise counsel. The Elector is almost pretending that he is the 
Prince; his reply to Froben actually revels in the fact that Froben will 
never teach him to be more circumspect (the obvious thrust of the 
veiled remarks on what Froben wants to do with his horse) and is 
more to be expected of a younger man obsessed by bravado than a 
mature ruler. 
Everything about the horses stresses the parallelism of Prince and 
Elector. Even the fact that the horses are "scheu" at or before the 
beginning of the battle points symbolically to the inappropriateness 
of their positions in the battle. Contrast and parallelism are present in 
the colors of the horses, for both men apparently change the color of 
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their horses: they begin as opposites (black and white) but finish the 
battle on horses that are merely different shades of brown, "Fuchs" 
and "Goldfuchs" respectively. A general pattern of the relations of 
the two is shown as contrast ends in identification, and their initial 
opposition turns out to be illusory; at first they seem quite different in 
character, but as the play progresses their underlying similarity be-
comes increasingly apparent. The horse image raises the questions of 
jursidiction, control, and supremacy, as does the image of the gar-
dener and his plants. Just as the plant image occurs when the Prince 
talks of going away to sow and reap elsewhere in order to get out of 
the Elector's sphere of influence, so the horse image occurs in a similar 
way when the Prince speaks to the Electress: 
Du scheinst mit Himmelskraften, rettenden, 
Du mir, das Fraulein, deine Fraun, begabt, 
Miralles rings umher, dem TroBknecht konnt ich, 
Dem schlechtesten, der deiner Pferde pflegt, 
Gehangt am Halse flehen: rette mich! 
(973-77) 
To remove any suggestion that he is challenging the Elector for the 
reins of power, the Prince will make himself subservient even to 
the lowliest boy who minds the horses; in other words, he will make 
himself as remote from claiming the horse as his own as he possibly 
can. 
There are various aspects of losing control of the reins: a man can 
be resigned that he needs to be helped from his horse by a noble son 
(the case of Kottwitz); or he can have the reins grasped by a son who 
wishes to assume control (the Elector and the Prince); or he can be 
persuaded by an older person that it is foolhardy to keep them (the 
Elector and Froben); or, as in the Prince's case, to which I shall now 
turn, he can be thrown from the horse. 
It is not easy to decide what actually happened to the Prince. Ho-
henzollern, when questioned by Kottwitz about the fall, answers: 
Nichts von Bedeutung! 
Sein Rappe scheute an der Miihle sich, 
Jedoch, leichthin zur Seite niedergleitend, 
Tat er auch nicht den mindsten Schaden sich. 
Es ist den Odem keiner Sorge wert. 
(379-83) 
Yet the stage direction at his entry a few lines later has him "mit 
einem schwarzen Band um die linke Hand," a fact that is remarked by 
no one present; and he is evasive about what he has been doing: 
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lch-war in der Kapelle, 
Die aus des Dorfchens stillen Bii.schen blinkte. 
(408-09) 
TruchB's later account, just after the battle, is entirely different: 
Der Prinz hat mit dem Pferd sich iiberschlagen, 
Man hat verwundet schwer, an Haupt und Schenkeln, 
In einer Kirche ihn verbinden sehn. 
(726-28) 
But TruchB is busy denying that the Prince could have led the cavalry 
in the battle. When the Prince arrives on the scene, Dorfling evidently 
suspects TruchB of lying ("TruchB! Was machtet Ihr?" [739]), and the 
Prince replies to the Elector's comment on his reported severe injury: 
Mein Goldfuchs fiel, vor Anbeginn der Schlacht; 
Die Hand hier, die ein Feldarzt mir verband, 
Verdient nicht, dais du sie verwundet taufst. 
(744-46) 
There seems here to be yet another parallel between Prince and Elec-
tor: the erroneous report of the Prince's injury recalls the erroneous 
report of the Elector's death. But what are we to make of the incon-
sistency of these three reports? Hohenzollern minimizes the Prince's 
wound while TruchB maximizes it-and it seems that the constant 
factor is the need to cover up for the Prince. The different situations 
and ways in which the Prince needs protection dictate the details of 
their accounts. Hohenzollern wants to counter any implication that 
the Prince might not be fit to lead in battle, while for TruchB the need 
is to believe that he could not have been fit enough to lead-a striking 
example of how the Prince is kept from individual responsibility by 
the shortsightedness of his friends, and how they sacrifice any larger 
concerns to immediate demands of the present situation. They too 
contribute to creating the crisis in the relations of Prince and Elector. 
But the thematic point of the Prince's being thrown by his horse is 
clear enough: if the Elector is not yet willing to give up the reins and 
admit that he is now too old, the Prince is unable to take them be-
cause he is not yet able to exercise intelligent control of them. 
So far, I have discussed the general character of the relationship 
between the Prince and the Elector, and the way in which it produces 
the situation that is the main focus of the play; I want now to con-
sider how the relationship develops during the play, and especially 
how the ending comes about and what it means. Criticism of the play 
has always had to deal with the fact that it is not at all easy to judge 
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the responses of either main character at the end. We are given no 
clear sign as to how the Prince responds in the play's final lines, nor is 
the Elector's state of mind or judgment of the situation entirely obvi-
ous during the whole last act. And judging his attitudes entails a 
much more complex and varied set of issues than, for example, the 
common critical puzzle: at what point does the Elector decide to par-
don the Prince? 
Let us return once more to the parallel passages from the first and 
last acts. They occur within fifty lines of the beginning and the end of 
the play respectively; one would expect them to constitute a kind of 
summary comment on what has happened meantime. Many features 
of the first sequence recur in the second, but there are significant 
changes. The most significant of them all is the change from "der 
Gartner" to "ein Madchen." The point of this is that the ending is 
dominated neither by the Prince nor by the Elector, but by Natalie; 
her influence and her thinking prevail. It is largely during the last half 
of Act III and all of Act IV-a stretch of the text where she is clearly 
the most important character-that she is active; and to understand 
what she does there we must first go back to Hohenzollern's role at 
the beginning of Act III. 
The Hohenzollern of Act I was inclined to simplistic dismissal of 
anything that was not immediately obvious, and he was especially 
opposed to taking the Prince's state as seriously as the female charac-
ters did; he rejected their notion that the Prince was sick and needed 
help. But by Act III, Hohenzollern is beginning to see the need for 
more serious thought, looks "bedenklich," and asks the Prince: 
Hast du vielleicht je einen Schritt getan, 
Seis wissentlich, seis unbewuBt, 
Der seinem stolzen Geist zu nah getreten? 
(911-13) 
It is surely important that Hohenzollern, formerly insistent that no 
hidden significance should be sought below the surface of events, 
now realizes that he and the Prince must look to the source of this 
problematic situation in some offense to the Elector's pride that the 
Prince may even have committed unconsciously. Hohenzollern's for-
mulation is very sophisticated and cautious, as is his further question 
to the Prince: 
Ein Wort, das die Kurfiirstin Tante sprach, 
Hat aufs empfindlichste den Herrn getroffen; 
Man sagt, das Fraulein habe schon gewahlt. 
Bist du auf keine Weise hier im Spiele? 
(920-23) 
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The Prince assumes that what he has done is to upset a political deal 
with the Swedes involving marriage of Natalie, and that this is the 
real source of the Elector's anger. This represents a swing on the 
Prince's part from a previous overconfident view of the Elector's be-
nevolence toward him to the opposite extreme of a very low view of 
the Elector's motivation as being merely deviously political. But that 
is the Prince's view, not Hohenzollern'.s-a point the critics of the 
play have consistently missed. Hohenzollern pointed on the contrary 
to the Elector's pride being hurt and to his sensitive reaction to what 
his wife told him. What Hohenzollern is getting at is more likely that 
the Elector was annoyed because the Prince had made a proposal of 
marriage to Natalie as soon as he thought the Elector dead, hastily 
seizing the chance to replace the Elector as her protector. 
It is already clear in Act II that Natalie senses how the Prince's 
advances to her while the Elector was presumed dead will constitute 
a problem. She was formerly most eager to accept those advances, in 
fact directly provoked them (577-80), but as soon as news arrives that 
the Elector still lives, she hastily pulls back (704), sensing the danger. 
Natalie is essentially practical in character. She is never taken in by 
the unreal cliches that the Prince thinks so important ("Edelmut und 
Liebe"); she understands the complex motivations of both Prince and 
Elector far too well for that. It was a practical matter for her immedi-
ately to invite the Prince to assume the Elector's role, rather than to 
continue to lament the Elector's death; and when she now sees the 
Prince collapse in fear of death, she is equally practical about the 
situation. She is far too shrewd to be insulted that the Prince would 
give her up to remain alive or to lament his lack of "Edelmut und 
Liebe"; instead she sees in his state of degradation a weapon that she 
may be able to use in order to free him, and she is "mutig" (1053) 
rather than disappointed. 
When she goes to the Elector to ask for the Prince's life, she speaks 
very openly about his present condition: 
Der denkt jetzt nichts, als nur dies eine: Rettung! 
Den schaun die Rohren, an der Schiitzen Schultern, 
So gralslich an, dais iiberrascht und schwindelnd, 
Ihm jeder Wunsch, als nur zu leben, schweigt. 
Schau her, ein Weib bin ich, und schaudere 
Dem Wurm zuriick, der meiner Ferse naht: 
Doch so zermalmt, so fassungslos, so ganz 
Unheldenmiitig trafe mich der Tod, 
In eines scheulslichen Leun Gestalt nicht an! 
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-Ach, was ist MenschengroBe, Menschenruhm! 
(1148-51; 1169-74) 
We might think it strange that Natalie should not only advertise the 
disgrace of the man she loves but actually go so far as to say that even 
a timid woman would not be so craven. But Natalie senses intuitively 
that this is the one approach that may work, for it is the one thing that 
will replace the Elector firmly in a dominant position. In the competi-
tion for supremacy, for public acclaim, and for the position of hero, 
the Elector has now won and the Prince has lost; the Prince's image as 
the courageous and valiant hero in battle has been severely damaged. 
Sure enough, the Elector is fascinated by the news, asks twice, "Er 
fleht um Gnade?" (1157 and 1159) (which Natalie wisely never an-
swers), and abruptly says, "So ist er frei" (1176)-forgetting, in the 
process, all of his scruples about legal and constitutional action! Na-
talie has managed to set in motion the events that lead up to the 
pardoning of the Prince. 
But the Elector cannot resist giving the situation one last twist. He 
offers the Prince a choice: he may either grant himself, unilaterally, a 
pardon, or he may consent to die if he believes that the sentence has 
been just. Thus the Prince can live only if discredited both by his 
unheroic behavior and by his avoidance of the law-not even as the 
beneficiary of a pardon. If, on the other hand, the Prince admits that 
he was justly condemned, the Elector can still pardon him since he 
will have acknowledged the Elector's authority and justice. 
Still the Elector cannot resist further humiliation for the Prince. He 
asks Natalie to carry his letter to the Prince and then says: "So kann 
er, fur sein Leben, gleich dir danken" (1198). The Elector, to complete 
the Prince's destruction as a hero figure, wants to make quite clear 
that he has a woman to thank for his life. 
In the conflict between the two men, the Elector seems to be gain-
ing ground. That his letter is not premeditated is indicated by the 
stage directions that show his surprise and confusion. He had not 
thought that he would win the struggle so quickly and easily. Natalie 
is suspicious: 
DER KURFURST. 
Mein liebes Kind! Bist du mir wieder gut? 
NATALIE nach einer Pause. 
Was deine Huld, o Herr, so rasch erweckt, 
Ich weiB es nicht und untersuch es nicht. 
Das aber, sieh, das fiihl ich in der Brust, 
Unedel meiner spotten wirst du nicht: 
Der Brief enthalte, was es immer sei, 
112 Heinrich von Kleist 
kh glaube Rettung-und ich danke dir! 
Sie kuflt ihm die Hand. 
DER KURFURST. 
GewiB, mein Tochterchen, gewiB! So sicher, 
Als sie in Vetter Homburgs Wiinschen liegt. 
(1199-1207) 
Only on the surface is this an affectionate conversation between father 
and daughter; scarcely hidden beneath it is a cunning game of double 
talk, in which each tries to outmaneuver the other. Natalie, aware of 
the sting in the Elector's words, attempts to bind him to a favorable 
interpretation of what he has said, asserting that any other would be 
a mockery of her, and virtually dares him to deny it; but he is evasive. 
The Elector appears to have secured the complete deflation of the 
Prince whatever happens; but during the course of Act V, it becomes 
dear that he has in fact miscalculated. To begin with, the Prince 
chooses a course that the Elector had not foreseen: a hero's death. 
And then Natalie sets up the confrontation between the Elector and 
his senior officers by giving forged orders to Count Reufs as soon as 
she sees what the Prince intends. (That Natalie's pragmatism will 
stop at nothing is shown when she tries to persuade the Prince to 
believe that the Elector's "Grofsmut" is boundless, which she dearly 
does not believe, any more than she believed her appeal to his nobility 
in line 1203; such concepts evidently do not form part of her own 
analysis of what is happening, but she is quite happy to use them, 
quite dishonestly, for debating purposes.) 
The Prince's response to the Elector's letter shows that he too is not 
happy with it: 
kh will ihm, der so wiirdig vor mir steht, 
Nicht, ein Unwiirdger, gegeniiber stehn! 
Schuld ruht, bedeutende, mir auf der Brust, 
Wie ich es wohl erkenne; kann er mir 
Vergeben nur, wenn ich mit ihm drum streite, 
So mag ich nichts von seiner Gnade wissen. 
(1380-85) 
The last lines indicate that the first two are a sarcastic expression of 
dissatisfaction at what the Elector has offered: the Prince did not want 
to be told that he could pretend he was innocent (he acknowledged 
his legal guilt in line 870) but to be forgiven for his crime. What the 
Elector offers is not, in fact, "Gnade." The tone of the last line is 
important; the Prince is saying that he wants nothing to do with a 
pardon if it is not freely given. The Prince thus responds as if to a 
challenge to that element of the Elector's letter that was a move in the 
game. On the surface, the Elector's offer seems reasonable, even 
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noble, and the Prince's answer equally so. Critics have traditionally 
regarded both men's actions in this way. In one sense this is not a 
mistake: it matters in the play and to the two men that their actions at 
this point should appear noble. Yet it would be a mistake not to 
consider the devious, calculating element in their actions too; we 
must remember that the object of the game they are playing is to 
achieve their desires while seeming impressive. 
Even at this point we cannot view the Prince and Elector as being 
simply hostile toward each other; in the emotionally confused situa-
tion there is still much that indicates their concern for each other. The 
Elector refers to the Prince as his son and as a young hero; the Prince 
acts deferentially and speaks of his personal relationship with the 
Elector in a way that implies its value for him (e.g., line 1765). But it is 
by no means clear whether the object of the Prince's deferential speech 
might not be to carry the hidden barb that emerges in his last request 
of the Elector. The request recalls the Elector's political negotiations 
with the Swedes involving Natalie; there is surely veiled criticism of 
the Elector in the Prince's asking him not to conclude such a dis-
honorable bargain, since the request assumes precisely that the Elec-
tor was indeed planning to do something dishonorable. This also 
gives the Prince an opportunity to attribute Natalie's rescue from the 
Elector's machinations to his own intervention; he will die and in so 
doing wring from the Elector the concession that will save her. Thus 
he subtly reverses the Elector's previous assertion that the Prince 
could thank Natalie for his life-she can now thank him for saving 
her from the Elector's plan. The Elector's reply is defensive: he con-
cedes the prior existence of the bargain but explains that it was due to 
the misfortunes of war. That, however, is a riposte in similarly veiled 
fashion; the misfortune to which he refers is the Prince's disobedi-
ence, without which the Elector thinks he would have won so deci-
sive a victory that no concession to the Swedes would have been 
necessary. The Elector is really saying that it was all due to the Prince. 
At the surface level of this scene is a noble last wish, magnanimously 
granted; beneath that surface is an unpleasant game of accusation 
and counteraccusation. 
Towards the end of Act V, the situation is no longer as comfortable 
for the Elector as was his position at the end of Act IV, when the 
Prince was crushed and degraded. The Prince has managed to repair 
his own damaged image, and his public request that the Elector not 
sacrifice Natalie to political expediency damages the Elector's image. 
The senior military officers are displaying coolness toward the Elector 
and siding with the Prince against him; and Hohenzollern has raised 
the issue of the Elector's part in provoking the crisis. We can see how 
uncomfortable he is by his uncharacteristic anger at Hohenzollern's 
well-reasoned statement and his confessing to being affected by Kott-
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witz's sentimental but insubstantial remarks. When, under the pres-
sure of this situation, he decides to pardon the Prince, he still does so 
hesitantly, tries to make others bear responsibility for the decision 
(1823), and cannot actually bring himself to say that he is doing so. 
His announcement, such as it is, is in the form of a not entirely clear 
question to his officers (1818-23) whether they will want to take the 
risk of rehabilitating such an irresponsible commander. And he still 
plays another joke on the Prince in the garden, one which has a cruel 
side to it. 
It is also doubtful whether the Prince has changed for the better. 
His irrational ambition for glory has not disappeared; the only differ-
ence is that victory in battle has given way to martyrdom as a means 
of achieving it, as the terms of line 1850, suggesting Christ, seem to 
indicate: "Schlug meiner Leiden letzte Stunde?" Thus the change in 
sophistication is not matched by a change in direction. The grandiose 
imagery of his early speeches is still present in lines 1830-34: 
Nun, o Unsterblichkeit, bist du ganz mein! 
Du strahlst mir, durch die Binde meiner Augen, 
Mit Glanz der tausendfachen Sonne zu! 
Es wachsen Fliigel mir an beiden Schultern, 
Durch stille Atherraume schwingt mein Geist. 
It is also doubtful whether he welcomes the outcome, which robs him 
of the glory he thought he was to achieve. There is an enormous 
discrepancy between the Prince's ecstatic readiness for death and the 
assumption made by all the other characters that he does not want to 
die. 
The ending of the play provides a surface resolution, but at bottom 
resolves nothing. In Kottwitz's affirmation, in response to the Prince's 
question, that this is all "ein Traum," the notion of dream is ambigu-
ous; it may refer either to a dream come true or to an illusion. And the 
joining of all voices in condemning the enemies of Brandenburg (1858) 
is possible only because it is not at all clear who those enemies are; 
the Prince and the Elector may also in their different ways have acted 
contrary to the interests of the state. Appeals to patriotism have al-
ways been linked in the play with the kind of simple-minded, super-
ficial thinking that helped to obscure the real basis of the situations in 
which they occurred, and they have served mainly to make self-
deception easier for both Prince and Elector. The basis of the conflict 
between Prince and Elector cannot be removed, and the relation be-
tween reasoned behavior and underlying motives will continue to be 
obscure and problematic. The play has probed but not solved the 
problem, nor could it. 
VII 
The Character of 
Kleist' s Literary Work 
In the first six chapters of this book I have examined and interpreted 
six of Kleist' s most important works at some length instead of at-
tempting to survey his whole output. In doing so, I have proceeded 
on the assumption, elaborated both in my introduction and in the last 
chapter of this book, that a close look at a manageable number of the 
best works is a much better foundation for a general discussion of the 
character of his writing than a more superficial survey of everything 
that Kleist wrote. There are a small number of basic questions that 
must be central to a general discussion of a writer: What are the 
fundamental concerns of his writing? What is most characteristic of 
him? What is the importance of his work? In discussing these ques-
tions I shall be drawing mainly, though not exclusively, on the results 
of the first six chapters; on occasion, I shall refer also to the major 
plays that I have not chosen to analyze in detail. 
In his well-known and much reprinted literary history, Fritz Martini 
begins his discussion of Kleist by referring to Goethe's negative re-
sponse to Kleist's "pathologisch erscheinende Neigung zum Grau-
samen, Entsetzlichen." 1 With variations of emphasis, this judgment 
is still the basis of the predominant critical attitude to Kleist's work. 
Critics commonly mention above all else the emotional intensity of his 
work, its preoccupation with violent passions such as rage and ven-
geance, and its consequent strong, immediate impact on the reader. 
They point also to the tendency of his work to deal with extreme 
situations and people of equally extreme character, and to the result-
ing image of a world in which no well-ordered life can be secure 
against the sudden eruption of violence and chaos. 
As a surface description of some of the events that occur in Kleist's 
work, this account has of course some limited validity; but it is far 
from being an accurate general discription of his work and even far-
ther from being a valid interpretation of Kleist's meaning. My point in 
introducing this predominant critical stereotype of Kleist here is to 
make a contrast with the direction in which my own argument will 
lead in this chapter. I shall argue that Kleist' s work is essentially of 
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a much more thoughtful kind than this; it has the character of a se-
ries of thematic studies, in which the occasionally intense or violent 
scenes always function to serve thematic purposes rather than simply 
to shock the reader or to create a world that is inherently violent. 
Kleist's work has indeed a highly characteristic quality, and that 
quality can be seen in every aspect of his writing-his style, his 
choice of themes, the personalities that he created, and the kinds of 
events that take place in his work. But it would be difficult if not 
impossible to discuss these characteristic features of his writing in 
any really useful way without taking them in their wider context of 
what he was actually trying to do with them. Only a discussion of the 
fundamental strategy and concerns of Kleist' s writing can provide the 
context in which his use of certain kinds of people, events, language, 
or motifs can be understood. For this reason, I want to begin by 
pointing to a typical thematic structure in Kleist's work. 
Consider, for example, how often the stories begin with a clear 
presentation of a set of circumstances or issues but later veer off in a 
surprising new direction that seems at first hard to reconcile with the 
initial part.of the text. Usually the change of direction is set in motion 
by a jolting episode that introduces fundamentally new issues, char-
acters, or events that may even seem so out of place in the text as it 
has developed to this point that the episode seems not to belong in 
the same story. 2 But, as we have seen in the preceding interpreta-
tions, the change of direction has the effect of making the reader 
question whether he really understood the issues that were presented 
at the beginning of the text, and whether those issues were indeed as 
simple and straightforward as they at first had seemed. In short, the 
unexpected episodes suddenly introduce much more thematic com-
plexity into the story and make us retroactively see the beginning of 
the text in a more complex light too. Let us look briefly at how this 
works in some of the texts that I have discussed. 
In Michael Kohlhaas, the early part of the story sets out the issue of 
justice fairly clearly, with the just Kohlhaas apparently pitted against 
a corrupt nobility and an unjust legal system. But the gypsy episode 
seems to be completely inconsistent with such a framework; it ap-
pears to depart from the world of real people and the concern of that 
world with law and social justice and to take the story instead into a 
world of magic and the supernatural. Yet gradually the effect of this 
jolting episode becomes clearer: it brings with it a more fundamental 
challenge to the earlier framework of the story than even appeared to 
be the case at first sight, for it destroys the whole notion of a corrupt 
establishment that was necessary for Kohlhaas' s stance to make any 
sense. The later episode thus has the effect of showing how the 
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earlier part had been built on assumptions that were merely illusions, 
the chief revelation being that the world is a much more untidy and 
inconsistent place than clear, consistent thinkers like Kohlhaas can 
deal with. In Der Findling, the simple notion in the early part of the 
story that this is about a benevolent old man and his ungrateful 
adopted son begins to crumble as soon as we see something that 
seems at first not to bear on that earlier framework at all, namely 
that his wife has a horrendous personal history that still haunts her. 
Slowly, this new factor changes everything, including our view of the 
old man, who no longer seems so unambiguously benevolent. In Das 
Erdbeben in Chili, there is a series of upsets to the reader's impression 
of what the story means and where it is going, but the entry of Don 
Fernando must be judged an especially puzzling episode at the time it 
happens; what had seemed to be the story of two young lovers, first 
gravely imperiled, then joyously reunited, is suddenly complicated 
by the appearance of a major new figure just when it seemed that the 
events of the story had already run their course. And, sure enough, 
at the end of the story he turns out to have been a central figure, even 
though he appeared so late in the work. Introducing a major new 
figure at so late a stage was evidently Kleist's way of making the 
reader wonder if he had been mistaken in his impression that he had 
already grasped the point of the story; he is not to be allowed to go on 
thinking that this is a tale simply about two lovers and their fate. 
Der Zweikampf is an especially interesting example, for its entire 
plot seems to be radically reshaped and redirected in the middle of 
the story. It begins on one issue-the murder of the Duke and the 
prosecution of the murderer-and then suddenly veers off in a new 
direction; the story then begins to focus almost exclusively on the 
issue of sexual morality and the fate of Friedrich and Littegarde. The 
Regent and the Duke are almost forgotten, and what had seemed the 
main plot issue of the story is taken up again only briefly at the very 
end. It is only after thinking carefully about what has happened that 
we see the important thematic links between the apparently separate 
areas of the plot and notice the really intriguing fact that the values of 
one half of the plot seem to negate those of the other half. Again, 
Kleist has used an apparent break in the continuity of his text to 
throw a fundamentally new light on it. 
Die Marquise van O . . . seems to have resolved its major issue 
before the disturbing new episode appears. The Count seems about 
to be rehabilitated after his earlier unacceptable behavior, and the 
story therefore appears to be about to close, when the extraordinary 
scene between father and daughter occurs. This time it is not the 
introduction of a major new character that produces the jolt to the 
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reader, nor is it the introduction of a major and unexpected tum in 
the plot events; what happens here is that the tactful and elegant tone 
of the story and its entire narrative convention are shattered by a 
grossly explicit description of father and daughter embracing. The 
point of this is that we must now think again about the whole ques-
tion of illicit desires and their place in the elegant aristocratic world of 
these people; the Count's transgression is suddenly given a new con-
text that must make us seriously rethink how it is to be judged. The 
thematic basis of the story is changed by an apparently irrelevant 
scene, and where formerly only the Count had seemed problematic, 
the whole family group including the Marquise herself must now be 
thought of as equally problematic. 
If we look at these five cases together, then, we find that in each 
case the reader's sense of what the text is and what it is about is 
disturbed at a late stage, and that the means of accomplishing this are 
one or more of the following: a break with the tone and narrative 
convention of what has gone before (Michael Kohlhaas and Die Mar-
quise van O ... ); a major new turn in the plot events, or indeed a 
transformation of the plot and of the issues with which it seems to be 
concerned (Der Zweikampf, Der Findling, and Michael Kohlhaas); or the 
introduction of major new figures and changes in the relative impor-
tance of existing figures (Das Erdbeben in Chili and Michael Kohlhaas). 
So far, I have looked only at the stories, and indeed, this particular 
pattern is characteristic only of the stories. But its fundamental pur-
pose is one that the plays share, though they realize that purpose in 
different ways. Therefore, before going on to discuss the plays, I 
want first to consider what Kleist's purpose is in constructing his 
stories as he does. 
Critics of Kleist' s work have on occasion noted that it is characteris-
tic of him to introduce new material late in his stories, but they have 
generally minimized the importance of this practice, as well as the 
unexpected character of the new material. Helmut Koopmann, for 
example, thought of all this purely in terms of a technique of exposi-
tion. 3 Kleist, he thought, was fond of a "flashback" kind of expository 
technique, and that was why he introduced late in the story material 
that belonged at the beginning. And, Koopmann thought, the funda-
mental reason Kleist did this was that he was a pedantic storyteller, 
who kept feeling the urge to motivate all that happened more thor-
oughly by giving a good deal of the prehistory of the events that he 
narrated. Now there is obviously much more to the unexpected new 
material than mere flashbacks-the most disturbing episode in Die 
Marquise van O ... , for example, is chronologically in its correct 
sequence in the text, even though it completes our understanding of 
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what has been a factor in the family situation throughout the story. 
But Koopmann has not really dealt with the flashbacks either, for 
they do not simply provide more exposition-they change the whole 
shape of the events. What we learn about Elvire in Der Findling com-
pletely changes our view of the entire household. More simply, it 
changes the character of all the rest of the exposition up to that point 
in the story. This is not merely more exposition but in a sense the 
reverse, an overturning of the shape of the prior exposition. 
Max Kommerell, on the other hand, stressed that Kleist' s work was 
full of puzzling episodes, but he thought of them merely as puzzling 
in themselves, not puzzling against the background of the rest of the 
text in which they occurred. 4 That led him to concentrate more on the 
Marquise's pregnancy as a puzzling fact (which, in the context of the 
story, it is not) than on the Marquise's behavior with her father, 
which, when it occurs, is utterly puzzling and causes a reinterpre-
tation of the whole story. 5 What is most important about the un-
expected episodes in Kleist's stories is not their intrinsic oddity, but 
their being part of a sequence of events and of narration against 
which they are unexpected because they take the events and the 
narrative in unexpected new directions. Das Erdbeben in Chili is the 
best example of how a Kleist narrative can constantly change direc-
tion. The reader forms an initial impression of the general shape of 
the situation, but as new events occur, he must continually change 
that impression and even revise his impression of the initial pages. 
The interpretation of the text constantly shifts as new events and 
emphases compel it to shift. 
An important consequence of this is the danger in trying to abstract 
any meaning from a particular page until we have seen what the rest 
of the text does to the impression gained on that page; Kleist' s stories 
do not stand still long enough for that-they develop thematically all 
the time. At particular points in his stories, for example, we may get a 
strong suggestion of ideas derived from Rousseau. In Das Erdbeben in 
Chili the middle section gives the reader the impression of a return to 
a natural state in which man is naturally innocent as soon as he is no 
longer corrupted by the institutions of society. And in Michael Kohl-
haas, Kohlhaas' s arguments in support of his action sound like a page 
out of Du Contrat Social; the thesis that the implicit contract between 
himself and the government is broken and that he is then free to 
pursue justice by his own individual means coincides exactly with 
Rousseau's own argument. Many critics have concluded that Kleist 
was simply advocating Rousseau's ideas in these texts, but they have 
missed the way in which his writings use certain ideas as thematic 
material but then move on from those ideas. If the critic becomes too 
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impressed with the atmosphere of a particular page, he is in danger 
of focusing narrowly on a single idea that the text abandons to go in a 
different direction. This principle is true regardless of how enthusias-
tically the narrator seems to embrace a particular viewpoint. Near the 
end of Das Erdbeben in Chili, for example, the narrator is evidently 
tremendously impressed with Don Fernando's dignified and coura-
geous stoicism, but the attentive reader will see that, only a page 
or so later, there is a subtle questioning of his role in what has hap-
pened; it may be that his concern with courage and dignity led to the 
final disaster because it precluded a more prudent and reasoned ap-
proach to the situation. 
The stories constantly use ideas and then cast them aside; the pur-
pose of the unexpected episodes lies in their jolting a story out of one 
set of ideas and sending it in a new direction. The point of this 
recurring phenomenon in Kleist's stories lies in a fundamental aspect 
of the meaning of his work: above all, Kleist's writings are about the 
process of coming to terms with the world, of interpreting and then 
reinterpreting it, of trying out different ideas and attitudes to it. The 
situations and often the characters in his work are ambiguous and 
difficult to grasp, and several possible ways of looking at them are 
exploited by the text at various times. There is constant movement in 
the text among the various possibilities, a continual search for atti-
tudes that will work, and an equally continual stumbling into new 
aspects of the characters and situations that make a given attitude 
difficult to maintain. It was this quality of a continual intellectual and 
emotional searching for the "right" attitude to the world that led me 
to call Das Erdbeben in Chili a kind of "detective story on a cosmic 
scale."6 
To say that Kleist' s work is ambiguous is not nearly enough, and 
does not get at its really characteristic quality. 7 It is after all something 
of a cliche in literary criticism to say that works of literature are full of 
ambiguity. It would still be far too static a view of Kleist to think 
merely of his work as having more than one level of meaning. What 
characterizes him is the active movement from one explanation or 
attitude to another, the constant search for meaning in events and for 
a secure judgment of people and their behavior. Meanings are not 
just ambiguous and left that way in Das Erdbeben in Chili, for example; 
they are set up initially as highly probable and then left behind in the 
wake of the story as it discards them, one by one, as failures. 
It is this general structural pattern, and the attitude towards mean-
ing that it represents, that is truly typical of Kleist. But within the 
pattern there is in fact considerable variety. Though they share the 
same kind of strategy for thematic development and exploration, his 
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works do not all treat the same thematic areas. Das Erdbeben in Chili 
explores in Kleist's characteristic fashion the most general problem of 
man's relationship to the world around him; the text is continually 
concerned with the interrelated questions of how he should under-
stand it and how he should behave towards it. The story is a study 
that has both epistemological and ethical aspects. The thematic mate-
rial of Michael Kohlhaas, on the other hand, lies in the area of social life 
and social justice, and the text is concerned with the problem of what 
an individual can expect from a society and the various ways in which 
he can interpret and respond to its failures to provide protection and 
justice. Der Findling is about the way people relate to each other, their 
roles in each others' lives, and the different possible evaluations of 
one person's role in the life of another-in particular the peculiar 
relationship between generosity towards and exploitation of another 
human being. 
Die Marquise von O ... and Der Zweikampf both concern the area of 
virtue and morality, yet in very different ways. In the former, the 
emphasis is on the positive and negative aspects of social norms, 
social elegance and social inhibitions generally, and on the extra-
ordinarily arbitrary quality of these notions; in the latter, it is on the 
different attitudes that are possible to virtuousness and moral im-
peccability. All the stories, then, have the stamp of Kleist's particular 
kind of thematic study, yet they are also about very different subjects. 
So far, I have spoken only of the stories. The dramas, it seems to 
me, are more various. Some are quite different from what we have 
seen in the stories and lack that characteristic quality of a Kleistian 
thematic study-the exploration of all sides of a thematic area. Die 
Hermannsschlacht, for example, though a late work (dating from 1808), 
appears to be a predominantly patriotic play, not to be considered in 
the same category as the rest of Kleist's output, and consequently it 
has not received the same critical attention as his other work. Die 
Familie Schroffenstein, Kleist's earliest play {1802), has evidently not 
yet embodied his most characteristic features. But the most well-
known and best received of his plays are indeed characteristically 
Kleistian thematic studies that share the same basic strategy and pur-
poses of the stories, though those purposes are realized somewhat 
differently. 
The stories use the sequence of narration to move from one situation 
(and interpretative attitude) to the next. The reader's understanding 
develops by a distinct feeling of moving on and occasionally, as we 
have seen, by being jolted into a new direction by enigmatic episodes 
that, as we think about them, effect a big change in the way we 
understand the entire story. By contrast, the plays tend to focus on a 
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single situation and to proceed to a deeper analysis of it by making 
most of its levels visible in some way from the very beginning. Prinz 
Friedrich von Homburg, for example, is evidently a study of the many 
layers of complexity in the relation of Prince and Elector. We do not, 
however, move in sequence from one layer to the next, as is the 
manner of the stories, but instead see the two main strata of the 
relationship at the very beginning of the play; and during the rest 
of the play we watch the increasingly complex interaction of those 
strata. 
A striking demonstration of the difference of strategy between this 
play and the stories lies in the position of the most obvious "puz-
zling" episode in the Prinz von Homburg. The analogue of, say, the 
gypsy episode in Michael Kohlhaas is the strange garden scene, but 
this begins the play and then recurs at the very end. The puzzling 
episode here, then, is in a sense ever-present: it is no less than the 
encircling framework for the entire play and the episode we must 
remember during the progress of the rest of the play. Instead of 
jolting us out of a viewpoint that is to be discarded, it constitutes an 
odd and puzzling scene which must color all we see. This is because 
the play is about the relation between conscious, reasoned behavior 
and the instinctive, less well-understood feelings and tendencies that 
underlie it. The structure of Prinz Friedrich makes us aware that all of 
the reasonable and rational argument and planning of the middle of 
the play takes place literally within the framework of unconscious or 
half-conscious dreams and wishes, as well as fears and anxieties. 
Here, then, we have the same characteristic concern with different 
ways of looking at people and events, and with interpreting and re-
interpreting what is actually happening between these two characters. 
But instead of presenting that concern by proceeding sequentially 
from one interpretation to the next, Kleist develops simultaneously 
all the possible levels of understanding the situation. Whereas the 
stories proceed from one view to another, the play moves back and 
forth between two predominant modes; in place of the searching and 
discarding of the former, the latter has a process of progressive illu-
mination of the relationship between public acts and private wishes. 
But, in common with the stories, the focus of interest is on the con-
tinuing process of interpreting and understanding the behavior of 
both men; and, again like the stories, the movement from one mode 
to another is partly signaled by a change in dramatic convention and 
style, though it can work in both directions: the harsh reality of the 
battle or of the general staff meeting at the end of Act I clashes with 
the prior fantasylike garden scene, just as the return to the garden in 
Act V clashes with the preceding legalistic argument between the 
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Elector and his senior officers. 
The fundamental continuity of purpose behind the different means 
of presentation can be seen by looking at the thematic similarity be-
tween Michael Kohlhaas and the Prinz van Homburg. The contrast of 
Kohlhaas' s concern with perfect justice on the one hand and the 
strange irrationalism of the gypsy episode on the other is rather like 
the contrast between the Elector's concern with the law and the exotic 
fantasy world of the garden. The thematic point of the two contrasts 
is also similar: in both, a reasonable, articulate, and logical way of 
looking at the world, which seems at first sight self-sufficient, is 
suddenly complicated by the appearance of less rational factors that 
strike at the basis of that whole system of thinking. 
Kleist's three other major plays-Der zerbrochne Krug, Amphitryon, 
and Penthesilea-all show his characteristic concern with different 
ways of looking at the same situation, with interpreting behavior, and 
with understanding the many levels of a given situation, though 
perhaps not developed to the same degree shown in the stories and 
the Prinz van Homburg. 
Der zerbrochne Krug is a relatively simple example. The plot looks 
easy enough to interpret, and it might seem that there is no diffi-
culty in deciding where our sympathies should lie. The village judge, 
Adam, is not only incompetent but misuses his position to try to 
intimidate Eve into accepting his advances. He sows discord, tempo-
rarily, between the young lovers Eve and Ruprecht; and the pretty 
young Eve is obviously well matched with Ruprecht, but not at all 
with a rather ugly man at least twice her age. The honest and decent 
inspector, Walter, comes to set the whole situation straight, and Adam 
is deposed. So far, so good, but many details suggest another way of 
looking at things, making it not quite so clear who deserves our 
sympathy. The most obvious textual feature that, in a manner typical 
of Kleist, jars with the obvious surface interpretation is the naming of 
the characters. At the surface plot level, the natural pair is Eve and 
Ruprecht, but the names suggest the pairing Adam and Eve. And 
that fact immediately suggests several other details of the setting, 
imagery, and even plot events that link with it. For example, Ruprecht 
is not an exemplary young man or the ideal match for Eve. Through-
out the play, he repeatedly calls Eve a whore, and though of course 
he thinks he has reason to feel suspicious of and disappointed in her, 
he is clearly far more verbally violent than is either necessary or 
accounted for merely by his disappointment; for example, his "Ver-
flucht bin ich, wenn ich die Metze nehme" (444) does not make him 
seem a very appealing choice for Eve. Nor, we feel, should any rea-
sonably acceptable mate for Eve ever try to kick her, as Ruprecht 
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does (1019) when blinded by the sand that Adam has thrown in his 
face. Kleist is obviously doing much more than showing a disap-
pointed lover; he is portraying Ruprecht as an ill-tempered, incon-
siderate, and unimaginative clod who can behave abominably toward 
the woman whom he supposedly loves. His boorishness and simple-
mindedness are conveyed too in both the sound of his second name 
and the names with which Adam confuses it: "Ach, Gimpel! Sim-
pel! Tiimpel heiBt der Ruprecht" (2160). Ruprecht and Eve would of 
course make a rustic and relatively unsophisticated pair, but that 
cannot be the point of Kleist's characterization of Ruprecht, for Eve 
herself is shown to be quite different to him; she is loyal even when 
abused, gentle, and considerate. The marriage of the two, then, is 
scarcely an unambiguously good conclusion of the play; they do not 
look as if they belong together, Ruprecht does not seem worthy of 
Eve, and we are left with the feeling that she deserves much better 
than this unattractive individual. 
Still, the Adam and Eve of the play, however their names are 
matched, do not seem a good match either; but that is not the point. 
The names are there to send the reader's thoughts in a different 
direction when he considers Adam. Like his counterpart in the Gar-
den of Eden, Adam meets Eve in the garden and is tempted by her; 
and as a result-though in more physical and even grotesque fashion 
-he too falls, out of the window. This puts much more emphasis on 
Eve as temptress than would seem to be there on the plot's surface 
and much more emphasis on Adam's sin as a universal human weak-
ness of the male for the female. Now this kind of emphasis might not 
seem to be easily reconcilable with the plot, in which Adam seems to 
demand of Eve that she give herself to him sexually as the price of his 
intervening to prevent Ruprecht's being conscripted for service with 
the army in Batavia, an event which Adam has in any case invented 
in order to frighten her. Human susceptibility is one thing; forgery 
and extortion are another. 
Here it is critical to recall that this is true only of the second, short-
ened version of the play. Criticism of the Weimar performance in 1808 
had centered on the long explanations at the end, and so Kleist short-
ened them, in the process compressing Eve's long narrative to a very 
brief explanation of her silence and statement of Adam's demands: 
"So Schandliches, ihr Herren, von mir fordernd, /Daises kein Mad-
chenmund wagt auszusprechen!" (1946-47). But though he shortened 
the play's ending, Kleist still subsequently published, in the edition 
of 1811, the original ending as a "Variant." He still wanted that origi-
nal ending as a possible alternative, then, and did not concede that 
the original, longer version had simply been improved by the revi-
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sion. The reason is not hard to see if we examine the two endings and 
compare them. The second version not only shortened Eve's explana-
tion, it changed the character of that explanation and made Adam's 
sin very different from that of the original version. The longer version 
has Adam use his forged document about Ruprecht only as an excuse 
to meet Eve in her room in the evening, where all he does is take her 
by the hand and look at her. He does not threaten her, nor does he 
demand that she submit to him. In the original, then, Adam uses the 
false story about Ruprecht as an excuse to have a secret evening 
meeting with a pretty girl, and that may well be as far as it goes; he 
takes her hand and looks at her just as Ruprecht is heard outside, and 
the scene cannot develop further. Of course we can speculate about 
what might have happened, but there are many possibilities: perhaps 
he would have declared his fondness for her; perhaps he would have 
asked her to show her gratitude for his saving Ruprecht by kissing 
him; perhaps he would have excused his looking at her and taking 
her hand by claiming a paternal fondness for her as a dose friend of 
her dead father; and perhaps something more serious might have 
occurred. The one thing that is certain is that we do not see him 
crudely threaten and extort. Indeed, it is difficult in the shorter ver-
sion to understand Walter's kindly, forgiving tone at the end of the 
play, when he says that he will only remove Adam as judge but do no 
more provided his accounts are in order. In the longer version that 
makes sense-Adam has been only indiscreet and silly. But in the 
shorter version, Adam has behaved criminally towards Eve, and fur-
ther punishment would be indicated. My own feeling here is that 
Kleist said what he wanted to say in the longer version, bowed, after 
the failure of the performance, to critical pressure for a punchier, 
more dramatic ending, but always wanted his original to stand-
which is why he printed the original version as a full alternative 
reading, available for any director who felt that length was not a great 
problem. 
The original version certainly contains the same potentiality for 
entertaining two different versions of what has gone on that is pres-
ent in his best and most mature work. The surface meaning of the 
play is that which I first described; but the meaning that keeps intrud-
ing in all kinds of ways has Adam as a man sinning in very human 
fashion and falling from grace, while the young man who is to marry 
Eve is an unattractive person who does not deserve her. That view 
has Adam as a pathetic figure, cruelly vulnerable to the most human 
of all attractions and temptations, the temptation of Eve, while the 
reader has no sympathy at all for the utterly unattractive Ruprecht. 
Typical of Kleist here, then, is the way that details of setting, imagery 
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and langauge all work against the overt plot events to undermine the 
superficial view that those events suggest and to substitute a com-
pletely different interpretation of what happens in the play. 
Amphitryon, too, is full of ironic reversals in the way events are 
perceived, though they are of a relatively uncomplicated kind. The 
obvious deceit in the play, for example, is Jupiter's deceiving Alk-
mene by pretending to be Amphitryon; but quite late in the text we 
find that the reverse has been just as true. Alkmene, when praying to 
Jupiter, has in fact been visualizing Amphitryon; and so where at first 
it seems that Jupiter has substituted himself for Amphitryon, in fact 
Alkmene has all along been substituting Amphitryon for Jupiter. An-
other curious reversal of what might seem to be the case lies in the 
question of the apparent wrong done to Amphitryon. At first sight it 
might seem that he has been cuckolded by Jupiter and so dishonored; 
but Kleist eventually has things the other way round: what an honor 
for Amphitryon and what an amazing proof of his wife's total faith-
fulness to him, that even Jupiter himself, the master of the universe, 
must pretend to be Amphitryon before he can make love to Alkmene! 
Yet another reversal is seen in the difference between the obvious, 
superficial view of Jupiter's intrusion into the lives of Alkmene and 
Amphitryon and what reveals itself when we look deeper. The sur-
face tends to let Jupiter be seen as the spoiled all-powerful one who 
takes whatever he wants, in the process trampling on the wishes and 
the happiness of mere mortals; this is consistent with the traditional 
view of Jupiter's sexual exploits in the classical legends. He is a kind 
of celestial sinner, always intent on being unfaithful to his queen 
Juno. But there is also something of the reversal here that we see in 
Der zerbrochne Krug; there is something of Ruprecht in Amphitryon. 
When Alkmene first tells Amphitryon that another has visited her in 
his guise, he abuses her, calling her "Verraterin" (971) and "Treulose! 
Undankbare!" (975) to the point where she eventually calls him an 
"unedelmiitger Gatte" (980). This is reminiscent of the exchanges 
between Ruprecht and Eve, in which he is willing to believe the worst 
of her very quickly. And like Ruprecht, Amphitryon is content to 
advertise his wife's embarrassment and his opinion of her. He ac-
tually says that he will call witnesses: "Zeugen doch / Jetzt ruf ich, 
... Ich rufe deinen Bruder mir, die Feldherrn, / Das ganze Heer mir 
der Thebaner auf" (996-99). The impression here is that of a selfish 
man who is concerned only with his own image and his honor, not 
with his wife's distress. No wonder Jupiter (still disguised as Amphi-
tryon) insists that he (Jupiter) is the one who is deceived: 
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Er war 
Der Hintergangene, mein Abgott! Ihn 
Hat seine base Kunst, nicht dich getauscht, 
Nicht dein unfehlbares Gefuhl! Wenn er 
In seinem Arm dich wahnte, lagst du an 
Amphitryons geliebter Brust, wenn er 
Von Kiissen traumte, driicktest du die Lippe 
Auf des Amphitryon geliebten Mund. 
0 einen Stachel tragt er. 
(1287-95) 
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To be taken for such a man and to have to resemble him in order to 
be loved is indeed no great compliment. And meanwhile there is a 
strange sense in which Alkmene is only recognized for what she is 
when given Jupiter's attention. The insensitive Amphitryon cannot 
see what he has in Alkmene and so cannot appreciate her value; but 
when she is visited by Jupiter, she is seen as the divine creature 
among women that she really is. In a sense, Jupiter takes the form of 
a mortal so that Alkmene can then emerge as something ethereal 
among mortals. 
Penthesilea is in many ways the strangest of all Kleist's works, and 
its savage ending has unfortunately done most to support the wide-
spread and mistaken notion that Kleist's work is in general obsessed 
with violence and brutality. In fact, this is not even entirely true of 
Penthesilea. While it is, to be sure, markedly different from anything 
else that he wrote, it still has the characteristic thoughtful quality of a 
thematic study that plays with many different ways of conceiving its 
subject-in this case the love relationship between Penthesilea and 
Achilles. The literal battle between the two is not something that 
takes us outside of, and makes the play irrelevant to, the range of 
normal experience in relations between men and women generally, 
nor does it simply reduce that experience to a lowest level of violence; 
on the contrary, it is used by Kleist to bring out all of the complexities 
of relations between the sexes and to allow the two to express a great 
number of different emotional responses to what is happening to 
them as they gravitate towards each other. The tone of the relation-
ship between them and its many levels of response is set firmly when 
Odysseus, reporting their first meeting, says of Penthesilea that she is 
"verwirrt und stolz und wild zugleich" (99). The symbolism of the 
battle situation projects the atmosphere of challenge involved in the 
beginning of a love relationship, the dangerous feeling of emotional 
vulnerability, as well as the excitement and exhilaration that accom-
pany those dangers. The very act of seeking each other out to fight is 
for Penthesilea and Achilles a kind of commitment to each other, a 
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decision to prove themselves a match for the other, and a provocative 
gesture that challenges each to accept the dangers and put aside fear 
in order to come to terms with the other; if both can stand the test, the 
relationship can progress. Mixed up with this already very compli-
cated set of emotions is the urge, which both show, to conquer the 
other, to carry him or her off as a prize that has been won, and to 
display the capture proudly to friends and countrymen; but both also 
show the opposite emotion, the wish to be captured by the other. 
Achilles is willing to make an elaborate pretense of Penthesilea's hav-
ing won, in order for her to carry him off to her capital as a captive; 
while Penthesilea herself, in spite of her expressed obsession with 
capturing Achilles and her resolve never to take a man that she has 
not captured by the sword (1580-81), is actually furious when she is 
rescued by her women from captivity in Achilles' hands (2298 ff.). 
Quite how precarious the balance is between these opposing wishes 
to conquer and yet be conquered is shown on a number of occasions. 
Early in the play, Achilles is menaced by the sword of a Trojan; Pen-
thesilea, though still nominally also in battle against Achilles, grows 
pale at the sight and kills the Trojan to protect Achilles, whose reac-
tion may seem ungrateful: 
Er jetzt, zum Dank, will ihr, der Peleide, 
Ein Gleiches tun; doch sie bis auf den Hals 
Gebiickt, den mahnumflossenen, des Schecken, 
Der, in den Goldzaum beifsend, sich herumwirft, 
Weicht seinem Mordhieb aus, und schieBt die Ziigel, 
Und sieht sich um, und lachelt, und ist fort. 
(187-92) 
The point is, however, that Penthesilea has disturbed the balance of 
emotions-she has saved him and in so doing has asserted domi-
nance and superiority over him at the same time as expressing con-
cern for him; she has satisfied both needs (she smiles, aware of her 
dominance), but he, now disoriented, can only lash out at her to try 
to redress that crucial balance of mutual dependence. 
If the play ends violently, that is surely a matter of the breakdown 
of the balance. Penthesilea recoils from sustaining the tremendous 
emotional complexity of the situation by engaging in a simple, un-
complicated act. The precariousness of the emotional situation has 
proved too much for her, the situation too difficult for her to maintain 
at so complex a level emotionally. The final savage act is above all a 
resort to simplifying the situation, letting one emotion take over and 
crowd out all the others that have formed a whole of unbearable 
complexity. She breaks down under the sheer effort of maintaining a 
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grasp of the situation that can keep its various parts in their proper 
perspective; what gets out of hand is her feeling of vulnerability to 
Achilles, to the possibility that he only wants to take her without any 
deeper commitment to her then merely the desire to show her off as a 
captive "mit Hohngelachter" (1571). Because she lets her view of 
Achilles' attitude to her become so reduced, a corresponding reduc-
tion of her emotions to a need for self-protection in the face of great 
emotional vulnerability is the result. 
Since Kleist's texts move so conspicuously among different atti-
tudes and interpretations, it follows that the one quality critics of his 
work most need in order to do it justice is flexibility; but, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, that quality has been rare in Kleist scholar-
ship. Kleist's critics have generally, like Penthesilea herself, recoiled 
from ambiguity into a single rigid attitude. 
More often than not, Kleist's text moves from initially simple and 
superficial attitudes to more complex ones. One particular version of 
this is found in both Das Erdbeben in Chili and in Michael Kohlhaas, 
which begin with ideas about the structure of the world (in the one 
case) and of society (in the other) that are, to be sure, grandiose but 
are also naive and simplistic. In both cases these neat, dear-cut ideas 
come to grief as it becomes evident that the world and society do 
not lend themselves to such tidy summarization. In both, grandiose 
philosophical and juridical notions are eventually rendered obsolete 
by a trivial circumstance, so that a card-house of theological and 
sociological theorizing is destroyed by the reality of actual people and 
events. In the former case, the trivial circumstance that triggers the 
final disaster occurs when the priest lets his tongue run away with 
him. In the latter, the circumstance is the person of Heloise and the 
Elector's vague affection for her, which turn out to have been the 
trigger for Kohlhaas's entire series of actions-neither a vast con-
spiracy nor a fundamental injustice in the society in which he lives. 
On the other hand, the movement in Penthesilea is really the other 
way round; here we see not the breakdown of simple, dear ideas, but 
instead the breakdown of the equilibrium of a complicated situation 
and a retreat from that complexity into the simplicity and directness 
of savage violence. The situation seems unable to maintain itself in 
the precarious balance of emotions that had existed for most of the 
text, and the ending represents a resolution on the part of Penthesilea 
that is always the most tempting in a complex situation-a reduction 
to the stark simplicity of death and destruction. Both patterns can be 
seen in Der Findling: an initially simple interpretation of the situation 
(that the kindly old Piachi is wronged by his ungrateful adopted son) 
is complicated by the addition of new levels of interpretation, but 
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then the resulting complexity is reduced to simplicity by an ending 
like that of Penthesilea. An emotionally precarious and complex situa-
tion is resolved only by violence and destruction. 
There is really no facet of Kleist's work-whether language, imag-
ery, narrative style, or recurrent motifs-that can be treated except in 
the context of the general framework of his fundamental concerns as 
a writer and the most basic strategy and structure of his work. Let us 
look, for example, at some of the most commonly identified recurring 
motifs in his writing. One such observed motif is that of error, decep-
tive appearances, and mistakes. It crops up frequently in criticism of 
Kleist, and the motif is indeed common in his work. But estimating 
what this recurrence means can only be a matter of setting it in the 
context of what his work is really about; and if we do that, we do not 
find Kleist to be obsessed with error and deceit per se, as many of his 
critics have thought. 8 Nor is his point the trivial one that people often 
make mistakes. This motif has to be taken as an integral part of 
Kleist's concern with the development of understanding and inter-
pretation; his emphasis is not on human fallibility but instead on the 
way life demands that we continually attempt to understand and in-
terpret what we see, and that we be prepared to abandon unsuccess-
ful attempts to interpret it in order to rethink the situations we face. 
Mistakes are a part of this process, not the point of the whole, and in 
saying this I do not mean that there is in Kleist's work a sense of 
finding the right answers: the emphasis is only on the search for 
them. 
"Gefiihl" is another watchword of Kleist criticism that has on oc-
casion been made an absolute value in his work, and the word itself is 
indeed another recurring motif. But its recurrence does not mean that 
Kleist embraces a heart-over-head, feeling-rather-than-intellect posi-
tion. 9 Sometimes intuitive certainty turns out to be correct, some-
times incorrect-a point we can see proven when, late in Das Erdbeben 
in Chili, Josephe feels strongly that everyone should go to pray in the 
Dominican Church, while Elisabeth's intuition points just as strongly 
in the reverse direction. The reason for the prominence of references 
to "Gefi.ihl" is simply that intuition and feelings are one way in which 
characters might respond to the situations in the stories. But the 
emphasis is on the continual need to respond-and intuition as one 
kind of response-not on it as the exclusive way to grasp the essence 
of a given situation. Typically, Kleist uses intuitive responses as a 
counterpoint to more reasoned ones simply in order to introduce 
conflicting attitudes to a situation; no issue is made of the value of 
intuitive feelings per se, either positively or negatively. 
The case is much the same with another of the well-worn words 
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of Kleist criticism: "Vertrauen." Complete trust seems to work well 
sometimes (the case of Friedrich von Trota in Der Zweikampf), might 
have worked at other times (the case of Gustav in Die Verlobung in St. 
Domingo), and is disastrous at still other times (the case of Achilles in 
Penthesilea and Josephe in the Erdbeben). In itself, it is viewed neither 
negatively nor positively; again, it is important only as another pos-
sible response to people or situations and thus another source for the 
various attitudes and interpretations that Kleist's texts play on and 
move among. 
The recurring motif of chance in Kleist' s work does not mean that 
in his world chance is all-powerful and fate blind (though that notion 
can of course be part of the "Stoff" -the material used in a particular 
text). 10 Within the context of Kleist's characteristic concerns, unex-
pected, chance events need to be seen primarily as challenges to the 
reader; they move the story in suddenly different directions so that 
he must rethink what is happening and conceivably alter his interpre-
tation of the situation. By the very fact that they seem to lack a clear 
place in the structure of the text, and thus a clear motivation within 
it, they invite attempts to search for their significance and purpose. 
The Erdbeben in Chili is the clearest example of this. The first few 
pages present a large number of events explicitly referred to as chance 
events: for example, Jeronimo's managing to see Josephe again after 
she is sent to the nunnery, his finding a rope when in his cell, and 
finally his finding a means of escape, which is only possible because 
he is able to go underneath a "zufallige Wolbung" (146) made by two 
houses as they collapse towards each other-a remarkable coinci-
dence indeed. But of course this very insistence on chance invites the 
reader to wonder whether more than chance is involved: is this divine 
providence? In Der Findling, the chance return of Piachi similarly 
provides food for thought: had Piachi been so apprehensive about the 
whole situation in his household that he had begun to spy on Elvire 
and Nicolo? Far from dismissing these events as having no signifi-
cance for the structure of the situation, this harping on chance invites 
us to think about what their possible place in that structure might be. 
The frequent invoking of chance, then, is all part of Kleist's strategy 
of making his reader continually think about the shape of what is 
happening. 11 Where several attitudes are possible, a chance event 
often provides a temptation for us to fit it into a possible structure and 
reach an interpretative conclusion about how to look at what is hap-
pening; but we must be prepared-most notably in the Erdbeben-to 
go back and abandon this construction that we have put on the event 
and resign ourselves to the fact that the event in question was, after 
all, mere chance. At other times, even when chance events do remain 
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in the realm of the genuinely fortuitous, they may still seem to have 
been in a sense invited by a given situation. Such is the case, for 
example, in Die Marquise von O ... , where there is a peculiar sym-
metry between the withdrawn and overprotected state of the Mar-
quise and the extreme means by which she is wrenched from that 
state. 
The critical investigation of Kleist's style and language might at first 
sight seem a more purely descriptive matter than those that I have 
been discussing, but it too can only be pursued within an interpre-
tative framework. From the point of view of the framework I have 
proposed, for example, Kleist's critics have been seriously mistaken 
even when they have tried to be merely descriptive. A common view 
of Kleist's style is that it is highly objective and factual, even sober, 
that it avoids subjectivity and either coloring or commentary by the 
narrator, that it is highly realistic, and that it is economical and direct, 
keeping description to an absolute minimum. In short, it is thought 
that he gives us the facts as they are and nothing besides. 12 This is at 
one and the same time a very good account of the surface impression 
that Kleist makes on his reader and a disastrous misconception about 
what he is really doing. There is, in the telling of the stories, an 
overall sense of directness; for example, facts speak for themselves 
rather than being colored or commented on by a narrator. (Even on 
the surface level, this is only partially true of the plays.) And this 
overall impression seems to put the onus on the reader to form his 
own judgment of those facts, which of course he must constantly 
do. But this cleverly maintained general impression soon disappears 
when we look more closely, for then we find that Kleist is constantly 
violating that convention and in so doing raising the issue of how to 
interpret the facts, suggesting possible ways to do so, often dwelling 
on the need for thought and interpretation, and just as often knock-
ing down interpretations that had seemed tempting. 
The chief characteristic of Kleist's prose style lies in a constant ten-
sion between factualness and interpretation. This is achieved partly 
by a fairly overt violation of his general convention of factualness and 
economy at critical points in the texts and also through a more subtle 
manipulation of the convention that is harder to see. The first phe-
nomenon occurs when Kleist violates his convention of an economi-
cal, fast-moving narrative by suddenly dwelling on and expanding 
the description of an apparently unimportant event, thereby arresting 
the normally rapid succession of plot events, or when his narrator 
uses some striking imagery or some equally obtrusive evaluative lan-
guage. But the second is found largely in the way the selection and 
formulation of events give them a particular direction, and this is 
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something that must be abstracted from a long stretch of the text, 
rather than an effect that has a dramatic quality that emerges visibly at 
a particular juncture. In this category we must also place those many 
instances where selection is a matter of omitting information that the 
reader needs, whether this consists in failure to tell us what someone 
whispers to another character, or failure to include any explanatory 
comment in situations that remain puzzling without it, or withhold-
ing from us until very late in the text a fact that was needed much 
earlier if we were to make sense of what was happening. All of this 
means that it is simply not true to say that Kleist tells the story 
directly and economically without any coloring of the facts; we miss 
the most important quality of his narrative if we see it this way. Yet 
paradoxically, it is also true that the nonfactual side of his narrative 
achieves its importance only through the general impression of fac-
tualness. By this means, Kleist gives the impression that he is merely 
giving us the facts, unadorned, but at the same time is always jogging 
the reader to do something with those facts-to see how they hang 
together, to think about particular facts more than others, to worry 
about facts that are not there and what they might prove if he knew 
them, to guess at facts that are hinted at but not really stated, and to 
grasp what really happened in passages that are left ambiguous. In 
short, the reader is always required to be active, to move and to 
think, to shape events and to interpret them. The surface impression 
of factualness, then, is precisely the reverse of what Kleist's real con-
cern is in these stories; evaluation of the facts is an ever-present 
problem. 
Let us next consider examples of how this actually works. The most 
easily visible examples of what I have been discussing are the overt 
violations of the convention of factualness and economy. There are at 
least two examples of a complete breakdown of the economy of nar-
ration in the otherwise breathlessly economical Erdbeben in Chili: the 
first devotes a whole page to Jeronimo's changes of attitude to the 
earthquake itself, and the second a comparable amount of space to 
Donna Elisabeth's misgivings about the plan to return to the city to 
pray. Both these passages arrest the action of the story and in so doing 
create a hiatus where the focus of attention is clearly not on what is 
happening but on the significance of what is happening. The Marquise 
von O ... , too, contains a section that is slow and relatively devoid 
of events, namely the pages leading up to the end of the story. But 
in these we get the extraordinary scene between father and daugh-
ter, which dwells on the tenor of their reconciliation at great length 
instead of merely reporting it. However, in so doing, it covertly intro-
duces issues that completely alter the basis of the text. Another ex-
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ample is the odd description of the duel in Der Zweikampf, in which 
the narrator is strangely long-winded about telling us that Friedrich 
seems not to be a very spirited fighter. This part of the story should be 
the high-point of its action-the duel itself. But Kleist evidently has 
something in mind in making it drag so much that the spectators 
think the whole thing a bore-a fact that the narrator seems to find 
embarrassing but only makes worse by his attempts to explain away 
Friedrich's incompetent performance, in the process making it actu-
ally ludicrous. Obviously, Kleist uses the possibility of retarding or 
accelerating the action as a way of drawing attention to key issues in 
his story, but it is only the general impression of rapid narration that 
allows him to do this. When it suits him to do so, he glosses over 
huge areas of plot events-notably in the first page of Das Erdbeben in 
Chili, where the entire history of the romance between Josephe and 
Jeronimo is compressed into a few lines. But he can also expand a 
single point in the events and describe it at great length: description is 
surely not consistently kept to a minimum in Kleist. 
Striking violations of the general convention of factual language are 
also quite common, and once more each occurrence derives its impact 
largely from its being a departure from a norm. A fine example is the 
appearance of the evaluative word "Bigotterie" (201) in Der Findling. 
This seems to jump at us from nowhere, without any secure position 
either among the facts we have been given or in the style of the story 
up to that point. The language of the scene between the Marquise 
and her father is similarly unexpected, a complete change in the tone 
of a narrative that has not only seemed factual, but also tactful up to 
that point. Elegance is suddenly replaced by a description that is 
nothing short of repellent. Some of the most striking examples of 
lapses into highly evaluative and evocative language come again from 
the Erdbeben; the central section provides the well-known example of 
a consciously "poetic" language (the description of the night scene), 
while the narrator's response to Don Fernando's behavior as he fights 
off the mob at the end of the story is an unusually direct and forceful 
evaluation: "dieser gottliche Held" (158). These dramatic examples of 
a break in the factual style could be multiplied, and they show all too 
clearly that subjectivity, narrator comment, and evaluation are not at 
all excluded by Kleist's style: on the contrary,they are actually high-
lighted and used with greater effect by that style. 
Nevertheless, the subtler kinds of manipulations of facts, those 
that do not call attention to themselves as breaks with the surface 
convention, are the most interesting. In Das Erdbeben in Chili, for 
example, it may not at first sight seem to be evaluative, rather than 
simply informative, to refer to Josephe's brother as "stolz" (144); but 
Kleist' s Literary Work 135 
that adjective, together with "hamisch," also applied to him, and 
"zartlich," this time applied to the character of the relationship be-
tween the lovers, all give a particular shape to the whole situation 
that unfolds at the beginning of the text; the formulations have given 
the situation a distinct shape in the reader's mind. To be sure, hav-
ing established that, Kleist then gives it a jolt with the phrase "zum 
Schauplatze seines vollen Gliickes," which does not agree with our 
impression so far of the situation. In similar fashion, the words "jagte" 
and "trieb" (146), used when Jeronimo is escaping from his prison, 
give that situation a distinct feeling too. This is anything but factual 
storytelling-it is constant manipulation. The same is true of those 
cases where Kleist deemphasizes critical facts, like a writer of a detec-
tive story who wants to draw a clue past the reader's nose without 
the reader immediately recognizing the answer to the mystery. 13 For 
example, Kleist will sometimes go to great lengths to justify the intro-
duction of crucial information with an utterly trivial excuse. In this 
category, for example, are the introduction of Heloise and the vital 
information that this gives about how all the establishment figures in 
the story are linked. The two critical facts about her are introduced as 
if merely the background information needed to set the stage for a 
colorful hunt party. The reader must look beyond the trivializing 
context of this information and make his own estimate of its actual 
importance. Or in Das Erdbeben in Chili, the shattering information 
about the hanging of an innocent man and of the continuing looting 
and thieving-all of which conveys the thematically vital fact that the 
world is actually no better than it was before, in spite of the previous 
appearances to the contrary-is introduced almost as a footnote to 
Josephe's anxiety about the appearance of friends who know of her 
status as a woman condemned to death. This understating of impor-
tant facts is carried even further in Der Findling, where it is crucial to 
know that Nicolo's "mother" Elvire is actually in her twenties, just as 
he is. But to discover that, the reader has to put together several 
pieces of information that are scattered throughout the story. All of 
this kind of manipulation of the stories' "facts" functions to keep the 
reader thinking and interpreting; he can never passively accept what 
is offered him but must constantly judge the significance of what is 
narrated and how it is narrated. 
Another kind of manipulation consists in the withholding of facts 
about which the reader will naturally be curious, and which the nar-
rator could easily have given us. In Der Findling, Nicolo's returning to 
his room and finding it locked is very odd; why should it be locked, 
and why should not Nicolo have a key to it? Why does Elvire have the 
key on her person? And how does this strange situation relate to the 
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odd coincidence that Elvire is still up and about at so late an hour, as 
Nicolo is returning? Is she deliberately watching over his movements? 
Does she faint on seeing him because she thinks she sees Colino or 
because she sees the resemblance between the two? None of this is 
explained; Kleist obviously wants us to puzzle over this for ourselves, 
but there is a good reason for his doing so. The nature of Elvire's 
feelings about Nicolo is the issue in these unanswered questions, and 
if we think enough about that issue, we should also come to think 
about the related question of why those feelings exist. From there we 
should be led to think about Piachi's role in Elvire's life and finally 
about the entire structure of Piachi's oppressive household. 
There is a great deal of information withheld from the reader in 
Michael Kohl/mas. From the day after Kohlhaas' s wife dies, all of the 
events involving the gypsy are withheld, for example, until very late in 
the text; and the crucial fact that Heloise is the link among the vari-
ous governmental figures who thwart Kohlhaas is revealed equally 
late in the story. Kleist here manipulates the facts of his story by 
initially withholding all those that do not fit with Kohlhaas's own 
view of the situation, and when he later fills in those gaps, it becomes 
clear that the shape of the situation is completely different from that 
we and Kohlhaas himself had imagined. Having given us the facts 
that will predispose us to one view of the situation, Kleist then gives 
us those that are inconsistent with that view and thus changes the 
direction of our thinking. 
Critics have on occasion thought of the way Kleist obtrusively omits 
information as part of his tendency to give us action and external 
description rather than giving us the responses and thoughts of his 
characters. This would all be consistent with the notion that he is a 
factual writer, one who shows us what happened but does not com-
ment on it or let his characters' reactions to it show either. But this too 
is an untenable view except as a description of a superficial impres-
sion that Kleist creates in order to exploit it. The truth is that Kleist 
does report the thoughts and responses of his characters over and 
over again. Even in Michael Kohlhaas, the story most frequently cited 
to demonstrate Kleist's allegedly purely external description of people 
and events, there is a great deal of comment on the state of mind of 
Kohlhaas and others, including even such explicit mind reading as: 
"Kohlhaas dachte: 'So moge mir Gott nie vergeben, wie ich dem 
Junker vergebe!'" (30). There is, as we have seen, a great deal of 
space devoted to the thoughts of Jeronimo in the Erdbeben, as well as 
frequent comment on the state of mind of others, including of course 
the absolutely all-important last sentence of the story, which reports 
Don Fernando's thought about what has happened. And in Der Find-
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ling, there is a continuous commentary on the tortuous progress of 
Nicola's thoughts and emotions. Yet even though there is no question 
that this kind of comment that goes beyond the visible events is 
extremely common in Kleist's works, it still often suits his purposes 
to pretend that this is not the case and to stay at the visible surface of 
what happens, pointedly omitting any other kind of comment. These 
are cases that present open invitations to the reader to ponder what 
the withheld information might have been, and they are all cases that 
take the reader, through that process, into the heart of the issues of 
the text. We do not hear what Elvire says to Piachi at the end of the 
story just before Piachi throws Nicolo out of his house. Kleist makes 
us think about what she might have said, which in turn will make us 
think about her whole state of mind at that stage and all the pressures 
that weigh upon her. The point is, of course, that nothing that she 
could actually have uttered would be as complicated as what is going 
on in her mind. By withholding from us something that seems impor-
tant enough for us to guess, Kleist has actually made us enter a realm 
of thought that is far deeper and more important than the few missing 
words that instigated the process of pondering in the reader. The 
words are almost a kind of bait; we chase them and end up grappling 
with something far bigger and more valuable. 
Similarly, there is the instance in the Erdbeben in which we are 
not allowed to overhear what Donna Elisabeth whispers to Don Fer-
nando. We have to guess what she might have said in order to form 
some idea of what his visible and audible response means, while the 
narrator pretends, in a manner quite inconsistent with his procedure 
up to this point, that he is in no better position to know what the 
words were than any other spectator to the scene. Once more, the 
result is different to, and more important than, what we would have 
learnt from the missing words; to guess at what was said will involve 
thinking about what kind of man Don Fernando is, and that will take 
us to the important thematic issue of his insistence on dignity rather 
than on calculation of what the future holds. 
One more example is the wordless gesture of the Marquise's father 
when he fires a shot into the ceiling; the lack of any comment as to 
why he was so upset, if this lack provoked the reader to consider the 
issue for himself, might well lead to some interesting reflection about 
so violent and aggressive a response to his daughter's pregnancy, 
which also would raise some of the most important issues of the 
story. Silences are evidently part of Kleist's strategy of drawing his 
reader into reacting to and thinking about what he reads. The same is 
true of the occasional blatant textual ambiguities; Nicola's comment 
on the likeness between himself and the picture of Colino, following 
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the comment of Xaviera's little daughter Klara, is the most obvious 
case. 
So far, I have been discussing mainly the language of the stories, 
which, since all are in prose, can more easily be taken together than 
the plays. The language of Penthesilea, for example, obviously differs 
from that of Der zerbrochne Krug partly because of the difference be-
tween the convention and tone of a Greek classical tragedy on the 
one hand and that of a play about village characters in Holland on the 
other. Nevertheless, the same basic strategy can be seen in the lan-
guage of the plays. One can compare with the analogous pattern in 
the stories, for example, the way in which the basic convention of an 
explicit, direct, informative style is varied or sometimes abandoned in 
the Prinz von Homburg. In that play we are given three contradictory 
reports of what happened to the Prince and his horse before the 
battle, and we have to make up our own mind what we will conclude 
-we are given no resolution of the inconsistencies. And we can only 
resolve them by interpreting the whole situation and abstracting its 
basic patterns; we need to see that one account minimizes the Prince's 
wound and one maximizes it, and we must then put this together 
with the reasons Hohenzollern has for the former and TruchB for the 
latter. Only then can we form a reasonable idea of what happened: 
evidently, the Prince was wounded seriously enough to be embar-
rassed but not enough to be incapacitated. Hohenzollern wanted to 
play down the first of these two facts and TruchB the second. If we 
think about the situation enough to find this out, we know a good 
deal about how the Prince's friends cover up for him and make it 
possible for him to avoid responsibility and to get deeper into trouble. 
This mental operation on the part of the spectator to the play is very 
like that of the reader who must put together various odd scraps of 
information to arrive at Elvire's age or guess what Donna Elisabeth 
said to Don Fernando. The conversation between Hohenzollern and 
the Prince after the garden scene in the first act is enigmatic, and we 
must pay close attention in order to form an idea of what is going on 
in the Prince's mind; we can, I think, discern that he has remembered 
at a key point in the conversation that Natalie figured in his dream, 
but we are not told that-we must guess from the external signs. 
Again, information is withheld, and we are made to guess at what is 
going on in someone's mind, just as in Der Findling, when we are not 
allowed to hear what it is that Elvire whispers. The same quality 
exists in the play, then, of varying an explicit, informative style with 
significant gaps and omissions that provoke curiosity and thought; 
the spectator is always being drawn into interpreting what he sees. 
Glaring ambiguities are found here too, and for the same purposes: 
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Kottwitz' s "Ein Traum, was sonst" (1856) demands as much thought 
and interpretation as Nicolo' s unfathomable reply to Klara. 
Metaphor and imagery as a counterpoint to the surface outline of 
the plot is even more developed in the Prinz van Homburg than in the 
stories. Probably only the case of Die Marquise van O ... , in which 
the metaphorical analogy of love and war is so important, is compa-
rable to the Prinz van Homburg's use of the images of plants and 
horses as a way of making us see the key relationships in a manner 
fundamentally different from the way we perceive their apparent 
shape at the surface level of the plot. 
It has often been observed that Kleist's Elector is somewhat in-
scrutable, and that it is hard to see when he makes up his mind and 
why; some critics have regretted this fact about the play and thought 
it a blemish in the text. But this is a case in which it is very important 
to understand how Kleist works. It is obviously much more impor-
tant to him that the reader ponder the complexity of the process, its 
length, and the many pressures on him which contribute to the Elec-
tor's decision than to show a definite reason and a specific point of 
decision; and in any case, the complexity of the situation precludes 
any kind of explicit statement, which would of necessity simplify it. 
The Prince and Natalie are not easy to comprehend either; the stage 
direction of line 1313 demands thought about what is going on in both 
their minds: "Natalie erblalst. Pause. Der Prinz sieht sie fragend an." 
In this play, the reader's need to interpret and read the signs correctly 
is compounded, for the characters are evidently doing the same thing, 
without necessarily getting the right answers. Take the following, 
apparently trivial exchange between Hohenzollern and the Prince: 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. 
Sieh da! Freund Heinrich! Sei willkommen mir! 
-Nun, des Arrestes bin ich wieder los? 
HOHENZOLLERN erstaunt. 
Gott sei Lob, in der Hoh! 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. Was sagst du? 
HOHENZOLLERN. Los? 
Hat er den Degen dir zuriick geschickt? 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. 
Mir? Nein. 
HOHENZOLLERN. Nicht? 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG. Nein! 
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HOHENZOLLERN. -Woher denn also los? 
DER PRINZ VON HOMBURG nach einer Pause. 
Ich glaubte, du, du bringst es mir.-Gleichviel! 
HOHENZOLLERN. 
-Ich weifs von nichts. 
(791-97) 
This is almost a comedy of overinterpretation; the Prince interprets 
the meaning of Hohenzollern's arrival and states what he thinks it is, 
then finds that Hohenzullern takes this as information that the Prince 
is giving him, until they both see their mistake. 
In its movement between apparently clear, direct language on the 
one hand and striking imagery or obscure and ambiguous utterances 
on the other, we find in the Prinz van Homburg very much the same 
kind of pattern that is found in the stories: a mode of exposition that 
is undermined by all kinds of features that run counter to it and serve 
to make us think again about the adequacy of any surface impressions 
we have of what is happening. 
Even the detail of Kleist' s sentence structure is best described and 
understood in an interpretative framework. While earlier critics spoke 
of the direct, intense forward-moving style of his narratives, Friedrich 
Beilsner first noticed that the structure of Kleist's sentences suggested 
a modification of that view; he found "rastlose Unverziiglichkeit 
des Berichts im ganzen, der im einzelnen immer wieder Umstand-
lichkeit entgegenwirkt." 14 Kayser picked up this insight to take it 
further; 15 he observed not only a large number of Kleist's sentences 
that were a direct series of simple past tense verbs recording a series 
of actions without any interruptions but also many others in which 
the same basic series of verbs was interrupted by a series of cir-
cumstantial subordinate clauses that impeded the flow of the action. 
Whereas Beilsner had thought of this second kind of sentence mainly 
in terms of acceleration or retardation of the events of the story, 
Kayser saw it as a much more meaningful part of the whole. He saw a 
contrast in the typical Kleist sentence of "Geschehnisfolge" and "Um-
standlichkeit"; the action pressed forward in the former, only to meet 
a new circumstance in the latter that complicated the situation. 
Kayser's remarks fit very well the interpretative framework that I 
have suggested; here is yet another aspect of that tension between 
fact and interpretation, between the simple surface of the plot events 
and the shaping of an attitude towards them. Events move forward 
in the sequence of simple past tense verbs, but the circumstantial 
details that intervene constantly suggest possible constructions that 
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can be placed on them or simply difficulties that must be registered 
and thought about. We are never really sure which is more important; 
the major events of the sentence may suddenly seem far less signifi-
cant than the detail that is relegated to a relative clause, if, as some-
times happens, that detail links with something else to suggest a 
revision in the reader's understanding of what is happening. The 
best example of this is, once more, the introduction of Heloise late 
in Michael Kohlhaas; the grammatically major parts of the sentences 
concerned are far less important than the information squeezed into 
subordinated clauses or even more grammatically tenuous apposi-
tional elements. These overloaded sentences not only retard the ac-
tion through their cumbersome grammatical structure-they return 
us to earlier episodes of the story to think again in the light of detail 
now emerging; and just as this detail complicates them grammatically 
in almost unbearable fashion, it complicates the whole understanding 
of the story even more. This kind of sentence structure, then, gives a 
perfect image of how a seemingly clear plot outline can be eaten away 
and destroyed through complicating factors that finally cause its col-
lapse. The tension of the style per se is not the point-though it does 
of course strike the reader as such; the point lies in the tension within 
the sentence between the gross surface of events and the details that 
may eventually compel us to see a fundamentally different shape in 
those events. 
One last aspect of Kleist's narrative style relevant to this view of 
Kleist's purposes is the question of his narrator. Kayser observed, 
with an accuracy and subtlety of formulation that has utterly defeated 
most subsequent critics who have discussed his view, that the evalua-
tions of Kleist's narrator are "oft aus der Perspektive einer Gestalt 
und immer unter dem Eindruck der jeweiligen Situation .... Er be-
sitzt keine Uberlegenheit iiber die Figuren .... Er iiberschaut nicht 
einmal das Ganze des Geschehens; seine Voraussagen sind nur par-
tiell, und seine Wertungen ... gelten fast immer der jeweiligen Si-
tuation."16 Many scholars have assumed Kayser to be saying that 
Kleist had no interest in evaluation, but that is of course a bad mis-
reading, only possible because they did not see the point of Kayser's 
distinguishing narrator and author. My investigation of the stories 
confirms Kayser's observations; the narrator does indeed evaluate 
from the standpoint of a particular point in the narrative and often-
not always-from the point of view of a given character. Most impor-
tantly, there is no sense of his being a figure who knows the right 
attitudes to the events and characters of these stories, so that his 
evaluations always have built into them a limited perspective. His 
taking Piachi' s perspective in Der Findling, for example, must not lead 
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us to see that as an authoritative judgment in Piachi's favor. Kayser's 
brief article does not go on to discuss the point of this use of the 
narrator; but it appears to me that by using a narrator whose under-
standing of the situation is limited, yet who is always raising the issue 
of understanding it, Kleist pushes the issue of interpreting the mean-
ing of the events into the forefront of our attention. The narrator 
himself continually attempts to come to terms with the meaning of 
the story, in the process making mistakes and then trying again. Like 
the reader, the narrator learns as the story progresses, and he tells the 
facts of the events as if they were as inscrutable to him as to anyone 
else. In this tension between the narrator's desire to see coherence in 
the story and his wish merely to relate what actually happened, let-
ting this speak for itself, lies the most characteristic quality of Kleist' s 
narration. Sometimes one pole predominates, sometimes the other, 
and this must be why some interpreters of the stories have seen in 
them above all gripping realistic narratives,17 while others have ex-
perienced them as symbolic or moral tales. 
Kleist's works are about the process of trying to come to terms with 
the world; and in his stories his narrator is, in a sense, always the 
central figure, the one who tries continually to think and rethink 
what he sees. The situations he chooses and the people who live in 
them are various, 18 but what always remains, whether we are dealing 
with the plays or the stories, is a focus on the fact that those situations 
can be grasped in various competing ways, and that understanding 
any aspect of them can be complicated by many different levels of 
judgment. Time and again, what seems obvious at one level can be 
seen in a way that is diametrically opposite when we respond to all of 
the subtleties of the text. 
VIII 
The Character of Kleist Criticism 
Criticism of Kleist is by now voluminous and increasing ever more 
rapidly. That being the case, it might be expected that anyone writing 
yet another study of Kleist would feel somewhat apologetic and even 
defensive about adding to this enormous amount of material. At the 
very least, an explanation is needed of why another study is thought 
to be necessary. This chapter will provide the necessary explanation, 
though that is not its main purpose; my intent here is to diagnose 
what I think to be a central weakness in virtually all studies of Kleist. 
To do so is not simply to carp at other critics but instead to attempt to 
explain how and why Kleist criticism has largely missed the essence 
of his work. In a sense that I shall explain shortly, Kleist's critics have 
fostered a view of him that stands diametrically opposed to what he 
tried to do in his writing. This is most obviously true, moreover, of 
the best-known and most influential studies of Kleist-the general 
books on his life and work, more prestigious and visible than the 
more delimited articles found in journals. This discussion is a neces-
sary addition to that of the previous chapter, and it will provide 
further perspective on what I have tried to do by contrasting it with a 
prevailing alternative that I have sought to avoid. The distinctive 
character of my own view of Kleist and the reasons for it will become 
clearer against this background. And in the case of an author such as 
Kleist, who makes the process of interpretation so central to his work, 
there is a peculiarly instructive quality about the basic interpretative 
mistake that is, if I am correct, a feature of Kleist criticism generally. A 
last, but still very important reason for the inclusion of this discussion 
is that it has a strong bearing on the shape and structure of this book; 
the central error of Kleist criticism that I shall be discussing is, as we 
shall see, a likely consequence of the kind of organization that I ar-
gued against in my introductory chapter. That theoretical argument 
is, then, supported by the demonstration in this chapter of an impor-
tant practical consequence of the more familiar kind of procedure 
generally used in critical studies of this and other authors. I can 
best begin this discussion by recapitulating a part of that theoretical 
argument. 
I argued in my introduction that it was preferable to give close at-
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tention to a moderately small number of important works rather than 
to try to cover Kleist's whole output-first, because considerations of 
space make it impossible to discuss everything if superficiality is to be 
avoided; and second, because the quality of a critical discussion soon 
degenerates once there is a sense that everything has to be covered. If 
a critic begins to say things because he feels that he must say at least 
something about everything, rather than because he has something 
in each case that he wants to say, he will soon lose a sense of what is 
important and what is not and then begin to judge the usefulness of 
his statements by progressively lower standards. But the most injuri-
ous consequence of this procedure is that it results in an attempt to 
facilitate finding something to say about everything by adopting a 
theme or feature to trace through each work, pronouncing it espe-
cially Kleistian, identifying it in every text, and passing on to the next 
to do the same again. This procedure leads to a minimizing of any 
differences between individual works, and that too reinforces the 
superficial quality of the resulting criticism, as each work is reduced 
to something easily manageable. Placing a general discussion of Kleist 
before the discussion of individual works is similarly problematic, 
since it tends to limit the meaning of the individual texts to the issues 
set out in the general discussion. I decided to reverse the more usual 
order and to let my general discussion of the character of Kleist' s 
work grow out of the results of some detailed discussions of a limited 
number of individual works. 
This argument in its most general form is not restricted to the case 
of Kleist, but there are reasons to think it especially important in his 
case. Abstracting motifs and ideas from their context in individual 
works is, as we have seen, a more than usually dangerous procedure 
in Kleist criticism since his works demand a close attention to their 
twists and turns. The very notion of a context is more complicated in 
works that continually change direction, and in which an idea can 
seem to have positive value on one page but be revalued later on. It is 
fruitless for the critic to try to trace a motif through all Kleist's works 
as if the motif had a constant value, because the complete context of a 
whole text rarely allows the abstraction of an idea that has any un-
ambiguous value even in one of Kleist' s works. 
This has, however, been the standard procedure of Kleist critics, 
and it is the most serious flaw in Kleist criticism. It has been common 
to give a fixed value throughout his work to particular notions such as 
trust, error, or feeling. This is not simply mistaken criticism but is in a 
way a recoil from Kleist's characteristic demand on his readers; for 
Kleist demands that the reader remain flexible and move with the 
texts' changes of direction, while his critics have generally responded 
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to this disturbing openness only by taking refuge from it in fixed, 
rigid positions. 1 Thus Kleist's meaning is reversed. He sets his read-
ers a challenge-to deal with a constantly developing situation-
and to grasp for firm orientation points from which each text can be 
judged is to fail that challenge. 
Here we find the reason for the sometimes extraordinary degree of 
disagreement among Kleist scholars as to the meaning of a particular 
work-especially Prinz Friedrich von Homburg and Das Erdbeben in Chili. 
The reduction of these complex works to the same simple messages, 
attitudes or ideologies, or to any other kinds of unambiguous asser-
tions, can only be a very arbitrary procedure; one critic chooses one 
facet of the text as the key to interpretation while another chooses 
something else. Sometimes a particular reduction of the text is more 
tempting than others (the case, say, of the "education" theory in Prinz 
Friedrich von Homburg), and that may produce at least a majority view-
point. In other cases, such as Das Erdbeben in Chili, the possibilities for 
reduction to a fixed viewpoint are so various that there is no majority 
tendency among critics. The texts clearly entertain (without finally 
allowing) various possible attitudes to and interpretations of them, 
and the great disagreement among critics on certain texts is simply 
due to the fact that individual critics seize on one or other possibility 
and on the particular limited context of the text that gives that pos-
sible interpretation its most tempting form; they then rigidify it to 
make of it the interpretation of the text. The subsequent arguments 
with others who have picked a different suggested interpretation 
always miss the point; while the critics argue over who has the better 
case, they do not see that the story is about that argument, not about 
the particular interpretation that they are trying to make the victor in 
the argument. Not all of Kleist's works have provoked this kind of 
controversy; Der Findling has not, for example. But this is because 
Kleist often makes one plausible explanation so explicit that it seems 
to offer the critic an unusually easy resting place. Here, to see only 
Piachi's altruism and Nicola's depravity is an especially tempting way 
of avoiding the disturbing complications of the text. 
So far, I have spoken in only very general terms of Kleist criticism; 
let me now turn to some examples to show what actually happens in 
typical instances. The first is a recent and relatively simple example of 
what I have been describing: Elmar Hoffmeister's Tiiuschung und Wirk-
lichkeit bei Heinrich von Kleist. This title confirms a commitment to the 
prevailing manner of Kleist criticism, for it is clearly analogous to 
Friedrich Koch's Bewuf3tsein und Wirklichkeit and Walter Muller-Seidel's 
Versehen und Erkennen, to take only two examples. The double-barreled 
thematic title, incidentally, is a fad that seems to have originated with 
146 Heinrich von Kleist 
Gerhard Fricke's Gefiihl und Schicksal bei Heinrich van Kleist; it appears 
to have carried over into journal articles (as in Hans-Peter Herrmann's 
"Zufall und Ich") and to works in English (as in John Gearey's Tragedy 
and Anxiety), and it is still as strong as ever-a new title is Hermann 
Reske's Traum und Wirklichkeit. 2 
What can be seen immediately in these titles (apart from a certain 
repetitiveness, for all tend to cover ground that is at least partly 
covered in the others) is a prevailing habit of abstracting a motif and 
tracing it throughout Kleist's work. Elmar Hoffmeister's case is typi-
cal: he goes through the texts one by one to show deception in each of 
them. Piachi is deceived by Nicolo in Der Findling; the Prince is de-
ceived by his own dream in the Prinz van Homburg; the Marquise is 
deceived by events in Die Marquise van O ... ; and so on. His conclu-
sion, in general terms, can only be that there is much deception in 
Kleist. Two things can be said about such a book and about all the 
other examples of the genre. First, the general conclusion about Kleist 
is a very uninteresting one, and in that sense at least the idea of the 
book is unproductive. And second, this journey through the works 
with a fixed idea produces no interpretative insights into the indi-
vidual texts. To take the former point first: one might look at Shake-
speare's best-known plays and say that there is much deception in 
them. Iago deceives Othello, Lear is deceived by his daughters, Mac-
beth is deceived by the witches, and so on. None of this is very 
unique or interesting: there is no obvious value in taking very general 
and unremarkable ideas out of context simply to list their occurrence. 
There is deception in Kleist, in Shakespeare, in Goethe, and in every-
day life: by itself, the notion is not startling. Some interest might be 
generated if the discussion could get at a specifically Kleistian use of 
the notion. But that would lead to a thorough interpretation of each 
text, with attention to the place of deception within the thematic 
structure of each text, and it is just such a procedure that books like 
Hoffmeister's seem designed to avoid: going through all the texts 
with a simple idea as an orientation point for each is not merely coin-
cidentally a procedure that does not involve serious thought about 
each text. Hoffmeister' s interpretative comments-and those of all 
such books-are in fact rarely new or original, and they generally 
follow well-known surface readings. A good example is his view of 
Der Findling. Hoffmeister simply assimilates it to his framework by 
identifying Nicolo as a deceiver in a section entitled "Der Betrug des 
Verfiihrers Nicolo in der Novelle Der Findling" ;3 that very formulation 
makes it clear that the interpretation offered is the superficial one that 
is well known from other general books of criticism. Evidently, this 
kind of work will have no impact on our understanding of the texts. 4 
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Hoffmeister's book is recent and not yet widely known. To show 
just how typical its failings are, I want now to turn to two cases that 
are superficially very different: Hans Matthias Wolff's book Heinrich 
van Kleist als politischer Dichter, and an article by Manfred Durzak, 
"Zur utopischen Funktion des Kindesbildes in Kleists Erzahlungen."5 
Wolff's book is a well-known, somewhat older general treatment of 
Kleist; Durzak's is a recent article which focuses narrowly on a par-
ticular mutif. 
Wolff's work is dominated by a political idea: the relation of indi-
vidual to state in Kleist's work. His thesis is that Kleist first felt that 
the individual was more important but later came to feel that the 
reverse was the case. Wolff goes through all the works and discusses 
them in this light. Just as in Hoffmeister's case, it will readily be seen 
that the general idea that forms the framework of the study is a fairly 
simple one that lacks intrinsic interest as it stands. Indeed, it is only 
fair to say that the idea as presented and discussed does not achieve 
the level of interest and complexity that one would expect from an 
introductory course in political science, and a reader ignorant of Kleist 
could surely be forgiven for concluding that Kleist was a dull and 
unsubtle writer if that was what his work was about. Once more, the 
level of interpretative comment on the individual texts which is al-
lowed by mechanical "coverage" with the aid of such an idea is very 
low. In Der zerbrochne Krug, for example, Wolff's main idea is that 
Adam is "nicht allein Mensch, sondern Richter, d.h. Beamter, und aus 
dieser seiner Stellung als Beamter ergibt sich die gesamte Problematik 
des Werkes ... er ist der Beamte, der seine Gewalt miBbraucht."6 
Here we can see only too clearly the way in which the pursuit of a 
general notion gets out of hand: that Adam is a state official-a trivial 
enough point-is suddenly the basis of "die gesamte Problematik des 
Werkes." It is easy enough to see (for example, in his very name) that 
Adam's being a human being is a rather larger issue than that of his 
being a bureaucrat. The discussion of Kohlhaas is in similar vein: 
according to Wolff, his troubles stem from his mistreatment by offi-
cials of the state. Together with Der zerbrochne Krug, then, Michael 
Kohlhaas shows how Kleist is for the individual and against the state 
at this stage. In Prinz Friedrich van Homburg, on the other hand, the 
Prince learns to accept the state, which means that Kleist himself now 
values the authority of the state over the individual. This all involves 
a sadly uninteresting view of all the works, and an avoidance of the 
really interesting issues of Kleist's texts; and in the process, no inter-
pretative remark about the texts is made that is of any originality. 
Wolff's view of Prinz Friedrich van Homburg is simply the very familiar 
"education" theory; his view of Michael Kohlhaas is simply that there 
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is injustice to Kohlhaas; and so on. Ironically, where Michael Kohlhaas 
questions whether it is possible to use abstractions like "the State" (a 
lofty abstraction that falls to pieces during the story), Wolff goes on 
using it regardless of what the story does to it. A determination to 
trace a general idea throughout all the works evidently makes this 
critic deaf to what any particular text is saying and to what it actually 
does with that idea. Wolff does not notice that one of the things that 
Michael Kohlhaas does is precisely to question the value of any analysis 
in the terms that he uses to examine Kleist's work; the notion of the 
individual versus the state evaporates in this story. 
Durzak' s analysis concerns the figure of the child in Kleist' s work. 
He too traces this motif through several texts, assigning to it a fixed 
value-a positive one-each time it appears. This means that he 
motivates critical events in any story simply in terms of Kleist' s be-
lief that children represent "reine Natur" regardless of what the con-
text of the particular work demands. So, for example, he thinks the 
reconciliation of the Marquise and the Count is possible because of 
the child, who "reprasentiert reine Natur"; that Kohlhaas's sons are 
knighted so that "die Katastrophe in einem utopischen Kindesbild 
aufgehoben wird"; and that the ending of Das Erdbeben in Chili, too, is 
optimistic because of the survival of the child. 7 None of this can be 
justified by the emphases of the context of the work. In each case, 
the critic substitutes what concerns him (the theme he is following 
through each text) for what concerns the work. In the Marquise van 
0 . . . it is surely obvious that we must look to the whole history 
of what has gone on between Marquise and Count and see the end-
ing as a result of all that; how could Kleist really motivate his story 
otherwise without seeming utterly arbitrary? In Michael Kohlhaas, the 
knighting of Kohlhaas' s sons is surely part of the pattern contrasting 
the flourishing of his name and that of the house of Brandenburg 
with the future demise of Saxony's; there is again no trace of any 
emphasis on childish innocence in what happens. And in the Erdbeben 
in Chili, especially, the delicate balance of the ending is disturbed by 
the unambiguous assertion that the child represents a utopian solu-
tion. In this last case, to preserve his thesis, Durzak has to rewrite 
Kleist's crucial final sentence and see in Don Fernando's final state-
ment "diese von Schmerz beschattete Freude." Kleist's own language 
is of course more guarded and much more interesting-its emphases 
are far removed from those of Durzak's theme. In commenting on the 
quality of this criticism it is not my purpose to find fault with any 
particular critic; my point is to stress that these are the inevitable 
results of a procedure in Kleist criticism that is very widespread. 8 
Criticism that seizes on a general idea and sets out to use it on all the 
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texts, whether in the form of avowedly limited articles like Durzak's, 
or general works that take a specific view of Kleist and his work like 
Hoffmeister's and Wolff's, will of necessity only produce results that 
reduce and distort the meaning of that work. 
So far, the flaw that I have diagnosed seems simple enough, and 
the question may arise: if it really is that simple, why is it not more 
obvious, and why have not more critics seen and overcome it? The 
answer to this question appears to me to lie in a feature of Kleist 
criticism that tends to conceal the true character of the situation. As 
if sensing that the basic content of their arguments is excessively 
simple, many Kleist critics elaborate it and restate it in ever more 
complex terminology. Hoffmeister, again, is a representative example: 
"Bei den Gestalten, die in guter oder boswilliger Absicht Irrtum stif-
teten, wurde schon deutlich, dais sie meist in einem unzulanglichen, 
verfehlten Verhaltnis zur Realitat als gegenstandlicher und gesell-
schaftlicher Wirklichkeit standen."9 The impressive terminology tends 
to cast a spell on the reader, but it can be broken by determined 
reflection. Is to "stand in an insufficient relationship to reality as 
objective and social fact" really more than "to be in error"? Hoff-
meister's verbal elaboration masks a thought so simple as to be hardly 
worth stating: "People spread mistakes because they themselves have 
made them." Hoffmeister's terminology is superficially impressive, 
and it may seem to lend his criticism some plausibility, but it really 
serves only to disguise that what he is saying is not remarkable. 
Another means of infusing an appearance of complexity into what is 
in reality very simple lies in the elaboration of distinctions that have 
no real point to them; for example, "Irrefiihrung in guter Absicht" is 
distinguished by Hoffmeister from "Irrefiihrung in schlechter Ab-
sicht," without his explaining why anything is gained from doing so. 
Categories must surely be justified as useful and pertinent ones if 
they are to contribute anything to an understanding of Kleist. 
The technique of creating a verbal complexity in the critic's own 
language to compensate for a lack of substance is by no means new, 
nor is Hoffmeister' s case an extreme one. It was already very notice-
able in the work of Friedrich Braig (1925), for example. When discuss-
ing Kleist's literary works, Braig would generally give a plot summary 
which was interspersed with a few comments such as: "Hier kampfte 
der Dichter um Sein oder Nichtsein," or "Hier hat sich Kleist bis in 
die letzten Tiefen der Menschenseele hinabgebohrt."10 These remarks 
are virtually without content as far as interpreting or characterizing 
the text goes, and they represent an attempt to make the critic's 
statements seem interesting and impressive when he has in fact no 
real point to make. 
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Another case has already been touched upon in the preceding chap-
ter: Herrmann's study elaborates the notion of chance events in Kleist 
mainly by adding linguistic complexity to an obvious thought, which 
is that many chance events in Kleist demand a response from those 
who experience them. But it is just as true of daily life anywhere, at 
any time, that chance events often compel a response to them; and 
since that is so, it cannot be very interesting to say that such is also 
the case in Kleist's world. Nothing is said here that is characteristic of 
Kleist. 11 A good test in such cases is to see whether the study con-
cerned involves or leads to interpretative comments that differ in any 
way from those that are standard in other general studies of Kleist. In 
Herrmann's study, none such is found-linguistic complexity super-
imposed on the obvious is all that is there. 
In some cases, the recourse to verbal complexity is recognizably a 
recoil from dealing with the problems of Kleist's texts. Max Kom-
merell's study is a case in point. Kommerell does indeed respond to 
the problematic nature of Kleist's texts, but he misplaces the source of 
this feature by locating it in the characters: "Kleists Personen sind 
Ratsel."12 Since we can say equally that Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello, 
and most other literary figures are "Ratsel," it is clear that Kommerell 
has not put his finger on the specifically Kleistian problematic charac-
ter of these texts. This bad start prevents further progress, and Kom-
merell then shifts to endless playing on the compounds of "Ratsel": 
"ratselhaft," "Verratselung," "Entratselung," without thereby adding 
anything to the interpretation of the texts. In Der Findling, for ex-
ample, he finds Nicolo "ruchlos," just as most others do;13 and his 
judgments are similarly unremarkable in other works. His discussion 
soon abandons any attempt to go beyond very well-known interpre-
tative views to concentrate on developing its own linguistic texture 
per se; and a consequence of his concern with elaborating his own 
verbal system rather than looking at what Kleist wrote is that he 
begins to make serious factual errors in referring to Kleist' s texts-an 
instructive example of where this kind of criticism is likely to lead. Let 
me give one example: Kommerell's discussion of Der Findling is es-
sentially a plot summary using his special vocabulary ("ratselhaft," 
etc.), but during this he refers to Colino as the man who rescued 
Elvire from a fire and died of wounds received doing so "'nach we-
nigen Tagen, wahrend derer sie ihn nicht verlieis." This is not only a 
bad factual error but a central one: a critic who wishes to come to 
terms with what is happening in this text, and what Elvire represents 
in it, could not possibly fail to be deeply impressed with her having 
spent three years (not a few days) constantly at the bedside of the 
dying Colina! 
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The examples I have discussed so far are typical of the field; quite 
how typical they are can be judged from the fact that all of the funda-
mental criticisms I have made of them can be made with equal justice 
of the work that is currently the best-known and most-quoted book 
on Kleist, Walter Muller-Seidel's Versehen und Erkennen .14 As his title 
suggests, Muller-Seidel's work is concerned with the abstraction of a 
motif from Kleist's texts: Kleist's characters first commit a "Versehen" 
and then experience "Erkennen." The notion that the characters first 
make mistakes and then see them is, here too, not by itself very 
promising; moreover, it derives in any case from earlier writers such 
as Kommerell and Koch. Elaboration is again the answer to this prob-
lem of lack of originality or inherent interest in his thesis, and Muller-
Seidel pursues it by categorizing various kinds of "Versehen" and 
"Erkennen." One section of his treatise, for example, is on "Sinnen-
glaubigkeit" as a subspecies of "Versehen," and he discusses as an 
important Kleistian problem "das Vertrauen in die Verla.Blichkeit der 
fiinf Sinne, das zur Ursache immer neuer Verkennungen wird. Es 
handelt sich um eine Art von Sinnenglaubigkeit, der manche Figuren 
schlechterdings verfallen."15 This is either trite, or wrong. It is trite if 
it refers to people in general, wrong if it refers to Kleist' s characters in 
particular. It is of course not a failing of Kleist' s characters but a 
universal human habit to believe the evidence of the senses. No one 
put in the position of the Marquise or Alkmene would be other than 
baffled by what happens. The real issue is the misleading nature 
of what those characters see; they do not hallucinate, they merely 
draw normal conclusions from what they see, as anyone else would. 
Muller-Seidel has managed to make much ado about nothing. An-
other example of the same procedure can be seen when he begins to 
categorize and subsection the concept "Erkennen." Here there is first 
a linguistically complex title: "Die Enthullung des ratselhaft-wider-
spruchsvollen Sachverhalts und die Formen des Erkennens."16 He 
then proceeds to tell his reader that one of the forms of "das Erken-
nen" is "dadurch, dais die beteiligten Figuren den verratselten Sach-
verhalt durchschauen." This could have been said more simply: one 
way out of a mistake is to see one's mistake. Once the polysyllabic 
terminology is cut through, only utter triviality remains. The function 
of the complex terminology is surely to disguise this fact. 
Interestingly, Muller-Seidel makes the same kind of factual errors 
as does Kommerell when he refers to Kleist's text. For example, 
Muller-Seidel refers to Colino as "den geheimen Liebhaber dieser in 
einer Scheinehe lebenden Frau."17 To be sure, the memory of Colino 
is Elvire's secret obsession; but he is not and never was her secret 
lover. Colino never knew Elvire until he rescued her from the fire, in 
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the process receiving wounds from which he died; and his death 
preceded her marriage. Again, this kind of example seems to confirm 
that criticism that strains to elaborate a simple idea, and therefore has 
all of its attention directed to the cultivation of its own texture, has 
very little time and energy left to give to what Kleist actually wrote. 
Muller-Seidel's interpretative judgments point to this conclusion just 
as surely as his inability to refer accurately to Kleist's text points to it, 
for those judgments are never innovative; they are in fact the reverse, 
always those most commonly found in previous critics. Take, for 
example, his view of Prinz Friedrich van Homburg. Muller-Seidel fits 
this into the general framework of his book by stressing that the 
Prince's seeing his mistake is the "Voraussetzung der Gnade und 
damit des untragischen Ausgangs." 18 Here the error motif is tacked 
onto a standard view of the Prince, and of the play, but in doing this 
Muller-Seidel simply evades all of the really important interpretative 
issues of the text. It was possible to raise questions here such as 
whether the Prince really does see his mistake, how he conceives of 
it, whether the ending is really positive and untragic, whether the 
Prince's mistake is the main issue in the play at all, and so on. This 
kind of criticism seems not designed to confront the complexity of 
Kleist's texts but instead to add linguistic complexity to rather routine 
views of them. To focus on the notion of error and trace it throughout 
Kleist's work is evidently an easy substitute for hard interpretative 
thought. 
Because of the prestige enjoyed by Muller-Seidel's work, I have 
thought it worth-while to spend some time discussing his study as 
a representative example of Kleist criticism. I want now to turn to 
another very influential figure in Kleist criticism-Gerhard Fricke. 
Though his view of Kleist no longer enjoys the kind of universal 
acceptance once accorded it, Fricke did more than any other critic to 
create the conditions in which the criticism that I have described is 
able to flourish. For in Fricke's work, verbal elaboration is not simply 
a compensation for poverty of content, as in the case of Hoffmeister, 
Reusner, Muller-Seidel, and others; in his criticism the elaboration of 
a verbal system is an independent goal, and there is a delight in his 
own language that soon leaves behind any thesis about Kleist's texts. 
This might have made him irrelevant to Kleist criticism; instead, he 
was until recently the most influential of all Kleist critics, and he 
continues to exert influence through those who have absorbed a good 
deal of his manner, if not his doctrines. 
The relation of Fricke's criticism and its concerns to Kleist's texts 
can be seen clearly enough in just one example, his discussion of Die 
Marquise van O .... The following quotation is long, but Fricke's 
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characteristic quality is very much a matter of length: 
Wieder ist allein die Marquise, oder besser die in der innersten und eigensten 
Tiefe ihres Wesens erwachende, geheimnisvolle, unendliche Kraft ihres Selbst 
das verborgene Ziel der Darstellung. Hier aber geht die erreichte Li:isung 
zum ersten Male iiber die bisher erschienene Mi:iglichkeit hinaus, in der die 
siegende, unverwirrbare Gewilsheit des innersten Gefiihls diesen ihren Tri-
umph nur zu bewahren vermochte in der Preisgabe des zeitlichen Daseins, 
der gebrechlichen Endlichkeit, die die Herrlichkeit des vom Absoluten le-
benden Ich und des unbedingten Gefiihls nicht zu tragen vermochte .... 
Das Ich vermag hier kraft seiner unbegreiflichen Macht, kraft seiner Reinheit 
und Einheit mit sich selber und damit mit Gott,-das ratselhafte und ver-
nichtende Schicksal zu iiberwinden, ohne an dem Widerspruch zwischen 
der Wirklichkeit und der bewahrten Reinheit des Gefiihls zugrunde zu ge-
hen .... Diese Kraft ist <lurch irgendwelche psychologische Kategorien: des 
Trotzes, der Selbstbehauptung-gar nicht mehr zu umschreiben. Sie ist reli-
gii:isen Ursprungs. Sie stammt aus der unmittelbaren, absolut-konkreten und 
absolut-substantiellen Einheit des Ich mit dem ewigen Soll seiner Existenz, 
sie stammt aus der weltiiberwindenden Kraft des Gefiihls, das hier das credo 
quia absurdum gleichsam au£ einer neuen Stufe vollbringt. 19 
This is only a sample of a lengthy discussion of the Marquise's 
strength of mind, in which the emphases become more and more 
Fricke's and less and less Kleist's. By the end, Fricke is clearly talking 
about what he thinks gives people strength of character in real life, 
that is., religious belief. But that is nowhere to be found in Kleist's 
text. The elaboration of Fricke's own text has obviously substituted 
for any kind of concern with what Kleist wrote; he is absorbed in the 
subtleties and paradoxes that he himself creates and has no wish to 
submit himself to the discipline of the text and to allow his train of 
thought to be determined by its subtleties. 
All too often, then, verbal complexity compensates for a deficiency 
in real content in Kleist criticism; and that deficiency, in turn, has 
usually resulted from a desire to find a general idea with which to 
characterize all of his works, one by one, and from the misconcep-
tions about the nature of his writing that must inevitably result from 
so reductive a procedure. 
The basic ideas that have formed the framework of these studies 
have sometimes been derived from aspects of the texts themselves. 
This is the origin, for example, of "Gefiihl," "Zufall," "Vertrauen," as 
well as the many different versions of error and illusion ("Versehen," 
"Tauschung," "Traum," etc.). I have argued above that Kleist's texts 
are badly misread if these ideas are taken as fixed and absolute ones, 20 
as authors of general studies have done in order to find a theme to 
trace through all the texts, rather than as material that Kleist exploits 
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at one moment and drops at the next in the interests of his larger 
concerns. But the basic notions of many general studies do not have 
even this much legitimacy; they are not the result of a misreading of 
the way certain motifs function in the text but instead derive from 
sources outside the texts. Two main kinds of source can be seen: the 
first consists in biographical information, the second in the ideological 
and critical preoccupations of the particular critic. 
Kleist's biography is obviously a main source of the view that his 
work is above all violent and tragic, the mirror of a tormented, sick 
mind;21 critics who take this view certainly have his suicide promi-
nently in mind. But if they had looked only at the emphases of his 
writings, it would have been harder to reach this conclusion. Penthe-
silea, to be sure, might superficially invite such a description, but it is 
an exception among the major writings. If we look at Prinz Friedrich 
van Homburg, Der zerbrochne Krug, Michael Kohlhaas, Der Zweikampf, 
Die Marquise van O ... , and even Das Erdbeben in Chili, we find 
ambiguous rather than solidly pessimistic works. They do not really 
compare in this regard to such works as King Lear, Othello, or Hamlet, 
and there is not a single scene in them that projects such deep and 
total despair as Faust's in "Wald und Hohle." To be sure, there are 
some violent and tragic elements in them, but the overall framework 
within which these elements occur is not of that character. One has 
only to compare the typically ambiguous endings of Kleist's works, 
hovering as they do between positive and negative attitudes to what 
has occurred, with the black, claustrophobic helplessness of, say, 
some works of Hebbel or Chekhov to see that he is indeed a serious 
and thoughtful writer but not an unreservedly gloomy one. Kleist's 
works present human life as something that must be thought and 
rethought, interpreted and reinterpreted; it is very much contrary to 
the drift of the great majority of his works to say that they present a 
consistently negative attitude to life. 
A comparable biographically introduced notion is that Kleist's char-
acters are extremists, "grenzenlose Menschen." In fact, there are very 
few of Kleist's characters who, looked at in themselves, might tempt 
the critic to use such a phrase. Aside from Penthesilea, Michael Kohl-
haas is the only obvious other possibility, but to label him simply an 
extremist would be to misunderstand his position in the text, espe-
cially the way in which that position changes. Far from representing 
an ideal character for Kleist as an uncompromisingly self-reliant fig-
ure, 22 Michael Kohlhaas is a character whose stance is questioned by 
the late developments of the story. Kleist's characters are far too di-
verse to be reduced to a single type: Adam, the Count F., Alkmene, 
Prince Friedrich, Friedrich van Trota, Michael Kohlhaas, Don Fer-
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nando, Jeronimo, and Nicolo are all very different people, and their 
all being found in Kleist's work involves only one generalizable fact, 
which does not remove those differences: they are all characters who 
are not easy to judge, and the reader must be prepared to change his 
atittudes to them as new situations develop within each text. 
There is one area of Kleist's biography (or what is known of it) that 
has at least some points of contact with the most central aspects of his 
work. This is the so-called Kant-crisis, which occurred when he was a 
student; he was severely shaken to discover in Kant's philosophy that 
absolute truth cannot be found. But the use of this by Kleist's critics 
shows only too well how even relevant biographical material can 
distort and limit critical understanding. For critics who proceed from 
, the Kant-crisis and conclude from it that Kleist's works embody a 
despair of knowledge and truth have blinded themselves to the fact 
that Kleist in the next decade moved well beyond that simple begin-
ning and added a great deal to it. His writings are not reducible 
simply to an expression of that early mood. Far from merely showing 
despair, they show a considerable fascination with how situations 
and people can never be judged in one authoritative way (the "truth" 
about them) but are instead the subject of a developing understand-
ing that can involve several different viewpoints. This, then, is a case 
in which the biographical pointer does not actually lead the critic in 
the wrong direction; but the pointer is so rudimentary and undevel-
oped that for the critic simply to accept it and go no further, using it 
as a key to the texts and leaving them at that point, is finally just as 
bad as following a completely misleading biographical fact. Although 
that experience was obviously the earliest sign of the development of 
Kleist's characteristic concerns, a thorough look at the texts is neces-
sary to see that his best work has developed so far beyond that stage 
that to use it as an interpretative key would restrict and limit the dis-
cussion to the point that nothing would be seen of the characteristic 
quality of Kleist' s mature work. Despair of knowledge is a very simple 
and easily grasped notion with nothing distinctive or unusual in it; 
where Kleist went from that beginning, on the other hand, is some-
thing unique and valuable. 
A practical demonstration of the value of adducing the Kant-crisis 
can be seen in the nature of the interpretative comments of critics 
who have approached the texts from this standpoint; they are rarely 
different from the standard judgments commonly made by critics of 
all persuasions. 23 At best, the Kant-crisis points to a large, vague 
area within which we must think about Kleist's work; it does not 
substitute for thinking, and the results of such thinking will look 
very different indeed from the mere transformation of a fact of the 
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young Kleist's experience into an interpretative comment on his ma-
ture work. Even this, then, the most promising of biographical point-
ers, is eventually as misleading as it is unnecessary. A thorough look 
at any of the texts would lead to the more appropriate and useful 
notion of how a search for understanding is built into their structure; 
the primitive biographical pointer by itself has only led to still more 
studies of "error" and "deceit" as motifs in Kleist's work. 
The other biographical pointer that is followed with regularity in 
Kleist criticism is the essay Uber das Marionettentheater. Enough has 
been written on this essay and its relation to Kleist's work to allow a 
whole volume of studies to be collected and published together, 24 
and at least a nod in the direction of its importance for understanding 
Kleist seems to be obligatory in any general study. I have no wish 
(and no space) to discuss the essay in detail here; and it is unneces-
sary to do so. Only two points need be made. First, the whole under-
taking has on its face the appearance of being fundamentally another 
reductive search for an easy solution to the understanding of Kleist' s 
work, yet one more way of circumventing serious thought about the 
texts by seizing on a simple idea to trace through them all. Any easy 
external key to texts as different as Michael Kohlhaas, Prinz Friedrich 
van Homburg, and Das Erdbeben in Chili is impossible to imagine, what-
ever its source. Second, the impact of this approach on the interpre-
tation of the works is in practice very little. Take the example of 
Johannes Klein: he proclaims the importance of the Marionettentheater 
essay for an understanding of Kleist, but when it comes to a discus-
sion of the works, he gives his readers the same view of Der Findling, 
of Michael Kohlhaas, of Die Marquise van O ... , and so on, that can be 
found in the work of practically any other critic. 25 
The only other category of general ideas that has been made the 
basis of general studies of Kleist is that deriving not from Kleist or his 
work but from the ideological or critical preoccupations of the critic 
himself. These inevitably are very general notions that occur equally 
as the basis of hundreds of other studies of other authors. The real 
source of these ideas, then, is critical practice in general. Michael 
Moering, for example, writes on irony in Kleist;26 Hans Heinz Holz, 
on Kleist's work as springing "aus einem sprachphilosophischen Pro-
blem";27 Friedrich Braig introduces religious belief;28 and so on. But 
the studies that are numerically most important-and most currently 
in vogue-are those whose framework is Marxist. That a critic deter-
mined to see definite religious viewpoints in Kleist' s works will do so 
regardless of their meaning needs no further comment; and Moering' s 
work and that of Holz are not sufficiently substantial to merit discus-
sion. I shall therefore conclude this survey of the tradition of Kleist 
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criticism by looking at the place within it of the Marxists. 
Marxist criticism is currently very much in vogue. It has achieved 
some prominence within German literary criticism and has even 
gained some regard from those who are not adherents: they tend 
often to view it as at least the work of genuine intellectuals. But the 
truth appears to be, as we shall see, that it shares the worst habits 
of the bourgeois, old-fashioned critics on whom Marxists generally 
pour scorn. Moreover, since it also tends to resist whatever has been 
progressive in criticism over the last few decades, it is a highly con-
servative and even reactionary form of criticism. Let us look at some 
examples; it is almost obligatory to start with Georg Lukacs. 29 
Lukacs is concerned above all else with the political aspects of 
Kleist' s work. He sees in Der zerbrochne Krug "die Mifshandlung der 
Bauern <lurch die Obrigkeit"; Prinz Friedrich van Homburg is about a 
"Konflikt zwischen Individuum und Gesellschaft"; Michael Kohlhaas 
is about the mistreatment of a normal individual by a corrupt ruling 
class. 30 Lukacs is particularly eloquent on this last point: 
Das tragische Schicksal des Kohlhaas fiigt sich organisch in die Reihe der 
bedeutendsten Dichtungen der Neuzeit ein: in die Reihe jener Dichtungen, 
die die in der biirgerlichen Gesellschaft unkisbare Dialektik der Gerechtigkeit 
zum Vorwurf haben, in denen die unaufkisbare Widerspriichlichkeit der Le-
galitat der Klassengesellschaft gewaltig gestaltet zum Ausdruck kommt. Diese 
Tatsache: daB es fiir die Klassengesellschaft typisch ist, daB der einzelne 
entweder sich widerspruchslos der Ungerechtigkeit und Gesetzlosigkeit der 
herrschenden Klassen zu unterwerfen hat oder dazu gedrangt wird, in den 
Augen der Gesellschaft, ja, nach seinen eigenen moralischen Anschauungen 
zum Verbrecher zu werden .... Kleist gestaltet mit riicksichtsloser Energie 
die verbrecherische Roheit, die barbarisch schlaue Gaunerei der Junker dieser 
Zeit. Er zeigt, wie alle Behorden und Gerichte mit diesen Junkern verschwa-
gert sind und deren Verbrechen korrupt decken und unterstiitzen. Der Ge-
stalter Kleist hat sogar eine Ahnung von den Grenzen des ideologischen 
Anfiihrers dieser Zeit, von den Grenzen Luthers .... Zu bedauern ist nur, 
daB dieses Meisterwerk <lurch einige romantisch schrullenhafte Zutaten 
Kleis ts entstellt ist. 31 
Before coming to the question of what is specifically Marxist here, 
we are first struck by the fact that these are the same kinds of judg-
ments found in the writings of the stuffiest, most conservative bour-
geois critics: they are almost identical with the views of Hans Matthias 
Wolff, for example, and exhibit all the drawbacks of this kind of 
criticism. Wolff too saw in Der zerbrochne Krug essentially no more 
than a corrupt state official oppressing the people, in Prinz Friedrich 
van Homburg no more than the individual versus the state, and in 
Michael Kohlhaas a struggle of an individual against corrupt state offi-
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cials. Lukacs even makes the same kind of comment on the allegedly 
unnecessary and unfortunate addition of the "romantic" ending of 
Michael Kohlhaas. The same very basic criticisms apply to both Wolff 
and Lukacs, therefore, and the fact that they are equally valid for both 
shows that they need not involve any kind of hostility to Marxism as 
a philosophy. Wolff and Lukacs both read these texts in the same 
superficial manner, reducing the content to an idea that obsesses 
them; but which is only a small part of the material of the text. Both 
lift elements of the text out of context and consequently destroy its 
thematic structure; both are deaf to anything in the text that is not 
connected with their very simple idea. And in both, a symptom of 
their reductive attitudes is the need to reject the end of the text as 
an unfortunate addition for which they can find no reason. Luka.cs's 
Marxist reading is in fact just like any other reductive, superficial 
misreading caused by the critic's obsession with a simple idea instead 
of trying to understand more of the text; it is no different from typical 
bourgeois criticism. 
There are, however, further reservations that are more specifically 
relevant to Marxism itself. For example, Lukacs clearly cannot con-
ceive of a historical subject being used for a thematic purpose; his 
comments on Luther show that he thinks Kleist's purpose was simply 
to give an accurate historical portrayal. Where even Wolff thought of 
the text in terms of a thematic idea, however simple, Lukacs thinks 
of Michael Kohlhaas in terms of its accuracy as a portrayal of the rul-
ing class of a historical period-a reduction that goes even beyond 
Wolff's. And Lukacs's praising this as a literary masterpiece because 
it is historically accurate from a Marxist viewpoint is, of course, an 
indicator of how very seriously he means that reduction: there is, 
apparently, nothing more that literature could be, or be about, than 
just that. 
There is a great irony involved in Luka.cs's view of Kohlhaas, one 
that shows only too well its weakness. Lukacs praises Kleist's por-
trayal of the oppression of Kohlhaas by the ruling class, but it is 
precisely the insufficiency of this kind of thinking that is an important 
theme in the story. Michael Kohlhaas is a story that questions whether 
such abstractions as "the state" or "the government" are usable; its 
final scenes see all political abstractions and any notion of a political 
"system" crumble as the reader at last recognizes that there exists 
only an incoherent, disorganized scene filled with individuals having 
no very clear ideas of what they are doing. The early part of the story 
seems to allow an impression of a coherent class that opposes Kohl-
haas in a consistent, disciplined way to preserve its interests as a 
class, and that is how Lukacs speaks of the whole story; but the text 
Kleist Criticism 159 
as a whole is partly about the fact that this is an illusion that the indi-
vidual has. The exposure of the lack of reality in a certain kind of po-
litical thinking-such as that of Lukacs-is part of the very structure 
of the story; no wonder Lukacs could not read this text adequately! 
Lukacs' s watchword for literary texts is "Realism," but that is highly 
misleading. A term as broad as "reality" must concern the whole of 
human life, yet for him it concerns only a narrow segment of human 
experience-political circumstances. To be more correct, he looks for 
only one aspect of that, namely, the class situation. And as a conse-
quence of his exclusive concern with whether an author has shown 
the "reality" (i.e., the class situation) of any given historical moment, 
he cannot read anything as a thematic study dealing with human life 
in a way that goes beyond experience at a particular moment in his-
tory (or beyond a certain aspect of politics). Michael Kohlhaas is a 
study of how an individual is almost bound to try to think of any sys-
tem that confronts him as if it were another individual with its own 
outlook, attitude, and personality, even though this view is pointless 
and conceivably disastrous. To look instead in a literary work for a 
realistic picture of historical circumstances is to preclude any recep-
tivity to a thematic study that uses historical material for its own 
purposes; and to look only for a validation of one's political ideology 
in a literary work is to preclude the possibility that it has anything of 
its own to say. 
Some more recent Marxist critics have themselves criticized Lukacs, 
but they fail to provide any superior version of Marxist criticism that 
avoids his fundamental misconceptions. Manfred Lefevre, in a recent 
Forschungsbericht, written from a Marxist point of view, concedes that 
some of Luka.cs's judgments were indeed oversimple, and he takes 
the view that a more advanced Marxist criticism now exists in a series 
of recent writers. 32 But these differences between Lukacs and his 
successors are superficial only. What these newer Marxists quarrel 
with in Lukacs is mainly his summary judgment that Kleist was a 
"bornierter preufsischer Junker" into whose works reality intruded 
only "gegen seine Absichten," which nonetheless made him an im-
portant Realist. 33 But their concern is mainly that a somewhat more 
favorable judgment of Kleist be made from the same basic standpoint, 
not that the texts be read in a fundamentally different way. The newer 
writers of whom Lefevre speaks in fact proceed much as Lukacs did, 
and are guilty of much the same misreadings and simplifications that 
Lukacs himself made. 34 Ernst Fischer sees Kleist's works as being 
about "die Wechselwirkung des Einzelnen und der Gesellschaft," with 
the early stories showing Kleist' s negative attitude towards society 
but Prinz Friedrich von Homburg showing a final awareness of "gesell-
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schaftliche Notwendigkeit";35 Hans Mayer thinks Kleist's works em-
body Rousseauism and that Prinz Friedrich van Homburg is a final 
synthesis of "Staatsraison und Gefiihlskraft" ;36 Siegfried Streller too 
thinks the teachings of Rousseau, but also those of Adam Muller, 
are embodied in Kleist, and Lefevre makes it clear when discussing 
Streller that he shares Streller's view: "Mit Recht wird auch darauf 
hingewiesen, da8 die Staatsvorstellung in Michael Kohlhaas entschei-
dend von Rousseaus Naturrechtslehre bestimmt sei (S. 166 f.) .... 
Kohlhaas argumentiert in seiner Debatte mit Luther vom Standpunkt 
Rousseaus aus."37 Again, this is all utterly familiar: when Marxists 
look at the texts, they are most likely to repeat Wolff, and these are in 
fact all Wolff's judgments. The iconoclastic new viewpoint in practice 
rarely results in anything more than judgments borrowed from old-
fashioned bourgeois critics. Even the elementary mistake of think-
ing that whatever Kohlhaas argues must be Kleist's view is Wolff's; 
neither Wolff nor the Marxists are able to resist taking a piece of 
political "Stoff" out of the work's context while ignoring its use in the 
work. But neither is this all really very far from Lukacs. Ldevre makes 
much of the fact that the judgments of the more recent Marxists are 
more sophisticated than those of Lukacs. For example, where Lukacs 
thought Kleist a "Junker" who portrayed social realism (read: the 
injustice of the class system) in spite of himself, Mayer sees in him a 
bourgeois artist who saw the limitations of bourgeois reality, and 
Fischer conceives of him as "vor allem ein Rebell."38 But these differ-
ences are mostly a matter of different summary attitudes by Fischer 
and Mayer based on readings of the texts that in most important ways 
are similar: they share fully with Lukacs the tendency to read the 
texts without much regard for their own emphases and to pursue in 
them a simple political idea that distorts Kleist' s characteristic way of 
writing. 
The Marxist critics I have cited make a point of saying that they 
read Kleist's work in the historical context of his time, which in prac-
tice means the context of political history. There are well-known argu-
ments for and against that procedure, but they are not relevant here, 
for that is not what these critics really do, and it is not the source of 
their readings or of their misreadings of Kleist's texts. The proof of 
this assertion can be seen in their results, which, as readings, are no 
different from those of non-Marxist critics. What is really happening 
is that they are placing the results of their reading the texts in the 
historical context (or rather, whatever their ideological view of that 
context is); and everything depends on the quality of those readings, 
which, if inadequate, render the whole procedure useless at the out-
set. In fact, then, they are setting readings that are superficial and 
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distorted into a historical context, and that can never do anything to 
make the readings better. There is, in a way, no test here of the 
usefulness of a historical approach; this is in its essence standard 
superficial reductive academic criticism. Marxists brandish some new 
terminology-but then, their bourgeois counterparts make much use 
of that stratagem too-and they are full of righteous fervor. But they 
say very much the same things about the texts that other critics have 
said, and to just as little purpose. 39 
All in all, then, Marxism is seen to differ only slightly (if at all) from 
the tradition of Kleist criticism. 40 Basic to all branches, it seems, is the 
practice of using a simple general idea as a key to all the texts. The 
unadorned results of this practice by themselves would be uninterest-
ing indeed, and so they are usually overlaid with something that will 
conceal that fact, whether terminological elaboration, a political doc-
trine, or some other extraneous preoccupation of the actual critic. I 
have ended on a gloomy note, but the quality of Kleist criticism leaves 
no room for the enthusiasm that the quality of Kleist's extraordinarily 
interesting texts inspires. 
* * * 
The analysis of Kleist criticism that forms the main body of this 
chapter was written in 1976; it therefore describes the situation up to 
the end of 1975. As my study goes to the printer, following the usual 
delays of the editorial process, I can add some brief comment on 
significant and representative trends in work that has appeared dur-
ing 1976 and 1977. 
There are some hopeful signs in recent critical essays on individual 
works. While many such essays still tend to repeat the same inter-
pretative views that have long predominated in Kleist criticism, a 
growing number of critics seem to be questioning the received opin-
ion of the past and taking a more complex and subtle view of the 
texts. But as before, general studies of Kleist lag behind this interpre-
tative progress and seem to seek only new ways of organizing familiar 
interpretations within a simplified and reductive thematic framework. 
Die Marquise van O . . . presents a particularly striking case of im-
provement in recent criticism. In the first paragraphs of the interpre-
tation of Die Marquise van O ... included in this volume, I noted that 
the important and provocative scene of reconciliation between father 
and daughter was never mentioned in the critical literature on the 
story, and I argued that this was a measure of how much the tradi-
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tional cliches of Kleist criticism had distracted attention from what he 
wrote. Since I wrote this, no fewer than four studies of the story have 
appeared that take this scene to be central to the interpretation of the 
text: Hermann F. Weiss, "Precarious Idylls: The Relationship Between 
Father and Daughter in Heinrich von Kleist' s Die Marquise von O ... ," 
Modern Language Notes, 91 (1976), 538-42; Thomas Fries, "The Impos-
sible Object: The Feminine, the Narrative (Laclos' Liasons Dangereuses 
and Kleist's Marquise van O ... )," Modern Language Notes, 91 (1976), 
1296-326; Heinz Politzer, "Der Fall der Frau Marquise: Beobach-
tungen zu Kleists Die Marquise van O ... ," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 
fiir Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 51 (1977), 98-128; Erika 
Swales, "The Beleaguered Citadel: A Study of Kleist's Die Marquise 
van O ... ," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fiir Literaturwissenschaft und 
Geistesgeschichte, 51 (1977), 129-47. It is of course possible to have 
some reservations about these essays too. Mine would be, briefly, 
that Swales's treatment becomes rather rigidly concerned with the 
notion of order and Politzer's with the text's exemplifying Freudian 
concepts, while Weiss's short piece does little more than stress the 
importance of the role of the father, and Fries devotes far more time 
to Leclos than to Kleist in his comparative essay. None of the four 
quite sees how the reconciliation scene clashes with what has gone 
before it, stylistically and otherwise, and how it forces a rewriting of 
the assumptions on which the world of the Marquise and the story 
generally had seemed to be based. Even so, to see the importance of 
the reconciliation scene must and does lead to the question of the 
repressed emotions of the Kommandant, and to get this far is to be in 
an interpretative sphere well beyond that of all previous Kleist criti-
cism. It is an odd fact that the importance of this scene is so obvious 
to all four of the latest critics of the story {five, including myself), for 
all previous critics had overlooked it in order to pursue the elabora-
tion of concepts such as error or contradiction. This curious contrast 
is yet more proof of how such a style of criticism has led critics away 
from the problems and subtleties of Kleist' s texts to ones of their own 
making. 
Two examples of how general studies of Kleist still lag far behind 
critical essays on individual works are: Denys Dyer, The Stories of 
Kleist: A Critical Study {London, 1977), and Ilse Graham, Heinrich van 
Kleist. Word Into Flesh: A Poet's Quest for the Symbol (Berlin and New 
York, 1977). That Graham's book uses a formula all too familiar in 
Kleist criticsm can be seen immediately from the publicity statement 
in the publisher's catalogue: "She isolates a primitive model of ex-
perience as being paradigmatic of him, and traces its two principal 
variants through Kleist's dramatic and narrative work." As so often 
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before, it is Kleist's essay on the Marionettentheater which is made 
to yield this key to all that he wrote. Graham's book uses the stan-
dard model that I have described: a simple idea, traced throughout 
the works; interpretations of the texts that agree in most important 
outlines with those of previous Kleist critics; and compensatory ver-
bal elaboration-indeed this work is written in an unusually self-
indulgent style. 
Dyer's book certainly avoids pretentiousness, and it represents a 
serious attempt to introduce the general reader to the world of Kleist 
and Kleist criticism without striving for originality of interpretation. 
Unhappily, the standard views of Kleist criticism, when set out baldly 
and directly, look somewhat uninteresting; Dyer's book suffers as a 
result. The absence of any real interpretative involvement in the texts 
leads to inaccurate quotation, frequently in ways that are crucial to 
the meaning of a text. Not once, but twice (pp. 49 and 53), Dyer says 
that in Der Findling, Xaviera had been discarded by the Bishop before 
she seduced Nicolo; but this only happens many years later, right at 
the end of the story. The parallelism of both Nicolo and Xaviera being 
in subservient roles is lost here. The crucial phrase "zum Schauplatze 
seines vollen Gliickes" in Das Erdbeben in Chili is misquoted as "ihres 
vollen Gliickes" and, again, an enormously important interpretative 
point is missed (p. 22). 
The magnitude of the difference in subtlety between these two 
general books and the best recent critical essays on individual works 
emerges when the judgments made by Graham and Dyer on Die 
Marquise van O ... are contrasted with those of Fries, Weiss, Politzer 
and Swales. Dyer speaks obsessively of the "purity" of the Marquise 
(four times on p. 68 alone), and Graham in similar vein of her "serene 
acceptance" (p. 149). By contrast, the other four critics appear ac-
tually to be talking about human beings, not unreal black and white 
characters. 
Two articles that have appeared recently on Der Findling also de-
serve special mention. They too point forward to better things in 
Kleist criticism: Erna Moore, "Heinrich von Kleists 'Findling': Psy-
chologie des Verhangnisses," Colloquia Germanica, 8 (1974), 275-97; 
and Frank Ryder, "Kleist's Findling: Oedipus Manque?" Modern Lan-
guage Notes, 92 (1977), 509-24. (Moore's study, though dated 1974, 
actually appeared in 1976 because the journal was well behind sched-
ule.) Both Moore and Ryder deal with the real people of Kleist's story 
and not with the narrator's surface judgments or the one-dimensional 
cliche characters of previous Kleist critics. Ryder's essay is somewhat 
speculative, as he himself freely admits, but whether or not his specu-
lations are absolutely sound in each case, his results are thought-
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provoking and illuminating to the reader who wishes to progress 
beyond the superficial traditional view of the story. Moore, in the best 
single interpretative essay on Kleist of recent years, also goes well 
beyond that view. She warns that we should not allow the narrator's 
superficial moral judgments to deflect our attention from the actual 
events that he relates, following the viewpoint on this question de-
veloped in my published essay on Der Zweikampf, which she cites in 
her support. She also argues persuasively that Kleist's characters are 
not to be treated as pawns in a metaphysical chess-game but instead 
as people whose psychology and motivation are to be understood. 
Having begun in this way, she achieves what seems to me a far more 
satisfactory view of Elvire than any hitherto, and one that has many 
points of contact with the view I have developed in this volume. Dif-
ferences between my interpretation and Moore's arise where Piachi 
and, to a lesser extent, Nicolo are concerned. In my view she does not 
go far enough in rejecting the narrator's surface judgments and look-
ing at what the narrated events in themselves indicate. And on the 
more general question of the thematic basis of the story, our results 
are even more divergent. However, I find her essay most impressive. 
If the six interpretative essays that I have discussed are an omen for 
the future, then Kleist criticism would seem recently to have become 
more promising. On the other hand, this selective discussion has 
dealt only with the best recent essays; there is still much evidence 
that unproductive criticism, of the kind discussed in the main body of 
this chapter, will continue to appear. 
Notes 
Introduction 
1. Throughout the discussions of individual works in the first six chapters, numer-
ous examples of this critical error are provided in the notes. 
2. This point is elaborated in Chapter Eight, where many examples are discussed. 
I. Der Findling 
1. The edition used throughout this study in referring to Kleist' s text is Heinric;h van 
Kleist: Siimtliche Werke und Briefe, ed. Helmut Sembdner, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Munich, 1964). 
The stories are all in the second volume; in my text page references to the stories are to 
the pagination of that volume. References to the plays, which are contained in the first 
volume, are by line number. Separate studies of Der Findling have been few: Kurt 
Gunther, "'Der Findling' -Die friihste der Kleistschen Erzahlungen," Euphorion, 8 
(1909), Erganzungsheft, 119-53; Albert Heubi, Heinrich van Kleists Nave/le "Der Find-
ling," Diss. Zurich 1948; Hans Matthias Wolff, "Heinrich von Kleists 'Findling;" Uni-
versity of California Publications in Modern Philology, 36 (1952), 441-54; Josef Kunz, 
"Heinrich von Kleists Novelle 'Der Findling': Eine Interpretation," in Festschrift fiir 
Ludwig Wolff, ed. Werner Schroder (Neumiinster, 1962), pp. 337-55; Werner Hoffmeis-
ter, "Heinrich von Kleists 'Findling,'" Monatshefte, 58 (1966), 49-63. See also adden-
dum to Chapter Eight. 
2. Hoffmeister's essay, the best separate study of the story to date, must be men-
tioned as an exception to this generalization, as can be seen from the emphasis of his 
comments: "Piachi ist keineswegs ein weicher und gutglaubiger Narr. Wo die Situation 
es verlangt, kann er unmittelbar und kraftvoll handeln" ("Kleists 'Findling,'" p. 53). 
Otherwise, this general view is shared both by writers of the separate studies of the 
story and writers of more general works, whether on Kleist or on the Nave/le. Kunz, 
for example, says that even after seeing signs of trouble with Nicolo ahead, "noch ist 
der Alte in seiner Gutmiitigkeit und Harmlosigkeit nicht genug gewarnt" (p. 337), 
while Johannes Klein in his Geschichte der deutschen Nave/le van Goethe bis zur Gegenwart, 
4th ed. (Wiesbaden, 1960), p. 95, and Fritz Lockemann in his Gestalt und Wandlungen der 
deutschen Nave/le (Munich, 1957), p. 68, both see Nicolo as an unambiguously evil 
man-in Klein's words, a "Gestalt aus dem Chaos." 
3. E.g., Kunz, "Kleists 'Der Findling,'" p. 347; and John Gearey, Heinrich van Kleist: 
A Study in Tragedy and Anxiety (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 78: "Although this is an interest-
ing point to end with, what, we may ask again, has it to do with the story?" 
4. E.g., Wolff, "Kleists 'Findling,'" p. 444: "Die verbliiffende Aehnlichkeit Nicolos 
und Colinos ist ein heterogenes Element, das mit dem eigentlichen Thema der Erzah-
lung nichts zu tun hat." Klein, Geschichte der deutschen Nave/le, p. 95, echoes this 
thought and extends it to cover the general coherence of the whole story: "Die Schick-
salsverkniipfungen bleiben technisch, mit dem Reiz formaler Kunst, aber ohne Ge-
schlossenheit und Folgerichtigkeit." Hoffmeister, "Kleists 'Findling,'" pp. 49-50, 
argues convincingly against this kind of criticism of the story (i.e., diagnosis of incon-
sistencies and irrelevancies) on the part of a number of other critics. 
165 
166 Notes to Chapter I 
5. Wolfgang Kayser, "Kleist als Erzahler," German Life and Letters, NS 8 (1954-55), 22. 
6. Manfred Durzak includes some brief but relevant remarks on the relationship 
between husband and wife in his "Zur utopischen Funktion des Kindesbildes in Kleists 
Erzahlungen," Colloquia Germanica, 3 (1969), 126-29; e.g., "Piachis Ehe :mit Elvire stellt 
dariiber hinaus die Pervertierung einer echten menschlichen Beziehung dar" (p. 127). 
But instead of using this insight as a starting point for a reinterpretation of Der Findling, 
he uses it only as part of an attempt to show that the child is essentially a figure of 
innocence in Kleist's work. I discuss this general view in Chapter Eight. 
7. Most critics have accepted without question the judgment that Nicolo is a compul-
sive womanizer, without noting that the judgment finds no support in the evidence of 
the story (intense involvement with one woman for six years and an incipient equally 
intense involvement confined to only one other). Kunz, "Kleists 'Der Findling,'" p. 
342, for example, speaks of Nicolo's "hemmungslose Triebhaftigkeit geschlechtlicher 
Art"; and Gearey, Heinrich van Kleist, p. 77, writes of Nicolo's "moral depravity," 
which, he thinks, clearly "causes the destruction" in this story. 
8. Hoffmeister, "Kleists 'Findling,'" p. 56, notes the insufficiency of the marriage, 
asserting that "Elvire ... in keiner echten und erfiillten Gemeinschaft mit Piachi lebt,'' 
and comments also on the precariousness of Elvire's psyche, in which there is "ver-
drangter Eros und Schuldgefiihle ihrem Erretter Colino gegeniiber." 
9. Kunz, "Kleists 'Der Findling,'" p. 341, for example, says that the early description 
of Nicolo shows "Kalte und Gleichgiiltigkeit" and that his serious look is "fragwiirdig." 
10. Elmar Hoffmeister, Tiiuschung und Wirklichkeit bei Heinrich van Kleist (Bonn, 1968), 
p. 21, thinks that Piachi's violence at the end of the story occurs because he is "von der 
ansteckenden Krankheit des teuflischen Betrugs infiziert:' This is a very lame explana-
tion for an action that would be so out of character, given his general view of Piachi. 
11. Werner Hoffmeister, "Kleists 'Findling,'" p. 55, noticed this quality of the narra-
tor's evaluations of Nicolo: "Nicolos negative Eigenschaften, vom Erzahler fast formel-
haft verwendet ... " But he did not draw the conclusion from this quality that I have 
drawn. 
II. Die Marquise van O .. . 
1. Studies devoted specifically to Die Marquise van O ... are by John C. Blankenagel, 
"Heinrich von Kleist's Marquise von O ... ," Germanic Review, 6 (1931), 363-72; Walter 
Muller-Seidel, "Die Struktur des Widerspruchs in Kleists 'Marquise von O ... ,'" 
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 27 (1954), 497-
515; Siegfried Bokelmann, "Betrachtungen zur Satzgestaltung in Kleists Novelle 'Die 
Marquise von O ... ,'" Wirkendes Wort, 8 (1957-58), 84-89; A. Horodisch, "Eine unbe-
kannte Quelle zu Kleists 'Die Marquise von O ... ,'" Philobiblon, 7 (1963), 136-39; 
Michael Ossar, "Kleists's Das Erdbeben in Chili and Die Marquise van O ... ," Revue des 
Langues Vivantes, 34 (1968), 151-69; Donald H. Crosby, "Psychological Realism in the 
Works of Kleist: 'Penthesilea' and 'Die Marquise von O ... ,'" Literature and Psychology, 
19 (1969), 3-16; Walter H. Sokel, "Kleist's Marquise von O ... , Kierkegaard's Abra-
ham, and Musil's Tonka: Three Stages of the Absurd as the Touchstone of Faith," 
Wisconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature, 8 (1967), 505-16; also very recently, Dorrit 
Cohn, "Kleist's 'Marquise von O .. : : The Problem of Knowledge," Monatshefte, 67 
(1975), 129-44; and Gerhard Diinnhaupt, "Kleist's Marquise van O ... and its Literary 
Debt to Cervantes," Arcadia, 10 (1975), 147-57. See also addendum to Chapter Eight. 
2. Only Cohn's "Kleist's 'Marquise von O ... ,'" takes a more complex, because 
more interpreted, view of the Marquise. One aspect of her results-that the Marquise's 
repressed condition prior to the beginning of the story's events is an important part of 
its content-seems to me a valuable insight. I am more doubtful, however, about the 
way in which her interpretation of the story makes the problem of knowledge its most 
central issue. For example, Cohn argues that the Marquise's fainting is due to the fact 
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that "the Count elicits feelings in her, as she does in him, and that such feelings bring 
foreknowledge of the impending erotic happening .... Her flight into unconscious-
ness appears as an instant reaction to salvage the purity of consciousness in the mo-
ment of emerging eros" (p. 133). It does not seem to me at all plausible to suggest in 
this way that the Marquise faints so that the Count can rape her without her knowl-
edge. There is simply not enough reason either to set up so elaborate a theory of why 
the Marquise fainted or to question the fact that a terrifying experience and an unex-
pected escape from it are sufficient to result in a faint. Other readings (e.g., of "unwis-
sentliche Empfangnis" as immaculate rather than unconscious conception) also leave 
me unconvinced. But Cohn's essay is the best criticism of the story to date. I am 
inclined to think that only too determined a pursuit of a shaky thesis prevents her 
discussion of repression and the Marquise from getting to the fruitful ground of the 
scene between father and daughter, a scene to which that topic must lead, but which 
Cohn never mentions. 
3. Ernst von Reusner, Satz-Gestalt-Schicksal: Untersuchungen iiber die Struktur in der 
Dichtung Kleists (Berlin, 1961). E.g., p. 100: "Und wie kann sich eine Frau einem Mann 
vermahlen, der gegen sie handelte wie der Graf gegen die Marquise? ... Im wirk-
lichen Leben sind Kompromisse dieser Art notig .... Aber ein Dichtwerk ... steht 
unter anderen Gesetzen als die Wirklichkeit." The text obviously calls for a much 
greater level of imagination and insight into the complexities of a human relationship. 
4. Johannes Klein, Geschichte der deutschen NClVelle von Goethe bis zur Gegenwart, 4th 
ed. (Wiesbaden, 1960) pp. 86-87. 
5. Millier-Seidel, "Die Struktur des Widerspruchs," p. 510. 
6. Friedrich Braig, Heinrich von Kleist (Munich, 1925), p. 454. 
7. Ossar, "Kleist's Erdbeben," p. 167, observes that the scene in question contains 
"suggestions of incest"; and Crosby notes that it "betrays what one might call a pre-
Freudian realism, a flash of psychological insight which penetrates deep recesses of 
unconscious relationships between fathers and daughters" ("Psychological Realism in 
the Works of Kleist," p. 14). But in neither case does this insight affect the way in which 
the story is interpreted. 
8. It is an unsatisfying view of the story to dwell on the misfortune of the Marquise's 
fate, as if she were simply the victim of bad luck, without seeing some relation between 
her previous overprotected state and the subsequent violence with which she is torn 
from it. An extreme but not entirely untypical example is Gerhard Fricke: "Das lch 
vermag hier kraft seiner unbegreiflichen Macht, kraft seiner Reinheit und Einheit mit 
sich selber und damit mit Gott-das ratselhafte und vernichtende Schicksal zu iiber-
winden" (Gefiihl und Schicksal bei Heinrich von Kleist [Berlin, 1929), pp. 136-37). 
9. This is essentially Muller-Seidel's view of the outcome: the Marquise accepts the 
Count having now experienced in his contradictory behavior "das Ineinander des 
Gottlichen mit dem Gebrechlichen" ("Die Struktur des Widerspruchs," p. 511). 
III. Das Erdbeben in Chili 
1. A number of studies devoted specifically to this story have appeared: John C. 
Blankenagel, "Heinrich von Kleist: Das Erdbeben in Chili," Germanic Review, 8 (1933), 
30-39; Karl Otto Conrady, "Kleists 'Erdbeben in Chili': Ein Interpretationsversuch," 
Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift, NF 4 (1954), 185-95; Johannes Klein, "Kleists 
'Erdbeben in Chili,'" Der Deutschunterricht, 8, No. 3 (1956), 5-11; Walter Silz, "Das 
Erdbeben in Chili," Monatshefte, 53 (1961), 210-38, rpt. as a chapter of his Heinrich von 
Kleist: Studies in his Works and Literary Character (Philadelphia, 1961), pp. 13-27; Benno 
von Wiese, "Heinrich von Kleist: Das Erdbeben in Chili," Jahrbuch der deutschen Schiller-
Gesellschaft, 5 (1961), 102-17, rpt. as a chapter in his Die deutsche NClVelle von Goethe bis 
Kafka, II (Diisseldorf, 1962), 53-70; Rodolfo E. Modern, "Sobre El Terremoto en Chile, de 
Kleist,'' Torre, 10 (1962), 39, 151-55; Walter Gausewitz, "Kleist's 'Erdbeben,"' Monats-
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hefte, 55 (1963), 188-94; Joseph Kunz, "Die Gestaltung des tragischen Ceschehens in 
Kleists 'Erdbeben in Chili:" in Gratulatio: Festschrift fiir Christian Wegner, ed. Maria 
Honeit (Hamburg, 1963), pp. 145-70; Epifanio San Juan, Jr., "The Structure of Narra-
tive Fiction," Saint Louis Quarterly, 4 (1966), 485-502; Michael Ossar, "Kleist's Das 
Erdbeben in Chili and Die Marquise von O ... ," Revue des Langues Vivan/es, 34 (1968), 
151-69; A. Owen Aldridge, "The Background of Kleist's Das Erdbeben in Chili," Arcadia, 
4 (1969), 173-80; Wolfgang Wittkowski, "Skepsis, Noblesse, Ironie: Formen des Als-ob 
in Kleists Erdbeben," Euphorion, 63 (1969), 247-83; R. S. Lucas, "Studies in Kleist: II. 
'Das Erdbeben in Chili,'" Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fiir Literaturwissenschaft und Geistes-
geschichte, 44 (1970), 145-70; Richard L. Johnson, "Kleist's Erdbeben in Chili," Seminar: A 
Journal of Germanic Studies, 11 (1975), 33-45; Peter Horn, "Anarchie und Mobherrschaft 
in Kleists 'Erdbeben in Chili:" Acta Germanica, 7 (1972), 77-96. The interpretation 
offered in this chapter has its origin in a paper read before the English Goethe Society 
in May, 1963, and published in the Publications of the English Goethe Society, NS 33 
(1963), 10-55. Of interpretations that have appeared since that time, only those by 
Wittkowski and Johnson have commented on my own, but neither has provided any 
compelling reason to rethink its basic position. Wittkowski so misconceived and mis-
stated my position that it is unnecessary to discuss his comments here. Moreover, both 
he and Johnson took a disappointingly shallow and moralistic view of the story. 
2. Raymond Bonafous, Henri de Kleist (Paris, 1894), p. 383; Wilhelm Herzog, Heinrich 
von Kleist, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1914), p. 350; Hermann August Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, 
IV (Leipzig, 1953), 86. 
3. Friedrich Gundolf, Heinrich van Kleist (Berlin, 1922), p. 165; Bonafous, Henri de 
Kleist, p. 380. 
4. Herzog, Heinrich von Kleist, p. 352, speaks of the story's "pessimistische Erkennt-
nis" of the "gebrechliche Einrichtung der Welt"; Philipp Witkop, Heinrich von Kleist 
(Leipzig, 1922), pp. 181-82, writes of the story's fatalism on the question of the inherent 
evil of human nature; Hans Matthias Wolff, Heinrich von Kleist: Die Geschichte seines 
Schaffens (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954), pp. 42-46, stresses social corruption; Silz, 
Heinrich von Kleist, pp. 23-24, is impressed by the fortuitousness of both life and death 
in the face of the earthquake. 
5. Hermann Pongs, Das Bild in der Dichtung, II (Marburg, 1939), 152 f. and 292 f., sees 
the child as a symbol of divine redemption through the power of love; Gunter Blocker, 
Heinrich van Kleist oder Das Absolute Ich (Berlin, 1960), p. 137, sees the earthquake as an 
influence that makes man stronger; Otto Brahm, Heinrich van Kleist (Berlin, 1884), p. 
172, thinks that Kleist shows "wie unter dem Eindruck des Zusammensturzes alles 
Bestehenden eine neue, bessere Ordnung der Dinge sich vorbereiten will"; Bonafous, 
Henri de Kleist, pp. 380-81, believes that it shows divine benevolence. 
6. Wolff, Heinrich von Kleist, p. 42; Blocker, Heinrich von Kleist, p. 137; Bonafous, Henri 
de Kleist, p. 380; E. K. Bennett, A History of the German "Novelle," 2nd ed., rev. and cont. 
by H. M. Waidson (Cambridge, 1961), p. 45; Conrady, "Kleists 'Erdbeben:" p. 186; 
Klein, "Kleists 'Erdbeben:" p. 11; Emil Staiger, "Heinrich von Kleist," in Heinrich van 
Kleist: Vier Reden zu seinem Gediichtnis, ed. Walter Muller-Seidel (Berlin, 1962), p. 55. 
7. Herzog, Heinrich von Kleist, p. 332; and Klein, "Kleists 'Erdbeben,'" p. 10. 
8. For a good account of the currents of thought, the "earthquake theology," sur-
rounding the Lisbon earthquake, see Thomas Downing Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake 
(London, 1956). 
9. The concentration on the episode as an experience of Jeronimo, his "Gluck," and 
words like "Schauplatz" all project the event as one that he has engineered for his own 
satisfaction, rather than as part of a relationship with devotion on both sides. The 
story's critics have missed this and other innuendoes that show the narrator's uncer-
tainty about the guilt or innocence of the lovers and assume that the narrator is un-
ambiguously on their side: e.g., Blankenagel, "Heinrich von Kleist: Das Erdbeben in 
Chili,'' pp. 34-35, gives a list of the means by which Kleist arouses sympathy for the 
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lovers and leaves the matter there. The list is a good one, but another list pointing in 
the other direction could be made. Wittkowski's view of this episode as a "Triumph des 
Naturlichen" and "'Provokation' des Christentums" does not take account of the 
crucial emphasis given to the masculine triumph ("Skepsis, Noblesse, Ironie;' p. 258). 
10. Throughout the story the very large number of references to chance as an ex-
planation of an event in itself throws doubt on this kind of explanation. By his frequent 
use of the concept, the narrator clearly invites us to think again; this is another device 
through which the narrator tries to stick to his facts and avoid interpretation but in so 
doing impresses us all the more with the need for some interpretation. Cf. Walter 
Muller-Seidel, Versehen und Erkennen (Cologne, 1961), p. 86: "Hinter dem vermeint-
lichen Zufall ahnen wir den Plan dessen, der ihn schickt." Silz, Heinrich van Kleist, 
p. 20, points to the unlikeliness, even unreality, of these chances but notes their enor-
mous scope to produce great consequences. 
11. Silz, Heinrich van Kleist, p. 14, notes the paradox of Jeronimo "clinging for safety 
to the very pillar on which he was minded to die." 
12. Both Silz, Heinrich van Kleist, p. 20, and Muller-Seidel, Versehen und Erkennen, pp. 
138-40, stress the use of" as if" in the story. But Muller-Seidel restricts the idea to the 
middle section ("Die Struktur Als-ob bestimmt in Erdbeben in Chili den Mittelteil der 
Erzahlung"); in my view it is equally relevant to all sections of the text. And while he 
correctly notes, "Fast durchweg sind religiose Momente das eigentliche Charakteris-
tikum dieser Sphare des Als-ob," Muller-Seidel then draws from this the strange 
conclusion, "Im sprachlichen Ausdruck wird falsbar, wie Gottliches ins irdische Dasein 
hineinwirkt," mistaking the narrator's provisional constructions as interpretative facts. 
He finally arrives at the view that God works for the good in the story, while man and 
his institutions are the source of evil. 
13. Lucas, "Studies in Kleist," pp. 147-48, here seems remote from the tone and 
setting of the story: "So many reversals may easily become comic; and yet, though one 
may smile at the naivety ... each moment in itself has a natural justification that 
draws one's sympathy .... It is unlikely to have occurred in anyone but Jeronimo to 
see the hand of God in what happened." 
14. Silz, Heinrich van Kleist, p. 15. 
15. Von Wiese, Die deutsche Novelle, II, 60, sees this sign pointing in what seems at 
the time to be the wrong direction, but he overlooks its function of helping to break 
down one concept of the story and produce another. 
16. I refer here to the three sections into which Kleist divided his story in the Erziih-
lungen of 1810. Sembdner, Heinrich von Kleist: Siimtliche Werke und Briefe, 3rd ed. (Mu-
nich, 1964), II, 902, regrettably reintroduces the much larger number of paragraphs 
used in the first printed version of the September, 1807, Morgenblatt fiir gebildete Stiinde, 
on the grounds that only lack of space caused the reduction to three. The three sections 
do, however, have structural importance. 
17. Wolfgang Kayser, "Kleist als Erzahler," German Life and Letters, NS 8 (1954-55), 
28. Von Wiese, Die deutsche Novelle, II, 63, and, following him, Lucas, "Studies in 
Kleist," p. 160, both misunderstand Kayser here and take his remark to be an adverse 
criticism of the Erdbeben. Conrady, "Kleists 'Erdbeben,' ,; p. 189, rightly describes this 
passage as "marchenhaft," though his metaphysical treatment of this is not convinc-
ing; the point is that fairy stories are unreal. 
18. Wittkowski, "Skepsis, Noblesse, Ironie," p. 251, misses the text's implied reser-
vation about the couple's mood being unchanged by the misery they see and therefore 
thinks of even this self-centeredness as displaying their nobility: "Die Liebenden schlei-
chen nicht beiseite, obwohl die Armen jammern, sondern weil sie jammern, weil sie 
diese nicht mit ihrem Gluck 'betruben' wollen. Sie nehmen mitleidsvoll Rucksicht, und 
zwar mit feinem Taktgefiihl." 
19. Lucas, "Studies in Kleist,'' p. 152, misconstrues this passage: "Josephe feels that 
the disproportion of suffering is an argument against the happiness that is now hers, 
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and has to overcome this feeling before she can gratefully acknowledge the blessings of 
the day." The text puts the "overcoming" of feelings very differently. Wittkowski, 
"Skepsis, Noblesse, Ironie," p. 251, calls this kind of gratitude "ein nobles Zuviel," but 
mention of "nobility" seems out of place here. 
20. See especially Friedrich Koch, Heinrich von Kleist (Stuttgart, 1958). Koch thinks 
that their "naive Deutung der Welt und Menschen" (p. 84) is what leads to their 
downfall and their foolish belief that "der Kosmos sei in Einklang mit ihrem Schicksal" 
(p. 77); see also Lucas, "Studies in Kleist," p. 156. 
21. This sinister picture also points forward to the death of the child Juan, who is 
dashed against one of these same "Pfeiler." This is one more relation that the reader is 
invited to ponder. A similar example of irony is Josephe's wish to lay her face "in den 
Staub" (154) before her creator; this is what she will do but in a different way than she 
had imagined. 
22. Wittkowski, "Skepsis, Noblesse, lronie," p. 249, makes the sentence a flat asser-
tion: "Trotz der schrecklichen Erfahrungen meldet sich die Freude." He justifies this 
simplification with a strange argument (p. 266): "Wieder macht solch kritisch-redliche 
Reserve das Ergebnis, statt es zu beeintrachtigen, nur um so glaubwurdiger." Avoid-
ance of the complexity of this last sentence is a common critical failing; see Lucas, 
"Studies in Kleist," p. 164. 
23. E.g., Pongs, Das Bild in der Dichtung, II, 153; Klein, "Kleists 'Erdbeben,'" p. 10; 
Conrady, "Kleists 'Erdbeben,'" p. 194 {the child is for him the "geheime Mitte der 
Novelle"); and von Wiese, Die deutsche Navelle, II, 69, who follows Pongs and calls the 
child a "Symbol fiir die ganze Erzahlung .... Es steht in seiner Unschuld stellvertre-
tend fur jeden dem Menschen neu geschenkten Anfang." Silz, Heinrich van Kleist, 
p. 24, gives the corrective to this view when he says that the child "is an example of the 
fortuitousness of existence in an incomprehensible world," though this is also an in-
complete because too definite view of the situation; Pongs is a corrective to Silz too. 
24. Wittkowski, "Skepsis, Noblesse, Ironie," by contrast, treats Don Fernando, Je-
ronimo, and Josephe as comparable in character (see, e.g., pp. 264 and 272). 
25. Blocker, Heinrich van Kleist, pp. 134-35. It is worth noting here that Kleist honors 
Don Fernando with quotation marks for his direct speech. Most editions unfortunately 
treat this as a mistake, and restore a consistency to the text that Kleist evidently did not 
want. Cf. Sembdner, Heinrich van Kleist: Siimtliche Werke und Briefe, II, 903: "Kleist setzt 
jeweils nur die Worte seines Heiden Fernando in Anfiihrungsstriche." 
26. See Lucas, "Studies in Kleist," p. 161: "Don Fernando, though less far-seeing, 
even to the extent of irritation at her warning ... " The irritation is, however, not to do 
with his judgment but with the challenge to his code of behavior. See also Wittkowski, 
"Skepsis, Noblesse, Ironie," p. 264: "Fernando und das Paar machen also sicher einen 
Erkenntnisfehler." 
IV. Der Z weikampf 
1. Separate studies of Der Zweikampf have been few: Heinrich Meyer, "Kleists No-
velle 'Der Zweikampf,"' Jahrbuch der Kleist-Gesellschaft, 17 (1933-37), 136-69; Horst 
Oppel, "Kleists Novelle 'Der Zweikampf,'" Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fur Litcraturwis-
senschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 22 (1944), 92-105; Karl Otto Conrady, "Der Zweikampf: 
Zur Aussageweise Heinrichs von Kleist," Der Deutschunterricht, 3, No. 6 (1951), 85-96; 
Donald H. Crosby, "Heinrich von Kleist's 'Der Zweikampf,"' Monatshefte, 56 (1964), 
191-201; Joachim Muller, Literarische Analogien in Heinrich van Kleists Novelle "Der Zwei-
kampf," (Berlin, 1969); Wolfgang Wittkowski, "Die heilige Cacilie und Der Zweikampf: 
Kleists Legenden und die romantische Ironie," Colloquia Germanica, 6 ,(1972), 17-58; 
Katharina Mommsen, "Kleist's Duel Story as 'Erlebnisdichtung,"' Carleton Germanic 
Papers, 2 (1974), 49-66. 
2. Meyer, "Kleists Novelle 'Der Zweikampf;" p. 147. 
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3. Conrady misses the crucial factor of the narrator's telling the story in the light of a 
stereotype that will not fit the events that he describes: "Der Dichter ist ein objektiv 
Berichtender, der das tatsachlich sich Ereignende wie aus einer Chronik zu erzahlen 
scheint" ("Der Zweikampf," p. 85). 
4. It is very interesting to note that Martin Greenberg, in his Heinrich von Kleist: The 
Marquise von 0- and Other Stories (New York, 1960), completely changes the impres-
sion of the original in his translation of this passage. His version asserts that Friedrich 
"once during a hunt had courageously snatched her from the path of a wounded boar" 
(p. 293). Greenberg obviously cannot believe the German here and so translates what 
in a sense ought to be there but is not: the text says nothing about courage, nor does it 
present the vivid image of Friedrich's snatching Littegarde from the boar's path. 
5. It is a remarkable fact that the critics of this story have persistently praised Fried-
rich as a wholly positive character: Crosby terms him "the idealized knight and ardent 
apostle of Vertrauen" in Heinrich von Kleist: Das Bettelweib von Locarno, Der Zweikampf, ed. 
Donald H. Crosby (Waltham, Mass., 1968), p. xiii; he also calls him "the masculine pole 
of the new romantic attraction added by Kleist" ("Kleist's 'Der Zweikampf,'" p. 196); 
Oppel summarizes the view common to three well-known Kleist critics (Pongs, Fricke, 
Lugowski) that the story presents "ein Musterbild herrlichster Bewahrung der unend-
lich vertrauenden Liebe" ("Kleists Novelle 'Der Zweikampf,'" p. 96); and even Klaus 
Miiller-Salget, who writes on "Das Prinzip der Doppeldeutigkeit in Kleists Erzahlun-
gen," Zeitschrift fiir deutsche Philologie, 92 (1973), senses no ambiguity here, only "das 
unbedingte Vertrauen und die vollige Hingabe an den geliebten Menschen" (p. 201). 
All of its critics not only accept but even glorify and exaggerate further a stereotype that 
is questioned within the story itself. 
6. For a contrary view of the scene as one that "supplies one of the most moving 
tableaus in Kleist's entire Novellistik," see Crosby, "Kleist's 'Der Zweikampf,"' p. 197. 
Wittkowski is more extreme: "Als Trota im Gefangnis Littegarde iiberrascht, da stilisiert 
Kleist Wort und Gebarde nach dem Vorbild Christi und der Siinderin zu religioser 
Form und lnbrunst. Das ist die Vergottlichung des Menschen, die sich bei Kleist allent-
halben findet. 1hr Grundzug ist die Noblesse" ("Die Heilige Cacilie und Der Zwei-
kampf," p. 52). This loss of contact with the very different emphases of Kleist's story is 
the result of Wittkowski's general belief that "Noblesse" and "Vergottlichung des 
Menschen" are basic, unambiguous values in Kleist. 
7. H. v. Kleists Werke, ed. Erich Schmidt, Georg Minde-Pouet and Reinhold Steig 
(Leipzig, 1904-05), III, 132. 
8. Crosby, "Kleist's 'Der Zweikampf,'" p. 193. 
9. The idea that everything preceding the duel is only an introduction without any 
thematic significance occurs throughout Meyer's "Kleists Novelle 'Der Zweikampf' "; 
e.g., on p. 149 it has "kein selbstandiges Interesse, hat lediglich einleitenden Charak-
ter, client der Hauptgeschichte zum Sprungbrett"; on p. 157 it is "nur ein dienendes 
Hilfsorgan, ein vorgesetztes Portal, ein Einfiihrungsstiick ohne selbstandiges Inter-
esse"; and on p. 167 the story is stated to be a "Zusammensetzung aus zwei Geschich-
ten ganz verschiedenen Inhalts." One then puzzles over his conclusion that the story is 
"ein Werk aus einem Gusse und ein Werk reifer Kunst" (p. 169). 
10. As Meyer puts it in "Kleists Novelle 'Der Zweikampf,'" p. 150, the story's "Luft 
ist nicht die der Aufklii.rung, sondern die des naiven Wunderglaubens." Crosby, 
"Kleist's 'Der Zweikampf,'" pp. 199-200, thinks differently: "The author obviously 
does not insist that we believe that the delayed revelation of the true victor of the trial 
by combat is a manifestation, say, of God's mills grinding slowly but exceedingly fine . 
. . . That it is sheer presumption to expect God to adjudicate human quarrels, 'unmit-
telbar' or any other way, does not and cannot occur to the Emperor, who unlike Trota is 
every inch a man of his time." The author cannot, of course, dictate his reader's real-
life beliefs, but the narrative convention can and does ask that God's adjudication of 
human quarrels in the duel be considered part of the story. Far from being ahead of his 
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time, Trota more than anyone else clings to the convention of simple faith while the 
Emperor, seeing its weakness, introduces a change in the statutes that embody it. 
11. Conrady' s view of the ending is speculation: "Nicht immer und zu jeder willkur-
lichen Anrufung spricht dieser Gott, sondern, wie es die SchluBworte sagen: Wenn es 
Gottes Wille ist. Das aber heiBt, so will uns nun scheinen: es muB etwas in den Herzen 
der Menschen sich ereignen, und dann fallt, wenn zwei Menschen in Vertrauen und 
Liebe gegen die verwirrende und tauschende Umgebung der gebrechlichen Welt 
durchhalten, auf sie durch alles Dunkel hindurch ein Strahl jenes Gottes, und eine 
heile Welt wird sichtbar" ("Der Zweikampf," p. 96). What was being explained and 
dealt with by the change in wording was not (as Conrady implies) the fact that the duel 
sometimes, in meritorious cases, reveals the truth, but that it sometimes appears not to 
do so, even in meritorious cases. 
V. Michael Kohlhaas 
1. A complete list of nearly forty separate studies concerned specifically with Michael 
Koh/haas is given in the bibliography. 
2. Karl Schultze-Jahde, "Kohlhaas und die Zigeunerin," Jahrbuch der Kleist-Gesell-
schaft, 17 (1933-37), 108-35. Schultze-Jahde emphasized the consistency of Kohlhaas's 
thought, which formed "ein klares System" (p. 109). 
3. Gerhard Fricke, "Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" Der Deutschunterricht, 5, No. 1 
(1953), 21 and 25. 
4. Richard Matthias Muller, "Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 
fiir Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 44 (1970), 107. 
5. R. S. Lucas, "Studies in Kleist: I. Problems in 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" Deutsche Vier-
teljahrsschrift fiir Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 44 (1970), 124, 128, 132, 133, 
and 136. 
6. Lucas, "Studies in Kleist," pp. 133-34. 
7. Lucas's smug, schoolmasterly reproof of Kohlhaas is probably the key to those 
misreadings: "We may sympathize deeply with the passionate resentment of these 
words .... Nobody who has gone through such experiences as Kohlhaas could banish 
such feelings utterly, but we are not all capable of adhering to them for Jong" ("Stud-
ies in Kleist," p. 131). This is academic criticism at its most remote from life outside the 
professorial study. 
8. Fricke, "Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" p. 18, (essentially followed by Gunter 
Blocker, Heinrich van Kleist oder Das Absolute Ich [Berlin, 1960], p. 213, and Muller, 
"Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" p. 108) argued that the "Chronist'' was the maker of the 
overt judgments in the story, not Kleist, and in so doing he set up an adequate frame-
work for investigating the relation of the narrator to his story-though for the wrong 
reason, since the same holds in a narrative not prefaced by "Aus einer alten Chronik." 
But he used this insight in order to undercut (and even to disregard and discard from 
the text) only the negative judgments on Kohlhaas. 
9. Ludwig Buttner, "Michael Kohlhaas-eine paranoische oder heroische Gestalt?" 
Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies, 4 (1968), 41. 
10. Clifford Bernd has given a clear and succinct account (which my own partly 
follows) of how this apparent inconsistency in the text has been treated by its critics in 
his "On the Two Divergent Parts of Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas," in New York University 
Department of German Studies in Germanic Languages and Literature, ed. Robert A. Fowkes 
and Volkmar Sander (Reutlingen, 1967), pp. 47-56. 
11. Heinrich Meyer-Benfey, "Die innere Geschichte des 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" Eupho-
rion, 15 (1908), 103; Karl Otto Conrady, Die Erziihlweise Heinrichs van Kleist: Untersuchun-
gen und Interpretationen, Diss. Munster 1953, p. 193. Lionel Thomas in "Heinrich von 
Kleist and his Stories," Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, 10 (1962), 
84, went so far as to praise the action of an editor who removed the whole episode as 
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"improving the tale." This kind of response is still common: e.g., T. J. Reed, in his very 
recent essay "The 'Goethezeit' and its Aftermath," in the important compendium Ger-
many: A Companion to German Studies, ed. Malcolm Pasley (London, 1972), calls the epi-
sode "a jarring aberration into a supernatural sub-plot at the eleventh hour" (p. 527). 
12. The readings of the gypsy by Benno von Wiese, "Heinrich von Kleist: Michael 
Kohlhaas," in his Die deutsche Novelle van Goethe bis Kafka, I (Diisseldorf, 1956), 47-63, 
and by P. Horwath, "The 'Nicht-um-die-Welt' Theme: A Clue to the Ultimate Meaning 
of Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas," Studia Neophilologica, 39 (1967), 261-69, are both recogniz-
ably of the same general kind as that of Schultze-Jahde and subject to the same criti-
cisms, even though neither mentions him. Bernd, "On the Two Divergent Parts," in 
rounding off his account of previous attempts to deal with the gypsy episode, gives his 
own general interpretation, which is that it functions to cause confusion in the story. 
Here, he is absolutely correct, and it would have been intriguing to see Bernd pursue 
the point in more detail in a longer article: e.g., what issues become confused and 
why? Muller's view, in his "Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" is that the Elector of Saxony 
deserved to be deposed in a revolution, and that since historical fact did not permit 
this, Kleist was compelled to find a form of punishment that would substitute for a 
social upheaval and thus decided on the gypsy. What makes this suggestion implau-
sible is that the gypsy is surely a very poor substitute for a revolution. In any case, the 
Marxist reading of the story that is behind it is inconsistent with the text. Nowhere in 
Michael Kohlhaas is there any stress on class war, and the story cannot be seen as critical 
of the nobility in general, since the Elector of Brandenburg is granted a long and 
glorious reign, and Kohlhaas's sons are knighted. 
13. Fricke, "Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" p. 38. 
14. Otto F. Best makes the point that one should not speak of the romantic "Schlufs-
teile" of the story since, while the passages in question occur towards the end of the 
text, they fill gaps in our knowledge of chronologically much earlier events; the story 
covers pp. 9-103, the gypsy is first mentioned on p. 82, but the events described at that 
point relate back to the time reached chronologically on p. 31 ("Schuld und Vergebung: 
Zur Rolle von Wahrsagerin und 'Amulett' in Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" Germanisch-
Romanische Monatsschrift, NF 20 [1970], 180-89). 
15. Lucas says that Wenk's answer is only due to his irritation over the presence of 
the Nagelschmidt band, and that "Kohlhaas' conclusion that only flight remains is the 
wrong one" ("Studies in Kleist," p. 135). This argument ignores the change in the 
sentry arrangements that Wenk had ordered, his reconfirming those arrangements 
before his answer to Kohlhaas, and the fact that, whatever the cause of Wenk's very 
emphatic "Ja! ja! ja!" its effect is to make Kohlhaas a prisoner and break the amnesty. 
16. John R. Cary, by contrast, says that the Elector of Saxony "is nowhere shown to 
be acting in anything but good faith," is "fallible but well-intentioned," is only "in-
advertently guilty," and is "civilized, not unappealing" ("A Reading of Kleist'sMichael 
Kohlhaas,'' PMLA, 85 [1970], 215-16). These judgments seem to me astonishing. 
17. See my analysis of all the odd effects of the weather in the story in "Der Herr la.1st 
regnen iiber Gerechte und Ungerechte: Kleist's 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" Monatshefte, 59 
(1967), 35-40. 
18. Millier, "Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,"' p. 117, regards Kohlhaas's final behavior 
toward the Elector of Saxony as a continuation of his "Aufstand gegen die ungerechte 
Obrigkeit"; while Lucas, "Studies in Kleist," p. 125, thinks Kohlhaas's earlier actions 
are a search for revenge rather than justice. One makes the end like the beginning, the 
other the beginning like the end, but both try to remove the difference between them. 
19. The gypsy herself introduces the notion of reducing the impossibly grandiose 
scale of Kohlhaas's concerns when, after he has retorted "Nicht um die Welt!" to her 
suggestion that he use the capsule to buy his freedom, she replies: "'Nicht um die 
Welt, Kohlhaas, der Rofshandler; aber um diesen hiibschen, kleinen, blonden Jungen!'" 
(97). Horwath takes the phrase "Nicht um die Welt" to stress temporal as opposed to 
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higher concerns in his "The 'Nicht-um-die-Welt' Theme," but that reverses the direc-
tion of the contrast; the gypsy's point is to direct Kohlhaas's attention to the concrete, 
immediate, real things that he can see (this particular little boy) rather than to more 
cosmic, but less immediately real, concerns. 
20. Lucas, "Studies in Kleist," pp. 133-34; and Cary, "A Reading of Kleist's Michael 
Kohlhaas," pp. 215-16. Lucas praises the "feeling for justice shown in the Elector's 
adherence to the views of Count Wrede," as if the text did not make it obvious that his 
motives are entirely different from Wrede's. 
21. Contrast Cary, "A Reading of Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas," p. 217: "It remains un-
clear why he [the Elector of Brandenburg] is spared a fate similar to that of the Elector 
of Saxony:' See also Lucas, "Studies in Kleist," p. 134, who sees in the courts of 
Saxony and Brandenburg "the mixture of good and bad men in each place." Both 
critics seem extraordinarily unreceptive to the ways in which the text contrasts the two 
Electors. 
22. Clifford A. Bernd, "Der Lutherbrief in Kleists 'Michael Kohlhaas,'" Zeitschrift fiir 
deutsche Philologie, 86 (1967), 627-33. 
23. Walter Silz sees "the older man unable or unwilling to recognize his younger self 
in the man he faces" and the link between them in Luther's "equally obstinate pursuit 
of what seemed to many a small matter but to him was a sacred principle" ("Three 
Themes in Michael Kohlhaas ," in his Heinrich von Kleist: Studies in his Works and Literary 
Character [Philadelphia, 1961], pp. 191-92). Silz saw here the most fundamental point 
of Luther's thematic place in the story, an important critical achievement. 
24. See, for example, Deuteronomy 9:13-14: "Der Herr sprach zu mir: Ich sehe, dais 
dies Volk ein halsstarriges Volk ist. Lais ab von mir, da mit ich sie vertilge und ihren 
Namen austilge unter dem Himmel: aber aus dir will ich ein starkeres und griilseres 
Volk machen"; Job 18: 16-17; and Proverbs 10:7: "Das Andenken des Gerechten bleibt 
irn Segen; aber der Name des Gottlosen wird verwesen." I am much indebted to the 
learning of my colleague Joseph H_. Silverman for these references. My earlier article 
"Der Herr la8t regnen iiber Gerechte und Ungerechte: Kleist's 'Michael Kohlhaas'" 
showed another way in which biblical material relating to the notion of justice enters 
into the story. Henrik Lange, in his "Sakularisierte Bibelreminiszenzen in Kleists 'Mi-
chael Kohlhaas,'" Kopenhagener Gennanistische Studien, l (1969), 213-26, points to other 
biblical material in the story but makes little interpretative use of it. 
VI. Prinz Friedrich van Homburg 
1. The critical literature on Prinz Friedrich von Homburg is enormous. A full bibliog-
raphy to 1963 is given in Heinrich von Kleist: "Prinz Friedrich van Homburg. Ein Schauspiel," 
nach der Heidelberger Handschrift herausgegeben von Richard Samuel, unter Mitwir-
kung von Dorothea Coverlid (Berlin, 1964); this is supplemented to 1968 by the bibliog-
raphy of my Kleist's "Prinz Friedrich van Homburg": A Critical Study (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1970). That very much fuller study of the play contains detailed comment on 
the critical literature, and I have therefore largely avoided duplicating such comment in 
the present volume. On the other hand, the present bibliography brings the earlier one 
up to date. 
2. See Gerhard Fricke, "Kleists 'Prinz Friedrich von Homburg,'" in his Studien und 
Interpretationen (Frankfurt a.M., 1956), pp. 239-63. 
3. Hellmuth Kaiser, "Kleists 'Prinz Friedrich von Homburg,"' Imago, 17 (1930), 119-
37. 
4. Donald H. Crosby thinks rather that the Elector leads only a "diversionary flank 
attack" (in his review of my Kleist's "Prinz Friedrich van Homburg," German Quarterly 
[AATG Membership Directory], 46 [Sept. 1973], 149), but that is a misreading of the text. 
Diirfling's reading of the battle plan makes quite clear that Hennings commands the 
right wing and Truch8 the main center; the Elector is with Truchls's contingent during 
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the battle. Richard Samuel's accurate diagram of the battle shows the positions of all 
participants clearly, and it assumes, correctly, that the major confrontation is between 
the Swedes under Wrangel and the Brandenburg center under the Elector and TruchB 
(Heinrich von Kleist: "Prinz Friedrich von Homburg," p. 206). This view is obviously 
confirmed by the fact that, when Wrangel's position is seen to be broken and he 
retreats, all present cry, "Triumph! Triumph! Triumph! Der Sieg ist unser!" (467). They 
could not make this claim if they did not all assume that the main part of the battle is 
decided in their favor already; i.e., they all know that this is not a diversionary flank 
attack, and that the battle is essentially won before the Prince's entry, as it was meant 
to be. 
5. Two reviewers of my Kleist's "Prinz Friedrich von Homburg" misconceived this point; 
Charles E. Passage, Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 70 (1971), 120-23, spoke of 
the Elector's being shown as "sly, cunning, cruel"; and Crosby, pp. 148-50, spoke of 
"malice" and "imputation of ad hominem motives." In using this language of con-
sciously evil intent both of course missed the whole point of my argument about the 
different levels of understanding involved in the relationship of the two main charac-
ters. 
6. J.M. Benson, "Kleist's Prinz Friedrich van Homburg," Modern Languages, 46 (1965), 
98-103, is an example. 
VII. The Character of Kleist's Literary Work 
1. Fritz Martini, Deutsche Literaturgeschichte von den Anfiingen bis zur Gegenwart, 7th ed. 
(Stuttgart, 1956), p. 293. 
2. Not surprisingly, some critics have simply concluded that the stories are inconsis-
tent. The most thoroughgoing version of this attitude is that of Hans Matthias Wolff in 
his Heinrich van Kleist: Die Geschichte seines Schaffens (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954). 
Wolff was convinced that each of the stories must have originally existed in what 
would have been from his point of view a clear, consistent version without any prob-
lematic later episodes, and that those episodes were added only much later when 
Kleist's interests had changed; Wolff even printed his reconstructed original material 
(e.g., of Der Findling) in an appendix to his book. Typical, then, of his judgments of the 
stories is that on Der Findling, which "leidet an einer sonderbaren Verworrenheit .... 
Dieser klare Handlungsablauf ist <lurch ein heterogenes Thema kompliziert" (p. 53). 
As for the Zweikampf, he thought that it contained "zwei verschiedene Handlungen" 
that were "so oberflachlich miteinander verkniipft, dafs von einer Einheit keine Rede 
sein kann" (p. 194). 
3. Helmut Koopmann, "Das 'ratselhafte Faktum' und seine Vorgeschichte: Zurn ana-
lytischen Charakter der Novellen Heinrich von Kleists," Zeitschrift fiir deutsche Philolo-
gie, 84 (1965), 508-50. Koopmann is simply critical of Kleist here: "Zu oft biegt Kleist 
vom direkten Weg ab ... er greift zu oft zu weit zuriick und motiviert sogar iiber-
genau" (p. 509). He calls this a "Pedanterie der Genauigkeit." Eberhard Lammert's 
attitude to Kleist's sudden introduction of striking new material from the past is simi-
larly unimaginative, and he too deals with it only as low-level technique, e.g., as "Der 
abschweifende Riickschritt," as "Retardation;' or as "Pause in der Haupthandlung" 
(Bauformen des Erziihlens [Stuttgart, 1955], p. 116). 
4. Max Kommerell, "Die Sprache und das Unaussprechliche: Eine Betrachtung iiber 
Heinrich von Kleist," in his Geist und Buchstabe der Dichtung (Frankfurt a.M., 1944), pp. 
243-317. In this article originated the phrase "das ratselhafte Faktum," since much 
used in criticism of Kleist. Kommerell' s arbitrariness in designating this or that event a 
"ratselhaftes Faktum" has much to do with his thinking in terms of orthodox Nave/le 
theory, which requires an equally arbitrary designation of an event that is "unerhi:irt." 
5. This is also the kind of approach taken by Hans-Peter Herrmann, "Zufall und 
Ich: Zurn Begriff der Situation in den Novellen Heinrich von Kleists;' Germanisch-
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Romanische Monatsschrift, NF 11 (1961), 69-99. Herrmann looks to the upheavals in the 
lives of the characters, rather than in the text as a whole; e.g., "ein unerwartetes 
Ereignis tritt in ihr Leben ... nun bedingt es ihr Handeln und gestaltet ihr Schicksal" 
(p. 70). This is neither especially characteristic of Kleist nor very interesting; all forms of 
literature deal with events that are not entirely commonplace. 
6. In my "Kleist's Das Erdbeben in Chili," Publications of the English Goethe Society, NS 
33 (1963), 54. Koopmann refers to the fact that Kleist's stories have qualities of the 
"Kriminalgeschichte" ("Das 'ratselhafte Faktum,'" p. 513), but only in the much more 
superficial sense that they sometimes are about the solution of a real crime mystery, 
e.g., who killed the Duke in Der Zweikampf, or who raped the Marquise in Die Marquise 
vonO .... 
7. See, for example, Klaus Miiller-Salget, "Das Prinzip der Doppeldeutigkeit in 
Kleists Erzahlungen," Zeitschrifl fiir deutsche Philologie, 92 (1973}, 185-211. Here the 
postulation of a double meaning is a restriction on the meaPing of the stories, which 
move among several different possibilities rather than between just two. K. H. Lepper, 
"Zur Polaritat der Weltsicht in Kleists Novellen," Trivium, 2 (1967}, 95-119, is similar in 
this respect. Miiller-Salget's argument sometimes appears closer to my own; he refers 
to and correctly sums up the point of my interpretation of Das Erdbeben in Chili ("Uber-
zeugend weist [Ellis] nach, dais hier die Problematik der Interpretation selbst zum 
Thema geworden ist;' p. 192} and for a time appears to have almost completely adopted 
the view of Kleist's prose narrative that I had set forward. Compare, for example, my 
pp. 14-15 with his view that in Die Heilige Cacilie the focus of attention is shifted "vom 
Geschehen selbst auf die Deutung des Geschehens" (p. 196); or my pp. 39-40 and 53 
with his comment on Michael Kohlhaas: "Der Interpret verfehlt den Sinn dieser wie der 
iibrigen Erzahlungen Kleists, wenn er versucht, eine gewaltsame Eindewtigkeit herzu-
stellen" (p. 191). Milller-Salget also adopts my procedure (p. 14) of learning something 
about Michael Kohlhaas from the persistence of contradictory critical opinions on the 
story. Yet he makes little progress beyond this point, largely because he allows the 
notion that the stories are "doppeldeutig" to be the conclusion that he reaches, not an 
indispensable framework and beginning for a thematic investigation of the texts. Con-
sequently, he easily reverts to familiar static attitudes to Kleist's stories, rather than the 
tentative and flexible ones that are required by the view that a continual process of 
interpretation goes on ln them. It is, for example, quite inconsistent with the frame-
work he has adopted to say that there is strong "Gesellschaftskritik" in Das Erdbeben 
(p. 207); or to say that there remains in Der Zweikampf the certain (therefore unambigu-
ous) value of "das unbedingte Vertrauen und die vollige Hingabe an den geliebten 
Menschen" (p. 201); or that in Der Findling, Nicolo is a "verwilderter Bosewicht" and 
that at the end of the story there is "kein Zweifel daran, wem die Sympathien des 
Erzahlers gelten," i.e., Piachi (p. 203). 
8. References to these critics are given in Chapter Eight. 
9. The outstanding example is Gerhard Fricke, Gefiihl und Schicksal bei Heinrich van 
Kleist: Studien uber den inneren Vorgang im Leben und Schaffen des Dichters (Berlin, 1929). 
10. Hans-Peter Herrmann, for example, thinks Kleist's world one "in der der Zufall 
vorherrscht" ("Zufall und Ich," p. 73). He develops this idea by saying that Kleist's 
stories, though different in many ways, all have a basic schema, which is characterized 
by "die Zufalligkeit, mit der einzelne Ereignisse in das Leben eines (oder mehrerer) 
Menschen einfallen," by "die herausfordernde Kraft" of the events for the people 
concerned, and by the fact that "Zufall und reagierender Mensch im Raum eines 
einzigen sprachlichen Gebildes vorgestellt werden" (p. 71). But these circumlocutions 
only show how uninteresting it is to focus on the simple idea that there are chance 
events in Kleist, unless one sees this within a wider framework. All that Herrmann 
does with the idea is to elaborate it verbally, but that adds nothing of substance to the 
bare fact that unexpected events do occur, and that people have to deal with them-as 
happens in the writings of many other authors. 
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11. Koopmann again reduces this to something that is of little consequence: "Kleist 
ist ein pedantischer Erzahler. Wo immer er nur geht, motiviert er, begriindet er und 
macht es verstandlich, warum sich dieses oder jenes ereignet hat. Auf nichts kommt es 
ihm so sehr an wie gerade darauf, und manchmal ruft er sogar den Zufall zu Hilfe, 
wenn sich ein Zusammenhang anders nicht mehr erklaren !assen will" ("Das ratsel-
hafte Faktum,'" p. 508). 
12. For example: Hans Heinz Holz, Macht und O/mmacht der Sprache: Untersuchungen 
zum Sprachverstiindnis und Stil Heinrich von Kleists (Frankfurt, 1962), p. 134, speaks of 
Kleist's "niichterne Fakti-:itat des Erzahlstils," which "auf alle schmiickenden Zutaten 
der Subjektivitat verzichtet" (p. 141) and is even "karg" and "sehr auf das Notwen-
digste beschrankt" (p. 143). Or Karl Otto Conrady, "Das Moralische in Kleists Erzah-
lungen: Ein Kapitel vom Dichter ohne Gesellschaft," in Heinrich van Kleist: Aufsiitze und 
Essays, ed. Walter Muller-Seidel (Darmstadt, 1967): "Nur die Fakten des Geschehens 
werden erzahlt, sachlich, niichtern, ohne Kommentar des Erzahlers" (p. 725). This 
view of Kleist' s style is virtually universal. 
13. It may even be the case that excessive and really irrelevant detail is on occasion 
part of this strategy; see, for example, the description of the crabs sold by the fake 
intermediary between Kohlhaas and Nagelschmidt, as discussed by Wolfgang Kayser, 
"Kleist als Erzahler," Gennan Life and Letters, NS 8 (1954-55), 26-27. 
14. Friedrich Beilsner, "Unvorgreifliche Gedanken iiber den Sprachrhythmus," in 
Festschrift Paul Kluckhohn und Hennann Schneider gewidmet zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag, hrsg. 
von ihren Tiibinger Schiilern (Tiibingen, 1948), p. 442. 
15. Kayser, "Kleist als Erzahler," p. 26. Miiller-Salget also addresses himself to the 
question of Kleist's "eigenwilligen Satzbau" (pp. 208 ff.) but, strangely, restricts himself 
to a tiny fraction of cases by writing only of those few where a real or implied dialogue 
takes place. His conclusion is that these sentences "demonstrieren, in wie hohem 
Maise der einzelne auf Grund der tauschenden Beschaffenheit der Welt angewiesen ist 
auf die Wahrhaftigkeit des anderen, darauf, dais der andere die Frage nicht mit einer 
Liige beantwortet." But these sentences are far from representative of Kleist's "Satz-
bau," the conclusion drawn from them is unnecessary (one person is always at the 
mercy of the truthfulness of the person telling him things, regardless of sentence 
structure), and the conclusion that "Vertrauen" is an unambiguous value in Kleist is 
equally unnecessary and unjustified. 
16. Kayser, "Kleist als Erzahler," pp. 22-24. Critics who have found fault with these 
perceptive remarks have generally only succeeded in showing how they have misun-
derstood them. When discussing the Erdbeben, for example, Wolfgang Wittkowski, 
Benno von Wiese, and R. S. Lucas all state what they think Kayser has said, and the 
results are revealing. Wittkowski thinks that Kayser "fiir die Sinnlosigkeit der Ereig-
nisse pladiert," and that Kayser believes "durchweg werte Kleist nur momentan und 
iiberblicke nicht das Ganze" ("Skepsis, Noblesse, Ironie: Formen des Als-ob in Kleists 
Erdbeben," Euphorion, 63 [1969], 249). Wittkowski evidently did not follow Kayser's 
distinction between narrator and author. The narrator's limitations are not Kleist's; 
Kayser of course knew that Kleist had a view of the whole, and that otherwise the story 
would be meaningless. Von Wiese makes a similar error when he offers what he thinks 
is a corrective to Kayser by saying that Kleist is indeed concerned with the "Wirklich-
keit des Geschehens" ("Heinrich von Kleist: Das Erdbeben in Chili," in his Die deutsche 
Nave/le van Goethe bis Kafka, II [Diisseldorf, 1962], 57). Actually, nothing Kayser says 
would imply that that was not true of both narrator and author. Misquotation is often a 
key to misunderstanding, as is the case when von Wiese wrongly states Kayser's view 
to be that the narrator evaluates "vom jeweiligen Standort der Gestalten aus" (p. 54). 
Lucas perhaps reads von Wiese's misquotation rather than Kayser himself when at-
tempting to correct Kayser by saying that "the narrator does not always abstain from 
all comment, submerging his mentality in that of the characters" ("Studies in Kleist," 
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift ftir Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 44 [1970], 149). 
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Neither of these critics of Kayser has correctly observed the positions of the words 
"Gestalt," "Situation," "oft;' and "fast immer" in his very careful formulation. 
17. Though Conrady missed the sense of Kleist's narration bursting out of a realistic 
mode (see above), he understood that realism is not the point: "Realistisch ist Kleist im 
einzelnen Detail, legt aber im ganzen auf Realismus keinen Wert" ("Das Moralische in 
Kleists Erziihlungen;' p. 727). Unlike most critics, Conrady also saw the force and 
meaning of Kayser' s insights; and starting out from them, he made some interesting 
remarks on the character of Kleist' s narration, which also have some points of contact 
with those made in my interpretation of the Erdbeben. Coincidentally, both studies ap-
peared in the same year (1963). For example: "Der Dichter ohne Gesellschaft bleibt 
selbst Fragender, ist suchender Erziihler .... Das Moralische der Kleistschen Erziih-
lungen ist jenes Suchen selbst .... Es ist identisch mit der Art des Erziihlens, das den 
Leser zum fragenden Partner des suchenden Dichters werden liiBt'' (pp. 733-35). On 
closer inspection, however, Conrady's view of Kleist's narration, and of the stories, is 
very far removed from that which I have presented. For example, he sees the process 
of searching as returning to two absolute values, which are "das Zusichselbstfinden" 
and "das Vertrauen zum Du," and calls them "diese unableitbaren Festpunkte letzter 
Wahrheit"; these rigid judgments are not at all in tune with the spirit of a narrative in 
which everything is tentative and part of a search for orientation points. As a conse-
quence, his interpretations of the stories are just as hampered by rigidity as those of 
other critics. Conrady' s use of a potentially more flexible framework is evidently limited 
by two factors: first, he confuses narrator and author, and second, he concentrates on 
"das Moralische." The two factors are linked: the equation of the narrator with Kleist, 
the "Dichter ohne Gesellschaft," leads to the limiting moral emphasis. The issues with 
which Kleist's narrator grapples, in the process making the reader also grapple with 
them, are much more diverse than this framework allows. But though Conrady's 
actual readings of the texts are as a result not nearly flexible enough-in fact are barely 
different from very familiar traditioni!l readings-it remains true that with his notion of 
a "suchender Dichter" who made the reader his partner in the search, he got much 
nearer to an adequate view of Kleist's narrator than any other German critic of Kleist. 
18. Attempts to characterize them as specifically Kleistian types have been unsuc-
cessful; I pursue this point in the next chapter. 
VIII. The Character of Kleist Criticism 
1. An interesting indication of the strength and persistency of this desire on the part 
of many Kleist critics to abstract specific and definite authorial viewpoints is provided 
by some responses to my previously published essays. Other critics have often read 
them as advocating a specific authorial viewpoint that happened not to be the one that 
they prefer, instead of a different attitude to authorial viewpoint in Kleist' s work. What 
seems to be involved here is a refusal to see that one might not want to simplify the text 
in the way that these critics want, to obtain a "clear message from it. See, for example, in 
the case of the Prinz von Homburg, the instances cited at the end of Chapter Six, and in 
the case of the Erdbeben in Chili, Wolfgang Wittkowski's "Skepsis, Noblesse, Ironie: 
Formen des Als-ob in Kleists Erdbeben," Euphorion, 63 (1969), 247-83. Wittkowski reads 
my demonstration of the way in which the text at one point questions Don Fernando's 
role as an unambiguous assertion that Fernando is viewed negatively in the story 
(p. 272); and he makes my discussion of the attitude to the Viceroy that the text at one 
point seems to allow into an assertion that the Viceroy is definitely to be seen as the 
symbolic representative of the corrupt society in this story (p. 262). 
2. Full references to titles mentioned in this paragraph are: Elmar Hoffmeister, Tiiu-
schung und Wirklichkeit bei Heinrich von Kleist (Bonn, 1968); Friedrich Koch, Heinrich von 
Kleist: Bewuj3tsein und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1958); Walter Muller-Seidel, Versehen und 
Erkennen: Eine Studie iiber Heinrich von Kleist (Cologne, 1961); Gerhard Fricke, Gefiihl 
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und Schicksal bei Heinrich von Kleist: Studien uber den inneren Vorgang im Leben und Schaffen 
des Dichters (Berlin, 1929); Hans-Peter Herrmann, "Zufall und Ich: Zurn Begriff der 
Situation in den Novellen Heinrich von Kleists," Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift, 
NF 11 (1961), 69-99; John Gearey, Heinrich von Kleist: A Study in Tragedy and Anxiety 
(Philadelphia, 1968); Hermann Reske, Traum und Wirklichkeit im Werk Heinrich von Kleists 
(Stuttgart, 1969). 
3. Hoffmeister, Tiiuschung und Wirklichkeit, p. 20. 
4. Cf. my Kleist's "Prinz Friedrich von Homburg": A Critical Study (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1970), p. 106; here I noted that general books on Kleist all tended to repeat 
one view of this play-the simplest possible. 
5. Hans Matthias Wolff, Heinrich von Kleist als politischer Dichter (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1947); an essentially similar position is taken in his later Heinrich von Kleist: Die 
Geschichte seines Schaffens (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954). Though in the earlier work 
Wolff acknowledged that he was seizing on one strand in Kleist (see the "Einleitung"), 
the interpretative comments in his later study make it clear that he sees this as the most 
important way to look at Kleist, since the comments of the 1947 volume are in sub-
stance repeated. Durzak's "Zur utopischen Funktion des Kindesbildes in Kleists Er-
zahlungen" is from Colloquia Germanica, 3 (1969), 111-29. 
6. Wolff, Heinrich van Kleist als politischer Dichter, p. 396. 
7. Durzak, "Zur utopischen Funktion des Kindesbildes," pp. 121-26. Der Findling is 
evidently a real stumbling block for Durzak, and so he says that "Kleist im Findling die 
Problematik seiner eigenen utopischen Losung reflektiert" (p. 129), since an innocent 
child like Nicolo has to grow up and lose his innocence. Here we see another case of 
the issues of a text being forgotten and replaced with issues that originate in the critic's 
attempt to preserve the consistency of his own view; there is neither any trace of a 
utopian solution nor any issue of its not being present in Der Findling. 
8. A random example of an article essentially like Durzak's is Joseph W. Dyck's 
"Heinrich von Kleist: Ehre und Ehrgeiz als Ursache der Schuld;' in Husbanding the 
Golden Grain: Studies in Honor of Henry W Nordmeyer, ed. Luanne T. Frank and Emery E. 
George (Ann Arbor, 1973), 64-74. 
9. Hoffmeister, Tiiuschung und Wirklichkeit, p. 52. 
10. Friedrich Braig, Heinrich von Kleist (Munich, 1925), pp. 450-51. 
11. See above, p. 131. See also the further case shown in Chapter Two, p. 21, of 
Muller-Seidel's article on Die Marquise van O ... , which restates an obvious fact of the 
story (the Marquise's sense of being pregnant conflicts with her awareness of having 
done nothing that could have led to this result) in complex critical terminology that 
adds nothing of substance to it; again, the interpretation of the story is substantially 
that found elsewhere, so that nothing is added to the discussion of this text by the 
verbal elaboration. 
12. Max Kommerell, "Die Sprache und das Unaussprechliche: Eine Betrachtung uber 
Heinrich von Kleist," in his Geist und Buchstabe der Dichtung (Frankfurt a.M., 1944), 
p. 245. Kommerell's enormously influential article initiated the line of thought that is 
the essential basis for much later work, e.g., Walter Muller-Seidel's Versehen und Erken-
nen, Hermann Reske's Traum und Wirklichkeit im Werk Heinrich van Kleists, and Helmut 
Koopmann's "Das 'ratselhafte Faktum' und seine Vorgeschichte: Zurn analytischen 
Charakter der Novellen Heinrich von Kleists," Zei tschrift fiir deutsche Philologie, 84 (1965), 
508-50. 
13. Kommerell, "Die Sprache und <las Unaussprechliche," p. 257. 
14. Friedrich Koch is another much quoted writer who belongs to the genre of Kleist 
criticism discussed in the text. Koch elaborates the same fact of the Marquise's experi-
ence that Muller-Seidel chose to elaborate, but in different terms: "Zwischen der Welt 
des Bewufstseins und der Wirklichkeit besteht grundsatzlich eine Differenz" (Heinrich 
von Kleist, p. 43). Just as in Muller-Seidel's case, nothing is added to the obvious facts 
of the story but a new terminology, the elaboration of which substitutes for and pre-
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vents a good look at the text and its problems. Ernst von Reusner' sSatz-Gestalt-Schicksal: 
Untersuchungen iiber die Struktur in der Dichtung Kleists (Berlin, 1961), represents some-
thing of a caricature of the tradition. Much of this work descends to an extreme of 
triviality: e.g., "Jeder Satz ist wie ein Blick auf etwas, das ist" (p. 17). 
15. Muller-Seidel, Versehen und Erkennen, p. 54. 
16. Muller-Seidel, Versehen und Erkennen, pp. 172-73. 
17. Muller-Seidel, Versehen und Erkennen, p. 73. His misreading (p. 205) of the Elec-
tor's remark on Hohenzollern in line 1720 of Prinz Friedrich von Homburg is another fail-
ure to grasp the literal sense of Kleist' s text; here he takes the Elector's "Die delphsche 
Weisheit meiner Offiziere" to be a straightforward positive evaluation of Hohenzollern 
in spite of the obvious scorn of the context ("Tor, der du bist, Blodsinniger!"). 
18. Muller-Seidel, Versehen und Erkennen, p. 175. 
19. Fricke, Gefiihl und Schicksal, pp. 136-39. And on Michael Kohlhaas, we have the 
following: "Das Ich des Kohlhaas selber als die heilige und letzte, sinngebende und 
sinntragende Wirklichkeit inmitten der endlichen Welt ist der Held der Dichtung" 
(p. 124). Again, the interpretative problems of the text are by-passed. 
20. Chapter Seven, pp. 130-31. 
21. The emphasis, for example, of Friedrich Braig, Heinrich von Kleist; John Gearey, 
Heinrich von Kleist; Friedrich Gundolf, Heinrich von Kleist (Berlin, 1922); and Michael 
Hamburger, "Heinrich von Kleist," in his Reason and Energy: Studies in German Literature 
(London, 1957), pp. 107-44 (this essay is obviously the source of the unsigned article 
"Heinrich von Kleist" in the Times Literary Supplement, 21 August 1953, pp. 529-30). 
22. E.g., Gunter Blocker, Heinrich von Kleist oder Das Absolute Ich (Berlin, 1960), p. 16: 
"Der grenzenlose Mensch, geschuttelt von den Schauern der Existenz, befeuert vom 
Willen zum Absoluten, umstrahlt von der Glorie der Selbstverantwortung, ist Kleists 
Held." 
23. See, e.g., Raimund Belgardt's working his way through the Kant-crisis to a 
laboriously deduced interpretation of Prinz Friedrich, which turns out to be identical 
with that found in at least a hundred other critics, in his "Kleists Weg zur Wahrheit: 
Irrtum und Wahrheit als Denkformen und Strukturmoglichkeit," Zeitschrift fur deutsche 
Philologie, 92 (1973), 161-84. 
24. Kleists Aufsatz "l1ber das Marionettentheater": Studien und Interpretationen, ed. Hel-
mut Sembdner (Berlin, 1967). 
25. Johannes Klein, "Heinrich von Kleist;' in his Geschichte der deutschen Novelle van 
Goethe bis zur Gegenwart, 4th ed. (Wiesbaden, 1960), pp. 77-98. 
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Jakobs, als Entlastung gelten !assen wollte" (Macht und Ohnmacht der Sprache, p. 102). 
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29. Georg Lukacs, "Die Tragodie Heinrich von Kleists," in his Deutsche Realisten des 
19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1951), pp. 19-48. 
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The time is long since past when it was possible to append even a reasonably 
complete bibliography of writings on Kleist to a volume of criticism such as 
this. The general section of this bibliography is therefore restricted to those 
items that are cited during the course of the book. The sections on the five 
stories to which I have devoted individual chapters, on the other hand, list 
titles devoted specifically to those works that are complete up to the end of 
1975. Complete bibliographies of work appearing in 1975 are not themselves 
published until late 1976 or early 1977; this study was completed in 1976. As 
my study goes to press, however, I have included, in an addendum to Chap-
ter Eight, discussion of some significant findings and trends in selected items 
that appeared in 1976 and 1977; these are included in the bibliography. The 
scope of what has been written on Prinz Friedrich van Homburg again makes 
completeness something that only a specialized bibliography could or should 
aspire to; in that section of the bibliography, I have primarily sought to bring 
up to date the two special bibliographies that I mention there, although all 
works cited in the chapter are included. The most valuable Kleist bibliography 
to have appeared so far is that by Eva Rothe: "Kleist-Bibliographie 1945-
1960," Jahrbuch der deutschen Schiller-Gesellschaft, 5 (1961), 414-547. Rothe 
gives references to the Kleist bibliography of Georg Minde-Pouet, which 
covers the years from 1914 to 1937 and is printed in installments in the 
Jahrbuch der Kleist-Gese/lschaft from 1921 to 1937. Readers who wish to read 
further in Kelist criticism of the last fifteen years have at the moment no 
better resource than the Kleist bibliographies published each year as part of 
the Year's Work in Modern Language Studies and of the Annual Bibliography in the 
PMLA. Other bibliographical resources are the periodical Germanistik and the 
biannual Bibliographic der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft, ed. H. W. Eppels-
heimer and C. Kottelwesch (Frankfurt, 1957 ff.). 
There are many editions of Kleist's works, but only two of them are used 
by scholars on a regular basis: Heinrich van Kleist: Siimtliche Werke und Briefe, 
auf Grund der Erstdrucke und Handschriften herausgegeben von Helmut 
Sembdner, 2 vols. (Munich, 2nd ed., 1961; 3rd ed., 1964; 4th ed., 1965); and 
H. v. Kleists Werke, im Verein mit Georg Minde-Pouet und Reinhold Steig 
herausgegeben von Erich Schmidt, 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1904-05; 2nd ed. rev. by 
Georg Minde-Pouet, 7 vols., 1936-38). I have used Sembdner's third edition. 
An historical-critical edition is planned by the Carl Hanser Verlag; the edi-
torial principles that it will follow are discussed by Klaus Kanzog, Prolegomena 
zu einer historisch-kritischen Ausgabe der Werke Heinrich van Kleists: Theorie und 
Praxis einer modcrnen Klassiker-Edition (Munich, 1970). See also Hans-Joachim 
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